Made in accordance with Article 4(1) of the Statute of the European Ombudsman^[1]

Background to the complaint

1. In 2015, as the number of asylum claims in the EU reached unprecedented levels, the European Commission presented its ‘European Agenda on Migration’.[2] One of the measures introduced by the Agenda was the ‘hotspot approach’, whereby EU agencies and Member States work together to manage migration at the external borders of the EU.

2. In Greece, the hotspot approach resulted in the development of several migration management facilities in the Eastern Aegean Islands. These facilities, called Multi-Purpose Reception and Identification Centres (MPRICs or RICs) or Closed Controlled Access Centres (CCAC),[3] host those who arrive by sea in the region while they go through identification, registration, and asylum or return procedures.

3. Under the hotspot approach, the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) is present in these facilities, based on operational plans concluded with Greece. In that context, the EUAA deploys caseworkers, whose tasks include supporting Greek authorities (the Greek Asylum Service, GAS) in processing asylum applications.[4] EUAA caseworkers  conduct interviews with asylum applicants (‘asylum interviews’), and may also draft opinions on asylum applications following interviews where this is sought by the GAS.[5] The interview transcripts and opinions are then used by the Greek authorities to take individual decisions on asylum applications.

4. The complainants are two non-governmental organisations which are providing legal support to asylum seekers in the MPRIC of the island of Samos.

5. On 24 and 28 November 2022, one of the complainants contacted the EUAA to express concerns about how EUAA caseworkers were conducting interviews with asylum seekers considered as ‘vulnerable applicants’, since they were victims of human trafficking. They alleged that EUAA caseworkers often failed to examine properly the traumatic experiences of these applicants, which had a negative impact both on the assessment of their asylum claims (as key information was missing from the file), as well as on their access to additional support (such as special guarantees during the asylum procedure, adapted reception conditions, etc.). They provided evidence of the alleged shortcomings, asked the EUAA to re-examine several individual cases and to communicate any mistakes committed by EUAA caseworkers during interviews to the Greek authorities, so that the latter could take this information into account before deciding on the asylum claims concerned.  

6. On 13 June 2023, one of the complainants wrote again to the EUAA, to raise similar concerns in relation to other named vulnerable applicants, namely victims of torture and inhuman treatment. The complainant also pointed out that, during the interviews, some asylum seekers had reported pushbacks[6] by the Greek authorities but that, to the complainants’ knowledge, the EUAA did not follow-up on such reports.

7. The EUAA did not reply to either of the complainants’ emails.

8. On 30 January 2024, dissatisfied with the EUAA’s lack of reply and inaction on the matter, the complainants turned to the Ombudsman.

The inquiry

9. The Ombudsman opened an inquiry into how the EUAA addresses allegations of fundamental rights violations in its activities in Greece.

10. The Ombudsman first requested the EUAA to reply to the complainants’ emails. The Ombudsman then received the complainants’ comments on the EUAA’s reply to these emails.

11. The Ombudsman inquiry team subsequently inspected EUAA documents related to the complaint, the situation in the facilities of Samos, and on how the EUAA deals with reports of alleged fundamental rights violations in general.[7]

12. Following that inspection, the Ombudsman requested that the EUAA reply to several questions, and received the comments of the complainants on the EUAA’s reply to these questions.

Asylum interviews and their follow-up

Arguments presented to the Ombudsman

As regards the conduct of asylum interviews

13. In their complaint to the Ombudsman, the complainants alleged that EUAA caseworkers would regularly fail, during asylum interviews, to create an environment conducive to the disclosure of asylum seekers’ traumatic experiences. Caseworkers would also fail to take into account indicators of vulnerability when those emerged during interviews, and to take adequate follow-up action (mostly by referring the vulnerability detected to the GAS so that asylum seekers can be granted additional rights and safeguards, in accordance with EU law). [8] These failures might put at risk the prohibition of refoulement under international law as well as the fundamental right to asylum.[9]

14. In their comments on the EUAA’s replies (the later are detailed in paragraph 16 to 21), the complainants acknowledged that the EUAA cannot substitute itself for national authorities in taking decisions on asylum claims. However, they emphasised that the Agency must still ensure that its caseworkers comply with EU law when carrying out their duties. That means that when vulnerabilities are identified by EUAA caseworkers during an interview, these should be recorded and the GAS should be informed, so that it can implement the required protective measures. In the complainants’ view, the failure of the Greek authorities to identify vulnerabilities before interviews cannot absolve the EUAA caseworkers from considering vulnerability indicators during interviews. On the contrary, it renders the role of the EUAA caseworkers even more important in contributing to ensure the full and effective protection of vulnerable asylum seekers.

15. The complainants further added that the steps taken by the EUAA to address these issues during the inquiry remained insufficient. Specifically, as regards the identification of vulnerability indicators, the complainants took the view that the EUAA’s newly introduced procedures did not suffice to ensure that urgent vulnerabilities (for instance medical ones) are promptly acted upon. As regards training, they emphasised that the fact that training is offered by the Agency does not mean that it is attended. They called for a structured approach to training needs, based on a mandatory and regularly updated training programme.

16. The EUAA emphasised its commitment to upholding fundamental rights in all its activities,[10] and underlined the structural efforts it had made to further ensure the protection of these rights in recent years, namely the development of the escalation mechanism[11] and the complaints mechanism[12] to deal with fundamental rights violations, the appointment of a Fundamental Rights Officer in charge of the complaints mechanism, the reconstitution of the Consultative Forum, and the adoption of the EUAA fundamental rights strategy.

17. The EUAA acknowledged that shortcomings during asylum interviews are bound to emerge from time to time, due to the non-automated and complex nature of these procedures. However, the Agency underlined that it had put in place a framework to identify and address such shortcomings. Specifically, the EUAA and Greece have a general pre-agreement on tasks, working arrangements, standard operating procedures (SOPs), as well as training measures (including coaching and shadowing). While caseworkers work daily with the GAS, the EUAA ensures their supervision through the presence of Team Leaders and Field Support Officers. Team Leaders help caseworkers preparing for interviews and may also conduct a review of the material produced by them before it is transmitted to the GAS. They can also report on any type of assistance needed by caseworkers (such as training) to the EUAA. Field Support Officers are responsible for coordinating and monitoring EUAA support at field level by ensuring that the caseworkers work in accordance with the operational plan, their allocated tasks, working arrangements, SOPs, and the EUAA Code of Conduct.

18. As regards the specific claims of the complainants in relation to the detection and handling of vulnerable cases, the EUAA explained that the responsibilities of its caseworkers are limited.

19. Indeed, the EUAA caseworkers in the cases referred to by the complainants were deployed to support the GAS, not other national actors who are in charge of conducting vulnerability assessments. Thus, the focus of these caseworkers during interviews is to ‘implement necessary procedural guarantees’ necessary for the asylum seekers to properly substantiate their asylum claims. They are not meant to conduct a vulnerability assessment – which should have been done before the interview takes place. If vulnerabilities emerge during the interview, EUAA caseworkers may implement some specific actions (for instance breaks) and ask the GAS to reschedule or extend interviews, but they cannot substitute themselves for Member State authorities. Although caseworkers cannot initiate referrals for vulnerability, they nonetheless communicate the vulnerability indicators to the GAS for its own consideration and follow-up. This used to be done verbally, via email, or in some cases via a written note.

20. The EUAA further emphasised that caseworkers follow training, on-the-job coaching, workshops, and shadowing to ensure the quality of their work.

21. Finally, the EUAA explained that, over the course of the inquiry, it introduced several measures to improve the handling of vulnerabilities during and after interviews. As from 2025, the EUAA has started implementing its own training and coaching plan for its caseworkers in Greece, directly selecting training participants. As a result, all caseworkers from the Samos MPRIC completed vulnerability training by the end of 2025. Since the end of 2024, it has also become compulsory for caseworkers to complete a written ‘note for the file’ for all interviews. This note – which flags all vulnerabilities identified – is submitted to the GAS after the interview, for follow-up action.

As regards the EUAA’s follow-up to asylum interviews

22. The complainants argued that the EUAA lacked a proper mechanism to identify and rectify mistakes made by caseworkers. At the time of their complaint, the EUAA had still not set up its complaints mechanism. They were unable to obtain any information about alternative means to submit complaints, or about how the EUAA would process them. They considered this absence of means of remedy to be incompatible with the right of every applicant to a fair and effective assessment of their asylum claim.

23. The EUAA emphasised that quality assurance mechanisms are in place to ensure that mistakes are identified and corrected. Specifically, several measures help ensure interview quality prior to the transmission of the file to the GAS. Team Leaders review all opinions drafted by EUAA caseworkers, as well as a sample of interviews. Follow-up measures may be implemented if deficiencies are identified, for example by conducting a complementary interview if necessary. However, a review of every interview is not possible for workload reasons, so cases are prioritised based on their complexity and caseworkers’ expertise (‘risk-based approach’). Considering the strict deadlines set by the national legislation to deal with asylum interviews, there is no possibility for any additional layers of review.

24.  After the transmission of the file to the GAS, another tool used to detect mistakes are the Quality Feedback Reports, a review of a sample of closed cases, conducted jointly by the EUAA and the GAS. Quality Feedback Reports are used to provide guidance to all caseworkers. In addition, caseworkers whose case has been analysed also receive individualised feedback and are given an opportunity to discuss it with its two assessors. The EUAA explained that ‘since QFRs are conducted jointly between the EUAA and GAS, GAS is immediately aware of the outcome of the exercise and can therefore take any corrective action it deems necessary in any specific case’[13].This exercise ‘does not aim to ‘rectify’ individual cases’, and therefore, ‘no alteration on the outcome [of an individual case] can be made (meaning at first instance)’.[14] This is both because of the anonymisation of the files, which entails that the EUAA does not know which caseworker worked on which case, and because QFRs are conducted on closed cases - for which the GAS is no longer the competent authority.

25. The EUAA recalled that the actions of EUAA caseworkers do not constitute a separate instance or procedural step but are merely carried out to facilitate that of national authorities. Those authorities remain exclusively responsible for asylum decisions. 

26. Finally, the EUAA stated that its complaints mechanism was established in 2024.

27. In their comments on EUAA’s replies, the complainants emphasised that the ‘sample’ approach applied by the EUAA left numerous cases unchecked with potentially extremely severe consequences for individual applicants. They further underlined contradictions as regards QFRs, with the EUAA explaining, on the one hand, that the caseworker is anonymised and yet, on the other hand, that caseworkers are provided with individualised feedback.

The Ombudsman's assessment leading to a recommendation

28. The EUAA is under the obligation to guarantee, in the performance of its tasks, the protection of fundamental rights in accordance with the requirements laid down by EU and national law on asylum.[15] This obligation continues to apply even when the EUAA’s actions consist solely of tasks conducted in a support role and with no decision-making power.[16] Moreover, in compliance with the principles of good administration, the EUAA should act with due diligence in all its activities.

29. Consequently, the EUAA should take appropriate steps to ensure that members of its deployed teams comply with their obligations when they deal with vulnerable asylum seekers during asylum interviews. [17] In line with the EUAA Regulation[18] and the EUAA Code of Conduct applicable at the time of the complaint,[19] this means that caseworkers deployed in EUAA asylum support teams should, at the very least, be able to effectively take into account and take action on indicators of vulnerabilities during interviews, and conduct those interviews in a way that asylum seekers traumatised by past experiences are able to give a proper testimony in support of their asylum claims. Otherwise, their support to national authorities cannot be adequate, and national decisions on asylum claims may be vitiated – which could ultimately have serious consequences on human lives.[20] 

30. While national authorities should identify special needs that may result from vulnerabilities within a reasonable time after the application for international protection is made (that is, normally, before the interview takes place),[21] the EUAA admitted that this is not always the case[22].

31. The failure of national authorities to meet their obligations in relation to the identification of vulnerabilities at an earlier stage of the procedure cannot absolve EUAA caseworkers from their own duty to deal with those cases adequately during interviews. On the contrary, as recalled by the Court in a recent case concerning Frontex, the principle of sincere cooperation should encourage EU Agencies to support national authorities so that these authorities carry out their tasks in a manner that fully respects EU asylum law and fundamental rights.[23] Supporting the relevant national authorities (in this case, the Greek authorities) in  dealing with vulnerability at each stage of the procedure in which the EUAA is involved – thus looking into and reporting any case that may have been overlooked – is an integral part of such support.

32. To fulfil the above obligations, the EUAA must ensure that (1) EUAA caseworkers are properly trained to deal with vulnerable asylum seekers, (2) there is a procedure for flagging to the national authorities vulnerability indicators detected during an interview, and (3) there is a procedure for reporting mistakes made by EUAA caseworkers during interviews and have them rectified, if appropriate.

Training of EUAA caseworkers

33. The Ombudsman’s inspection found that, before 2025, EUAA caseworkers were not sufficiently equipped to deal with vulnerable asylum seekers before they conducted the interviews reported by the complainants. As a result, the Agency was not in a position to guarantee to these asylum seekers that their case would be handled fairly and impartially.

34. Despite the urgency of the matter and having received clear and repeated warnings from the complainants, as well as regular input from the Team Leaders on training needs, the EUAA took more than a year following its own 2023 Quality Feedback Report and shadowing exercise to implement generalist training on vulnerability, as well as specific training on trafficking and on interviewing vulnerable applicants. This is in contradiction with the EUAA Regulation, which provides that it is the Agency’s responsibility to verify and ensure that participants in asylum support teams have received the training relevant to their duties and functions “in advance of or upon deployment”.[24] This constituted maladministration.

35. The Ombudsman notes that, in 2025, the EUAA started implementing its own training and coaching plan for the caseworkers concerned in the Greek operation, thereby ensuring that it retains control over the training of caseworkers operating in asylum support teams. This is an important step. However, it is not clear to the Ombudsman whether the introduction of this plan will suffice to remedy the instance of maladministration outlined above, as its effectiveness will depend on the plan’s content and implementation. In addition, as the EUAA is bound by the same obligations under its Regulation in all the locations where it operates, lessons should be drawn from the experience in the island of Samos in order to pre-empt any similar issues in other locations.  

36. The Ombudsman therefore recommends that the EUAA ensure that all caseworkers who participate in asylum support teams - given the high probability that they will interview vulnerable applicants - should receive mandatory, specialised and regular training on vulnerability and victims of human trafficking. This training should be overseen by the EUAA, and its effectiveness should be regularly assessed. Such requirements should be included in all future operational plans, across all locations where the EUAA provides operational support involving direct contact with asylum seekers.

Flagging of vulnerability indicators detected during interviews to the Greek authorities

37. As regards the detection and flagging of vulnerability indicators during interviews, caseworkers deployed in asylum support teams are bound, under the EUAA Code of Conduct, to promote that asylum seekers receive adequate assistance and to give special consideration to applicants who may have special needs.^[25]

38. In light of this obligation, the Ombudsman notes with concern that, based on the EUAA’s reply, until well into 2024, when caseworkers identified new vulnerability indicators, this was communicated to the GAS in a formal manner (through a ‘note for the file’) only in some scenarios, while in other instances this information was passed on ‘via email’, or even ‘verbally’. This practice does not seem compatible with the obligations under the EUAA Code of Conduct, nor with the EUAA Regulation, which foresees that operational plans should detail, as part of the conditions for and organisation of the deployment of asylum support teams, ‘measures for referring (...) victims of trafficking in human beings (...) and any other persons in a vulnerable situation to the competent national authorities for appropriate assistance’.[26] This conditionality is recalled in the Fundamental Rights Strategy of the EUAA.[27] Yet, the operational plans applicable at the time of the complaints did not contain any such measures, and the current plan appears vague on the matter until today.[28]

39. Considering the impact that being identified as ‘vulnerable’ may have on access to rights, as well as the applicable legal framework, the reporting practice in the island of Samos at the time of the complaint constituted maladministration. 

40. The Ombudsman appreciates that, during her inquiry, the EUAA took steps to address the issue of flagging vulnerability indicators emerging during interviews. In particular, EUAA caseworkers are now required to prepare, for all interviews (as opposed to selected ones in the past), a ‘note for the file’ shared with the GAS. In this ‘note to the file’, any vulnerability indicator detected in the interview is to be flagged.

41. That said, the Ombudsman wishes to draw the EUAA’s attention to the fact this step can only be effective if caseworkers are clearly instructed to investigate, even in a preliminary manner, any indicator of vulnerability not already on file that emerges during the interview. In addition, and to ensure that the EUAA fully complies with its fundamental rights obligations, the Agency should consider the possibility of asking the GAS to provide feedback on how it handled the indicators identified in the note, and of being able to react to that feedback. This is particularly the case when it comes to vulnerabilities that require medical health care, which may require swift action and follow-up outside of the asylum process.

42. The Ombudsman therefore recommends that the EUAA operational plans clearly define the measures for referring victims of trafficking in human beings and any other persons in a vulnerable situation to the competent national authorities for appropriate assistance. Additionally, as regards the ‘note for the file’, the EUAA should seek confirmation from national authorities on the actions taken in response to identified vulnerability indicators, especially regarding medical vulnerabilities. If the EUAA is not satisfied with the follow up given by national authorities, it should report the matter to the Management Board. 

Procedure to handle mistakes committed by EUAA caseworkers during interviews

43. As regards the EUAA’s follow-up to possible mistakes committed by caseworkers, the fact that there is a national appeal procedure for asylum decisions does not exempt the EUAA from providing a proper follow-up to such mistakes during interviews, which might have an impact on such decisions.

44. Based on her inspection of the documents, the Ombudsman is not aware of any follow-up taken by the EUAA to rectify the handling of an individual case, in relation to the complainants’ reports of potential mistakes made by caseworkers during a number of asylum interviews. This is a matter of concern.

45. Indeed, it appears from the inquiry that the EUAA does not ensure a systemic review of all interviews transcripts before they are transmitted to the Greek authorities, but rather prioritises cases based on their complexity and the caseworkers’ expertise. This is due to workload reasons, in combination with the strict deadlines set by the national legislation. The Ombudsman acknowledges the challenges the EUAA is facing in this regard.

46. In this situation, it appears even more important that there is a proper procedure for receiving and handling reports of mistakes made during an interview. However, as of today, it remains unclear how applicants or third-parties could submit such reports to the EUAA, and how those would then be handled by the EUAA. Indeed, while it is welcome that the EUAA’s complaints mechanism has now been established, it does not appear designed to accommodate complaints about the interview content. The complaints mechanism deals exclusively with ‘concrete fundamental rights violations’ and, in addition, cannot be used to challenge an asylum decision taken by national authorities. It is unclear if a complaint about an interview (which is the preparatory stage before the asylum decision) would be considered ‘concrete’ enough in the absence of a decision, whereas a complaint made after the decision is taken would likely be understood as challenging the decision itself and thus be considered inadmissible.

47. Besides the question of its scope, the applicable timelines (30 working days to assess the admissibility of a complaint, six months to deal with it, and, at first sight, no suspensive effect) and the nature of possible follow-up measures (disciplinary sanctions, referral to the competent authorities for civil or penal proceedings, and damages)[29] are not suited either to review and follow-up on reports of mistakes made  during interviews with asylum seekers (for instance, by re-scheduling such interviews or suspending the decision-making on the file).

48. In the Ombudsman’s view, other channels are needed, which would allow for a swifter and less administratively burdensome processing of reports such as those initially submitted to the EUAA by the complainants. This should be both in the interest of the EUAA and the asylum seeker. One possibility could be, for instance, to include the case at issue in the sample of cases for pre-transmission review.

49. Finally, the Ombudsman is concerned that, even when mistakes are identified by the EUAA and the GAS themselves as part of a Quality Feedback Report, no remedial action is taken on individual cases. Although the EUAA explains that this is because the review is meant to be conducted on ‘closed cases’, the fact that a case has been closed at GAS level does not mean that communicating that mistake becomes redundant. The applicant may still be involved (or will be involved) in other procedures where this information could be relevant.

50. It follows from the above that, unless an applicant’s interview has been selected as part of a sample for review prior to the transmission to the Greek authorities, there is no procedure to effectively handle reports of a mistake made during an interview, including by reviewing the relevant documentation. Even when a person’s interview is included in the sample of QFRs and mistakes are detected, no corrective action is implemented in individual cases.

51. The Ombudsman is therefore concerned that the current review system contains  oversight gaps that may result in unidentified or unaddressed mistakes during interviews, which could prevent the correction of such mistakes, or, if the file has already been transmitted to the GAS, their timely communication to the next actor, so that they can take appropriate remedial measures (such as re-conducting the interview or suspending a planned return). This is so despite the Ombudsman’s finding of maladministration in a similar case eight years ago.[30]

52. Overall, the Ombudsman finds that the EUAA’s failure to provide asylum seekers with an appropriate procedure to report mistakes made during interviews and to have such reports reviewed by the EUAA constitutes maladministration.

53. To address this situation, the Ombudsman recommends that the EUAA establish an internal procedure, including a central contact point, to enable third parties or applicants to report mistakes in the conduct of an asylum interview. Further, when receiving allegations that such a mistake was made, the EUAA should assess the matter in a timely manner. If the case is still with the EUAA asylum support team, measures to correct the mistake should be taken immediately. In cases where the EUAA becomes aware of a mistake after the material proposed by its asylum support team has been transmitted to the GAS (for instance as part of a QFRs), the EUAA should ensure this information is swiftly transmitted to the relevant national authorities and to the applicant, so that it can be duly taken into account in upcoming procedures, such as appeals or subsequent applications.

54. The Ombudsman will inform her counterparts in the European Network of Ombudsmen of her different recommendations set out in this section, for the latter to check, if they decide to do so, how compliance with fundamental rights is ensured in the cooperation between EUAA caseworkers and national asylum officials.

Follow-up to alleged fundamental rights violations by a host Member State

Arguments presented to the Ombudsman

55. The complainants argued that EUAA caseworkers regularly failed to investigate possible fundamental rights violations by the Greek authorities – especially pushbacks and border violence – which were reported by asylum seekers during asylum interviews. In the complainants’ view, the EUAA, by not ensuring that its caseworkers investigate and report such violations, risks making itself complicit of this situation by omission, as its silence would allow such violations to persist unsanctioned in the very environment where the Agency operates.

56. The complainants further considered that not ensuring proper investigation and reporting of these experiences went against several of the EUAA’s obligations. This included in particular the obligation for EUAA caseworkers to report any violation committed by the host Member State or EU bodies in the context of operational activities,[31]  the duty to exchange information with national authorities in a timely and accurate manner,[32] and the obligation to suspend or terminate deployments where there are serious or persistent violations of fundamental rights by the host Member State.[33]

57. As regards the latter, the complainants further criticised the Agency’s delay in establishing an internal mechanism to deal with external reports on fundamental rights violations by the Member States. They called for the development of clear and transparent procedures to record violations, ensuring that the EUAA Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO) and the European Commission would be informed accordingly. 

58. The EUAA explained that it can only look into such reports of alleged fundamental rights violations by the host Member State in the context of the limited instances set out in Article 18(6)(c) of its Regulation, which foresees the suspension or termination of EUAA asylum support teams in cases of ‘violations of fundamental rights or international protection obligations by the host Member State that are of a serious nature or are likely to persist’. However, the Agency takes reports of non-compliance with fundamental rights seriously and channels them as relevant - for instance to the FRO, the Management Board, or national authorities, when it deems that those reports are serious enough.

59. As regards internal reporting, since 2024, the EUAA is working on an ‘escalation mechanism’, which will allow for a structured and systemic identification, reporting, and escalation of violations that could qualify as such under Article 18(6)(c).  

60. The EUAA further explained that it does not engage in border management activities. As pushback incidents are not material to the asylum claim, they do not necessarily require investigation during the asylum interview. Instead, applicants will be informed of the possibility to submit a complaint to the FRO of the Greek Ministry of Migration and Asylum; and caseworkers will send an incident report to the EUAA management, who in turn informs the Greek authorities. The EUAA emphasised that it had not identified evidence of its caseworkers preventing applicants from disclosing such experiences.

The Ombudsman's assessment

61. It is undeniable that pushbacks can result in serious fundamental rights violations.[34] The EUAA is not responsible for potential fundamental rights violations committed by Greece or any other Member State in which they are not involved. However, the Agency cannot ignore signals that such violations may be occurring. In the context of a previous inquiry against Frontex, the Ombudsman already warned about the serious legal and reputational implications that continued cooperation with a Member State responsible for fundamental rights violations may have.[35] The Ombudsman has also recalled (paragraph 31) recent case law in which the Court has clearly stated that the duty of sincere cooperation does not mean blind trust into a Member State’s actions, but on the contrary entails supporting it to comply with its EU law and fundamental rights obligations.[36]

62. If conducted properly, individual interviews with asylum seekers provide an opportunity to identify fundamental rights violations that may be reported by them, given the direct contact with the potential victims of such violations or their representatives.

63. The Ombudsman considers that, as a matter of principle, asylum seekers must be given every opportunity to report violations of their rights, including by the Member State. Such information should be systematically recorded and transmitted to the relevant actors within the EUAA (including the FRO, given his role under Article 18(6) of the EUAA Regulation), and also to the European Commission. This is to enable the latter to fulfil its role as guardian of the Treaties and protector of the EU budget, incorporating such information into its oversight functions. This obligation derives from the EUAA’s mandate and reflects a positive duty to ensure accountability for fundamental rights violations.[37]

64. Based on the inspection of the EUAA’s documents, and in view of the recent procedural changes introduced by the EUAA, the Ombudsman cannot yet draw final conclusions as regards the effectiveness of the (future) escalation mechanism. She notes, however, that it does not seem to require reporting to the Commission. For that reason, the Ombudsman invites the EUAA, when replying to her recommendation, to provide her with an update on the state of play of the escalation mechanism and the next steps for its adoption and implementation. To support the EUAA in its current process of developing a structured and systematic approach to identifying, reporting, and escalating violations of fundamental rights, the Ombudsman will make two related suggestions for improvement below.

65. The Ombudsman further notes that, in the past,[38] the EUAA had expressed willingness to make public its rules for terminating or suspending deployments. She reaffirms that such transparency would strengthen trust in both the existing and future reporting frameworks and encourages the EUAA to deliver on its commitment.

Recommendations

Based on the inquiry into this complaint, the Ombudsman makes the following four recommendations to the European Union Agency for Asylum:

1. The EUAA should ensure that all caseworkers who participate in asylum support teams - given the high probability that they will interview vulnerable applicants - receive mandatory, specialised and regular training on vulnerability and victims of human trafficking. This training should be overseen by the EUAA, and its effectiveness should be regularly assessed. Such requirements should be included in all future operational plans, across all locations where the EUAA provides operational support involving direct contact with asylum seekers.
2. The EUAA operational plans should clearly define the measures for referring victims of trafficking in human beings and any other persons in a vulnerable situation to the competent national authorities for appropriate assistance.
3. As regards the ‘note for the file’, the EUAA should seek confirmation from national authorities on the actions taken in response to identified vulnerability indicators, especially regarding medical vulnerabilities. If the EUAA is not satisfied with the follow up given by national authorities, it should report the matter to the Management Board.
4. The EUAA should establish an internal procedure, including a central contact point, to enable third parties or applicants to report mistakes in the conduct of an asylum interview. Further, when receiving allegations that such a mistake was made, the EUAA should assess the matter in a timely manner. If the case is still with the EUAA asylum support team, measures to correct the mistake should be taken immediately. In cases where the EUAA becomes aware of a mistake after the material proposed by its asylum support team has been transmitted to the GAS (for instance as part of a QFRs), the EUAA should ensure this information is swiftly transmitted to the relevant national authorities and to the applicant, so that it can be duly taken into account in upcoming procedures, such as appeals or subsequent applications.

The European Union Agency for Asylum and the complainants will be informed of these recommendations. In accordance with Article 4(2) of the Statute of the European Ombudsman, the European Union Agency for Asylum shall send a detailed opinion by 8 October 2026.

Suggestions for improvement

In addition, the Ombudsman makes the following two suggestions for improvement:

1.  The EUAA should launch a review of its current reporting system for alleged fundamental rights violations by the host Member State, with a view of assessing its effectiveness and shortcomings. The outcome should serve both to immediately improve the system if relevant, and to inform the development and implementation of the escalation mechanism. Once the escalation mechanism is set up, clear instructions should be sent to asylum support teams as regards their due diligence obligations in terms of reporting, and to line managers as regards the systematic channelling of such reports into the escalation mechanism.
2. Independently of Article 18(6)(c) obligations, the EUAA should ensure that, when it becomes aware of information that a Member State in which it operates may be infringing EU law or violating the Charter, this is reported to the Commission. This should also apply to reports of pushbacks.

Teresa Anjinho
European Ombudsman

Strasbourg, 02/07/2026

 

 

[1] Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2021.253.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2021%3A253%3ATOC

[2] A European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240 final, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52015DC0240

[3] For an overview of existing facilities, see: https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/asylum-procedure/access-procedure-and-registration/reception-and-identification-procedure/

[4] Measure EL-AS 1: Asylum Support, EUAA Operating Plan to Greece 2022-2024 (as applicable at the time of the complaint), available at: https://www.euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EL_OP_amendment_3_FINAL.pdf

[5] See EUAA-Greece Operational Plan 2022-2024, amendments 1 and 2, applicable at the time of the exchanges between the complainant and the EUAA: https://www.euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EL_OP_amendment_rev29032022_Final.pdf & https://www.euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EL_OP_amendment_2_FINAL.pdf

[6] Pushbacks are defined by the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants as “various measures taken by States which result in migrants, including asylum seekers, being summarily forced back to the country from where they attempted to cross or have crossed an international border without access to international protection or asylum procedures or denied of any individual assessment on their protection needs which may lead to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement.” See: https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-migrants/report-means-address-human-rights-impact-pushbacks-migrants-land-and-sea

[7] The documents inspected were considered confidential by the EUAA.

[8] The complainants alleged a violation, in particular, of Articles 4, 15, 16 and 24 of Directive 2013/32/EU as regards the asylum procedure (Asylum Procedures Directive, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/32/oj/eng), Articles 21, 22, 25 of Directive 2013/33/EU (Reception Conditions Directive, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0033) as regards reception conditions, and Article 4 of Directive 2011/95/EU (Qualification Directive, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/95/oj/eng).  

[9] Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (available at: https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/1951-refugee-convention-1967-protocol.pdf), as well as Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng). In addition, the complainants further alleged a breach of Articles 19, 21, and 41 of the Charter.

[10] In accordance with Regulation 2021/2303 on the European Union Agency for Asylum, in particular Article 57, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2303/oj/eng

[11] An escalation mechanism to report violations committed by the host Member State, to feed into the procedure foreseen under Article 18(6) of Regulation 2021/2303. 

[12] A complaint mechanism for violations of fundamental rights committed by participants in EUAA operational activities is foreseen by Article 51 of Regulation 2021/2303. 

[13] First reply of the EUAA, https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/doc/correspondence/228628, p.8

[14] Second reply of the EUAA, https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/doc/correspondence/228629, p.21

[15] Articles 57 and 58 of Regulation 2021/2303, quoted above, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2303/oj/eng

[16] By analogy, Case C-679/23 P, judgment of the Court of 18 December 2025, WS and Others v Frontex (Joint Return Operation), paragraphs 90-134, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62023CJ0679.

[17] In particular Articles 14, 15, 16 of Directive 2013/32/EU (Applicants must be offered interviewing conditions that allow them to present their application grounds in full and comprehensively, that guarantees confidentiality and that allows them to explain what may be missing or inconsistent), Article 4 of Directive 2013/32/EU, Article 25 of Directive 2013/33/EU (Caseworkers should receive adequate training including on vulnerability, including on the needs of victims of torture for instance) and Article 24 of Directive 2013/32/EU and Articles 21, 22, and 25 of Directive 2013/33/EU (Vulnerable groups should benefit from specific guarantees in order to enable them to exercise their rights and obligations on an equal footing with other applicants. The latter Directive sets out a number of such safeguards, including ceasing to apply accelerated procedures. Such support should also be provided if the need emerges during the asylum procedure.). To note, in addition, that victims of human trafficking benefit from additional safeguards, such as the prohibition to enforce expulsion orders against them during the reflection period (Article 6 of Council Directive 2004/81/EC).

[18] Articles 57 and 58 of the EUAA Regulation (2021/2303), as well as Recitals 41 and 42, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2303/oj/eng. For full analysis, see the assessment below. 

[19] In particular Article 6(b) and (c) of the former European Asylum Support Office’s (EASO) – now EUAA - Code of Conduct, now Section 6 of the EUAA Code of Conduct. For full analysis, see the assessment in paragraphs 37 and 38 in this recommendation. EASO Code of Conduct available at: https://www.euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EASO%20Code%20of%20Conduct%20-%20Oct16%20.pdf ; EUAA Code of Conduct available at: https://www.euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-06/code_of_conduct_20220617.pdf

[20] In her decision on the complaint 1139/2018/MDC, the Ombudsman found that the errors made by the then-EASO experts may have contributed to the deportation of an asylum seeker, who was subsequently feared dead. Case available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/119726

[21] Article 24 of Directive 2013/32/EU, quoted above, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/32/oj/eng

[22] See paragraphs 18-19 of this recommendation, and p.6-8 of the EUAA’s second reply.

[23] By analogy, Case C-679/23 P, quoted above, paragraphs 107-108, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62023CJ0679.

[24] Article 8(6) of Regulation 2021/2303 (EUAA Regulation), available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2303/oj/eng

[25] Article 6(b) and (c) of the EASO Code of Conduct, now Section 5 of the EUAA Code of Conduct. EASO Code of Conduct available at: https://www.euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EASO%20Code%20of%20Conduct%20-%20Oct16%20.pdf; EUAA Code of Conduct available at: https://www.euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-06/code_of_conduct_20220617.pdf

[26] Article 18(2)(m) of Regulation 2021/2303 (EUAA Regulation), available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2303/oj/eng

[27] See Specific Objective 1.2 of the Fundamental Rights Strategy 2024-2028 (EUAA/MB/2024/130): Processes are in place for organising operational and technical assistance in a manner that fully respects fundamental rights and specifically criterion 1.2.2: The operational plans include a detailed and clear description of the obligations of the Agency regarding fundamental rights, which states ‘In line with Article 18(2)(m) of the EUAA Regulation, operational plans will set out measures for members of the asylum support teams to refer persons in need of international protection, victims of trafficking in human beings, children and any other persons in a vulnerable situation to the competent national authorities for appropriate assistance. Detailed measures will be either explicitly formulated as an operational pre-condition or targeted by a specific prioritised implementing measure. (...).’. The Fundamental Rights Strategy is available at: https://www.euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-10/mbd_166_2024_fr_strategy_final.pdf

[28] Specifically, it states that rules and conditions for deployment, ‘including where available detailed information about [referral] measures’ (emphasis added) will be available on an internal platform.

[29] See Articles 6, 9, 10, and 11 of the EUAA Management Board decision No 159 on the setting up of the complaints mechanism, available at: https://www.euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-10/159_mb_decision_complaints_mechanism.pdf 

[30] See case 1139/2018/MDC, quoted above, available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/119726

[31] Section 20 (Obligation to report) of the EUAA Code of conduct applicable to all experts participating in asylum support team (33/2025); and prior to 2025, Article 19 (Reporting) of the EASO Code of conduct for persons participating in EASO operational support activities. The EASO Code is available at: https://www.euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EASO%20Code%20of%20Conduct%20-%20Oct16%20.pdf ; the EUAA Code at https://www.euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-06/code_of_conduct_20220617.pdf  

[32] Article 4 of Regulation 2021/2303, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2303/oj/eng

[33] Article 18(6)(c) of Regulation 2021/2303, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2303/oj/eng

[34] In two judgements from 2025, the European Court of Human Rights found strong indications of a systematic practice of pushbacks by the Greek authorities, in the region of the Evros river  (A.R.E v Greece, Application no. 15783/21, judgement of 7 January 2025, available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-240242%22]}, and as well as from the Aegean islands, where the complainants operate (G.R.J. v Greece, Application no. 15067/21, judgement of 7 January 2025, available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-243431%22]}).

[35] See the European Ombudsman’s Decision on how the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) complies with its fundamental rights obligations with regard to search and rescue in the context of its maritime surveillance activities, in particular the Adriana shipwreck, OI/3/2023/MHZ, paragraphs 71-78, available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/182665

[36] Judgment in case C-679/23 P, quoted above, paragraphs 107-108, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62023CJ0679

[37] Under Article 1(2) of the EUAA Regulation (available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2303/oj/eng), the Agency is under a broader positive obligation - set out in its mandate  - to contribute to ensuring the efficient and uniform application of Union law on asylum in Member States in a manner that fully respects fundamental rights.

[38] Closing note on the European Ombudsman’s Strategic Initiative concerning how the EU Agency for Asylum complies with its fundamental rights obligations and ensures accountability for potential violations (SI/4/2022/MHZ), available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/doc/closing-note/en/166550