Background to the inquiries

1. The Commission plays a key role in the EU legislative process, as it has, in principle, the exclusive right to put forward legislative proposals.^[1] While exercising its broad discretion in this regard, it must comply with the Treaty-based principles of transparency and openness,[2] including by carrying out broad consultations with parties concerned.[3] The Commission gave effect to these above principles by adopting the Better Regulation rules (the ‘Guidelines’[4] and the ‘Toolbox’[5]), anchored in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making,[6] which provide for broad stakeholder consultations and impact assessments before legislative proposals and other measures are adopted.

2. The Ombudsman received three complaints raising similar issues regarding the Commission’s compliance with the Better Regulation rules and other rules included in the European Climate Law[7] and the Commission’s Rules of Procedure[8], while preparing several legislative proposals that it considered ‘urgent’:

• complaint 983/2025/MIK (‘the Omnibus case’) – concerning the ‘Omnibus I’ proposal,[9]
• complaint 2031/2024/VB (‘the migration case’) – concerning two proposals for (i) a Regulation on enhancing police cooperation in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings, and on enhancing the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation’s (Europol) support to preventing and combating such crimes and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/794[10] and (ii) a Directive laying down minimum rules to prevent and counter the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the Union, and replacing Council Directive 2002/90/EC and Council Framework Decision 2002/946 JHA,[11]
• complaint 1379/2024/MIK (‘the CAP case’) – concerning the proposal to amend legislation related to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).[12]

3. The complainants in all three cases were concerned that the Commission had breached its Better Regulation rules by putting forward the relevant legislative proposals without conducting impact assessments. The complainants were not convinced by the Commission’s position that it had been required to act in urgency and could therefore derogate from the impact assessment requirement.

4. The complainants in the Omnibus and CAP cases were also concerned that the Commission had breached the European Climate Law by failing to conduct and publish a climate consistency assessment of the legislative proposals[13].

5. The complainant in the Omnibus case was further concerned that the Commission had breached its Rules of Procedure by conducting a shortened fast-track inter-service consultation on the legislative proposal at issue.

6. The Ombudsman inquired into the issues raised by these complaints, in particular:

• how the Commission assessed whether the legislative proposals were ‘urgent’ and thus required a derogation from certain requirements in the Better Regulation rules;
• whether the Commission followed the applicable procedures to derogate from the requirements in its ‘Better Regulation’ rules and how related decisions were recorded;
• how the Commission ensured that, despite the derogation, the urgent preparation of the legislative proposals complied with the principles of a transparent, evidence-based and inclusive law-making process;
• whether the Commission conducted ‘climate consistency assessments’, in line with the European Climate Law, and how the results of such assessments were recorded (Omnibus and CAP cases); and,
• how the Commission conducted its inter-service consultation on the legislative proposal in the Omnibus case.

7. The Ombudsman requested written replies of the Commission to specific questions,[14] inspected the Commission’s documentation underpinning the preparation of the proposals at issue, and her inquiry team held meetings with the Commission’s representatives in the Omnibus and CAP cases.[15] She also invited the complainants to send comments on the Commission’s replies and the meeting reports, which they did.

The Ombudsman’s recommendation

8. In her recommendation,[16] the Ombudsman reminded the Commission of her view that EU institutions and bodies must apply the rules they have established for themselves, to ensure consistency, transparency and avoid any sense of arbitrariness in the way the EU administration works. [17]  The Ombudsman also noted that, according to EU case law, by publishing internal rules, EU institutions impose a limit on the exercise of their discretion. Therefore, they cannot depart from these rules under the general principles of the protection of legitimate expectations,[18] as well as good administration.

9. In all three cases, the Commission derogated from the requirements in the Better Regulation rules to carry out impact assessments and public consultations in relation to its proposals, referring to the ‘urgency’ of the situation. While the rules in principle allow for such derogations, they do not define what an ‘urgency’ consists of. The Commission thus considered its initiatives as ‘urgent’ on very different grounds, such as in view of evolving political priorities of the Commission’s leadership in response to current challenges (Omnibus case), shifting geopolitical trends and challenges (migration case), and growing and intense social protests against certain EU policies (CAP case).

10. The Ombudsman considered that, while the Commission must certainly retain a margin of discretion in defining the circumstances which it considers to be ‘urgent’, the broad interpretation of ‘urgency’ it had used in the three cases risked rendering the application of the requirements of the Better Regulation rules challenging for the public to understand and to predict. Following the Commission’s broad interpretation, any situation could in principle be considered ‘urgent’ if decided so by the political leadership of the Commission. In view of this, the Ombudsman found that the lack of a definition of ‘urgency’ in the Better Regulation rules undermined predictability, consistency and legal certainty.

11. The Ombudsman identified further shortcomings in how the Commission had applied the ‘Better Regulation’ rules in the examined cases. The shortcomings included a lack of proper records relating to the procedure and subsequent decisions to exempt the initiatives at issue from the requirements of the Better Regulation rules, the late publication of analytical documents that replace fully-fledged impact assessments in urgent situations, as well as the Commission’s failure to seek a broad and balanced consultation of stakeholders on the legislative proposals at issue in the CAP and Omnibus cases.

12.  The Ombudsman’s inquiry also revealed shortcomings in the Better Regulation rules as such. Specifically, the Ombudsman noted the absence of a procedure in the Better Regulation rules that would ensure that the urgent preparation of legislative proposals does not weaken the essence of a transparent, evidence-based and inclusive law-making process. This included the absence of any description of what information analytical documents should contain, and the absence of guidance on how stakeholder consultations should be performed under ‘urgency’.

13. In view of this, the Ombudsman recommended that the Commission should ensure a predictable, consistent and non-arbitrary application of the Better Regulation rules, by

• defining the notion of ‘urgency’ in the context of Better Regulation, possibly in the context of the rules’ upcoming revision;
• recording any internal decisions to exempt legislative proposals from the requirements of the Better Regulation rules, including who requested the exemption, on which grounds, and who granted it;
• clearly explaining in the explanatory memorandum accompanying its legislative proposals why a derogation was needed.

14. The Ombudsman also recommended that, where derogations are granted, the Commission should establish a procedure to ensure that the urgent preparation of legislative proposals still complies with the principles of a transparent, evidence-based and inclusive law-making process, as required by the Treaties and the case law of the EU courts. The Commission could do so in the context of the upcoming revision of the Better Regulation rules. [19]

15. The Ombudsman also suggested in that regard that:

• The Commission should ensure that the analytical document, which replaces the impact assessment in case of ‘urgency’, informs the co-legislators and the public of the evidence on which legislative proposals are based in a timely manner and as soon as the legislative proposal is adopted, thus reflecting the urgency of the matter. The Better Regulation rules should lay down minimum substantive requirements that analytical documents should fulfil in that respect.
• The Commission should clarify that stakeholder consultations, conducted when a derogation from the impact assessment requirement has been granted, still need to comply with the general principles and minimum standards applicable to all public consultations. The Better Regulation rules should provide guidance on how such stakeholder consultations are to be performed under ‘urgency’.

16. Furthermore, the Ombudsman examined how the Commission had applied Article 6(4) of European Climate Law, which requires an assessment of all the Commission’s draft measures and legislative proposals in view of the EU’s climate goals. The Ombudsman’s inquiry revealed that the Commission did not keep clear internal records of a climate consistency assessment being effectively carried out before the adoption of the legislative proposals at issue in the Omnibus and CAP cases. The Ombudsman also found that the Commission did not publish, in a clear manner, the results of any climate consistency assessment when adopting the relevant legislative proposals, as foreseen in Article 6(4) of European Climate Law.

17. In view of this, the Ombudsman suggested that the Commission should clarify that climate consistency assessments are to be carried out for all legislative proposals, including those that are not accompanied by an impact assessment, and that any such assessments should be internally recorded. The Commission should also specify in which document climate consistency assessments and the results thereof are to be published when adopting legislative proposals that are not accompanied by an impact assessment.

18. Finally, the Ombudsman examined how the Commission applied its Rules of Procedure concerning inter-service consultations in the Omnibus case. The Ombudsman noted that inter-service consultations ensure that, in formulating its policy proposals, the Commission takes a holistic and well-balanced perspective on the matter. She considered that, by shortening the inter-service consultation to less than 24 hours over a weekend, the Commission excessively limited the possibility of its departments to provide meaningful input on the legislative proposal in question.

19. The Ombudsman therefore suggested that the Commission should ensure that, when it decides that the duration of an inter-service consultation needs to be shortened, the justifications for that decision are duly recorded. Only in exceptional situations of urgency should the duration be less than the 48 hours foreseen in its fast-track procedure and adequate reasons should be given.

20. Overall, the Ombudsman found that, taken together, the various procedural shortcomings she identified in how the Commission prepared the legislative proposals at issue amounted to maladministration.

The Commission’s opinion and the complainant’s comments

The Better Regulation rules

21. In its opinion of February 2026 on the Ombudsman’s recommendation,[20] the Commission agreed to reflect on “more transparent parameters” for assessing the need to act urgently in its upcoming revision of the Better Regulation rules. It said that it will do so while ensuring that the Commission’s discretion to respond to urgent situations is not impeded. It also stressed the need to be able to take decisions quickly, and that it has a margin of discretion in defining the circumstances in which it considers that action should be taken urgently.

22. After sending its opinion to the Ombudsman, in April 2026 the Commission adopted its Communication ‘A Simpler, Clearer and Better Enforced EU Rulebook’,[21] in which it referred to the Ombudsman’s recommendation and provided further information on its implementation. As regards the parameters for assessing ‘urgency’, the Commission listed the following elements: (i) “the existence of anticipation of shocks or crises, including in the Union’s external relations”, (ii) “potential consequences in the absence of immediate action”, (iii) “legal deadlines”, and (iv) “political context creating a need for urgent action”.   

23. At the same time, the Commission reiterated in its opinion to the Ombudsman that, in the Omnibus, CAP, and migration cases, there were objective reasons to act urgently and to use the flexibility provided for in the Better Regulation rules.

24. The Commission also recognised the importance of properly recording and publicly explaining derogations from the Better Regulation rules to ensure maximum transparency. It said that the relevant departments will be required to transmit their requests for derogations to the Secretariat-General of the Commission as early as possible in the process of preparing initiatives. These requests will be accompanied by a detailed justification, including a clear explanation of the context of urgency. The Commission will also keep records of any derogations granted, and will ensure that the explanatory memoranda of the relevant proposals clearly describe the derogations and provide justifications for them.

25. The Commission added that it will strive to publish analytical documents, which replace impact assessments in urgent situations, as soon as possible and no later than three months after the adoption of its proposal, as foreseen in the current Better Regulation rules. The analytical documents will in the future cover, at least, the following elements: (i) a definition of the problem, (ii) the approach and measures identified for the initiative, (iii) an assessment of the key impacts of the initiative, (iv) a summary of stakeholders’ input, (v) the climate consistency assessment and its results. However, in its Communication of April 2026, the Commission no longer mentioned the fourth element, that is, a summary of stakeholder input.

26. In addition, to ensure maximum inclusivity despite urgency, the Commission will strive to prepare a ‘call for evidence’ from stakeholders, conduct a ‘reality check’ or other targeted consultations. In its Communication, it specified that a call for evidence will be the main instrument to maintain meaningful stakeholder engagement under the accelerated procedure, giving stakeholders a possibility to shape the Commission’s initiatives. Targeted consultations are also mentioned as an optional element, including in the context of ‘reality checks’.

27. In their comments on the Commission’s opinion, the complainants considered that the measures proposed by the Commission are insufficient to implement the Ombudsman’s recommendation.

28. They pointed out that the Commission, in its opinion on the Ombudsman’s recommendation, only committed to reflecting on the notion of ‘urgency’ but not to defining it, while the parameters provided in its Communication are overly vague. The complainants were also concerned that the Commission may include in the notion of urgency ‘political priorities’, as this would leave the Commission unfettered discretion to consider any initiatives as urgent and derogate from the Better Regulation rules in an unpredictable, inconsistent and arbitrary manner. In the complainants’ view, the Commission must ensure that urgent law-making in derogation from the Better Regulation rules remains the absolute exception. Overall, the complainants considered that urgency should be limited to well-defined situations (such as natural disasters and public health emergencies), and robust safeguards should be in place to ensure full transparency and accountability in the legislative process. They pointed out that policy objectives such as ‘simplification’ or ‘administrative efficiency’ should not qualify as grounds for urgency.

29. The complainants expressed also concerns about the Commission’s statements in its Communication concerning ‘targeted initiatives’ and the impact assessment requirement. In their view, these statements indicate that while the Commission will strive to produce more impact assessments, these impact assessments will concern a lesser number of significant impacts of the proposed initiatives, including environmental, health, social, and fundamental rights impacts.

30. In addition, the complainants were concerned about the impartiality of the Commission’s procedure for granting derogations. This is because the Commissioner responsible for implementation and simplification is also responsible for granting derogations, whereas the rules do not foresee an alternate decision-maker in case the same Commissioner is also in charge of the subject matter of the legislative proposal for which a derogation is sought.

31. The complainants welcomed the Commission’s specification of minimum elements analytical documents should contain. However, they reiterated that, in the cases examined in the context of the Ombudsman’s inquiries, the Commission failed to include adequate evidence supporting its legislative proposals.[22] Moreover, the complainants considered that analytical documents should also indicate which information is missing in the absence of a full impact assessment. They also said that the three-month deadline for presenting analytical documents after the adoption of legislative proposals is excessive, given that some urgent legislation may be adopted within months.

32. The complainants considered that the Commission did not explain how concretely it plans to ensure an adequate involvement of stakeholders in urgent cases. In their view, the Commission should commit itself to identifying civil society organisations as relevant stakeholders even in urgent cases and the Better Regulation rules should be supplemented with additional information on how stakeholders are effectively mapped for targeted consultations. In addition, the complainants argued that ‘reality checks’, which the Commission listed as an example of targeted stakeholder consultations, are limited in scope and usually do not include stakeholders other than company representatives, thereby excluding civil society, citizens, and academics.

European Climate Law

33. The Commission reiterated in its opinion on the Ombudsman’s recommendation that it had performed the required climate consistency assessments in the Omnibus and CAP cases, but that, in accordance with the applicable rules, there was no need to reproduce the analysis in the analytical documents or in another specific format. Nonetheless, the Commission had summarised the conclusions of these assessments in the analytical documents and the memoranda accompanying the legislative proposals at issue.

34. The Commission will ensure, however, that the climate consistency assessments will be reported not only in impact assessments, but also in analytical documents replacing impact assessments, and that their results will also be clearly reported in the explanatory memoranda accompanying the relevant legislative proposals.

35.  The complainants argued that the Commission’s position was not clear as to whether it will publish only the results of its climate consistency assessments or the full analysis leading to these results, and to what extent climate consistency assessments or at least their results will be published in the analytical documents.

The Commission’s Rules of Procedure on inter-service consultations

36. The Commission stated that, if the Secretariat-General exceptionally agrees to an inter-service consultation of less than 48 hours, it will provide a justification for it.

The Ombudsman's assessment after the recommendation

37. The Ombudsman welcomes the overall constructive opinion of the Commission on her recommendation. She appreciates in particular that the Commission mentioned the measures it intends to take in relation to each recommendation and suggestion for improvement.

38. At the same time, the Ombudsman is concerned that the opinion describes the measures the Commission intends to take in general terms only, often lacking in specificity and concrete commitments. Based on the information provided, it is not clear to the Ombudsman how exactly the Commission will address the shortcomings she identified and whether the Commission will thus be able to achieve her recommendation’s intended purpose, that is, to ensure a sufficiently transparent, evidence-based and inclusive law-making process in situations of urgency. The Communication has not dispelled the Ombudsman’s doubts either.

39. Specifically, as regards her recommendation to define the notion of ‘urgency’, the Ombudsman recognises the Commission’s discretion in responding to emergencies, crises, and novel challenges in the most efficient way. That said, the Commission’s opinion and the Communication do not sufficiently mitigate the risk that ‘urgent’ law-making could become the prevalent way of EU law-making.

40. The Commission said in its Communication that “political context” may be one of the parameters “creating a need for urgent action”. The Ombudsman considers that this is a too vague statement. In this regard, she remains concerned that giving effect to political priorities could be used to justify recourse to “urgent” law-making. Thus, without having seen the final list and formulation of “more transparent parameters” for assessing the need to act urgently in the Commission’s upcoming revision of the Better Regulation rules, and without having seen the practical application of these parameters, the Ombudsman is not in a position to assess whether the Commission will render the application of the requirements of the Better Regulation rules more predictable.

41. Moreover, in the Communication, the Commission differentiates between “major new legislative initiatives or revisions” and “targeted initiatives”, and it appears that the application of the Better Regulation requirements may differ in relation to these two categories.[23] “Targeted initiatives” will be understood as “those that do not significantly alter the policy objectives of existing legislation and propose changes that aim to optimise its effectiveness and efficiency”. However, as the details of the Commission’s approach to “targeted initiatives” are unclear at this point, including the implications of initiatives being considered “targeted” for the purposes of applying the Better Regulation rules, at this stage the Ombudsman is not in a position to take a final position on this newly introduced differentiation either.

42. As regards the recording and publishing of derogations from the Better Regulation rules, the Ombudsman welcomes the Commission’s commitment to improve its practices in this regard. However, she notes that these commitments seem to apply to ‘bottom-up’ requests for derogations only, that is, to requests stemming from the Directorates-General responsible for the relevant initiatives. In the cases examined by the Ombudsman, the requests for derogations were made in a ‘top-down’ manner, as they came from the Deputy Secretary-General and the political level of the Commission.[24] The Ombudsman notes that the Commission’s opinion does not present any measure specifically addressing how the Commission will record such ‘top-down’ requests for derogations. The Ombudsman trusts that the Commission will ensure that also these requests, including their justifications, are properly recorded.

43. As regards the analytical documents, the Ombudsman welcomes the fact that the Commission has now defined their minimum elements, although the list of these elements provided in the Communication does not include the summary of stakeholder input, which was specifically mentioned by the Commission in its opinion on her recommendation. In any case, as indicated by the complainants, the three-month timeline for publishing analytical documents may not be sufficient to achieve their purpose, that is, to inform the public debate before legislation is adopted, especially where the legislative procedure is completed within a few months only. The Ombudsman invites the Commission to further reflect on this matter in the upcoming revision of its Better Regulation rules.

44. The Ombudsman also notes the Commission’s commitments as regards targeted consultations made in the Commission’s opinion on the Ombudsman’s recommendation. However, in its Communication, the Commission said that the main instrument of stakeholder engagement in the accelerated procedure will be a ‘call for evidence’. The Ombudsman understands that a ‘call for evidence’ enables stakeholders to submit to the Commission information regarding its planned initiatives at the very beginning of the policy-making process, that is, when only relatively limited information about the Commission’s envisaged policy options is available. The Commission considers that ‘calls for evidence’ will enable stakeholders to “contribute to shaping the initiative”. However, the Ombudsman considers that the Commission should also give stakeholders an opportunity to comment on the Commission’s preferred policy options once these have been fully fleshed out. Therefore, the Ombudsman is not convinced whether a ‘call for evidence’ is a sufficient instrument of stakeholder engagement under the accelerated procedure.

45. In this context, the Ombudsman notes that, according to the Communication, it is not clear whether targeted consultations of specific policy options will always be conducted, as the Commission intends to engage the stakeholders through ‘implementation dialogues’ or ‘reality checks’. It is also unclear whether the latter form of stakeholder engagement consists of consulting on fully-fledged policy initiatives of the Commission, and whether it allows for a balanced representation of all stakeholders.

46. As stated in her recommendation, the Ombudsman believes that any targeted consultation the Commission conducts under its urgent law-making activities should comply with certain minimum requirements, which the Commission should specify in the Better Regulation rules. Possibly substituting targeted consultations with ‘calls for evidence’ or other forms of stakeholder engagement, which are not equivalent to full targeted consultations of policy initiatives, does not seem to go in the direction suggested by the Ombudsman.

47. Moreover, under Article 6(4) of the European Climate Law, the Commission must include a ‘climate consistency assessment’ in any impact assessment accompanying its legislative proposals, “and make the result of that assessment publicly available at the time of adoption”.[25] The provision does not specify where the climate consistency assessment should be included in the absence of an impact assessment. The Ombudsman therefore welcomes the Commission’s commitment to publish ‘climate consistency assessments’ not only in impact assessment reports but, in their absence, also in analytical documents. The Ombudsman further takes note of the Commission’s commitment to explicitly indicate the result of the climate consistency assessment in the explanatory memoranda of its proposals. She will monitor the implementation of this commitment based on future complaints she might receive.

48. As regards fast-track interservice consultations, the Ombudsman notes the Commission’s commitment to provide justifications in exceptional situations in which inter-service consultations will have to be concluded within less than 48 hours. However, she also points out that the Commission must ensure that, in shortening inter-service consultations, it does not excessively limit the possibility of its departments to provide meaningful input on the legislative proposals in question, for instance, by giving them only a few hours on a weekend to submit their comments.

49. In light of the above, the Ombudsman is not yet in a position to draw any definitive conclusions as to whether the measures the Commission committed to will fully and adequately address her recommendation. The Ombudsman will only be able to take a view on this once the Commission has revised its Better Regulation rules and applied the revised rules in the preparation of upcoming legislative proposals. Based on possible future complaints, the Ombudsman will closely monitor the adequacy of the revised rules and their implementation. Until this happens, the Ombudsman concludes that no further inquiries are justified into this matter and therefore closes the cases.

Conclusion

Based on the inquiry, the Ombudsman closes this case with the following conclusion:

No further inquiries are justified at this stage, given the Commission’s overall agreement to implement the Ombudsman’s recommendations and suggestions for improvement. That said, the effectiveness of the concrete measures to be undertaken by the Commission to this end remains to be assessed. The Ombudsman will thus monitor their implementation in the context of future complaints and once the Commission has finalised the revision of ‘Better Regulation’ rules.

The complainants and the Commission will be informed of this decision.

Teresa Anjinho
European Ombudsman

Strasbourg, 23/06/2026

 

[1] Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

[2] Articles 1 and 10(3) TEU, and 15(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

[3] Article 11(3) TEU.

[4] European Commission, Better Regulation Guidelines, Staff Working Document SWD(2021) 305 final, available at: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/d0bbd77f-bee5-4ee5-b5c4-6110c7605476_en?filename=swd2021_305_en.pdf.

[5] European Commission, Better Regulation Toolbox, July 2023, available at: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/9c8d2189-8abd-4f29-84e9-abc843cc68e0_en?filename=BR%20toolbox%20-%20Jul%202023%20-%20FINAL.pdf.

[6] According to Article 295 TFEU, interinstitutional agreements “may be of a binding nature”. Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making, OJ 2016 L 123, p. 1, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2016/512/oj/eng.

[7] Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’), OJ L 243, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32021R1119.

[8] Commission Decision 2024/3080 of 4 December 2024 establishing the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3080/oj/eng.

[9] COM(2025) 81 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0081.

[10] COM(2023) 754 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023PC0754.

[11] COM(2023) 755 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023PC0755.

[12] COM(2024) 139 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024PC0139.

[13] The European Climate Law introduced a requirement for the Commission to verify the consistency of both existing EU legislation and new legislative proposals with the climate policy objectives (Article 6(4)).

[14] See https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/doc/correspondence/en/211281; https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/case/en/67546; https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/doc/correspondence/en/201482.

[15] See https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/doc/inspection-report/en/208118; https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/doc/inspection-report/en/215918.

[16] Recommendation on the European Commission’s compliance with ‘Better Regulation’ rules and other procedural requirements in preparing legislative proposals that it considered to be urgent (983/2025/MAS - the “Omnibus” case, 2031/2024/VB - the “migration” case, and 1379/2024/MIK - the “CAP” case), https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/recommendation/en/215920.

[17] Decision in case 1474/2018/TE on alleged shortcomings and biases in the European Commission’s preparation of its policy and legislative proposal on the reduction of single-use plastic products, paras. 28-30, available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/111569.

[18] Judgment of 28 June 2005, Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri A/S v Commission, paras. 209-211, available at : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=59846&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11937880.

[19] According to the European Commission’s Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Commission work programme 2026, COM(2025) 870 final, 21 October 2025, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0870.

[20] See Commission’s opinion here: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/doc/correspondence/en/220471.

[21] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A simpler Clearer and Better Enforced EU Rulebook, COM(2026) 380 final, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/75b997e8-ebe0-4954-9705-6b61bdb05b87_en?filename=com-2026-380_en.pdf.

[22] In particular, in the migration case, the complainants pointed out that the European Parliament had considered it necessary to conduct substitute impact assessments, see https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_STU(2025)765787; see https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_STU(2025)765777.

[23] The Regulatory Scrutiny Board will continue issuing qualified opinions with regard to “major new legislative initiatives or revisions”, whereas for targeted initiatives, it will issue “recommendations for improvement that will be transparently communicated and taken into account”.

[24] Recommendation, footnote 16, paragraph 57.

[25] “The Commission shall assess the consistency of any draft measure or legislative proposal, including budgetary proposals, with the climate-neutrality objective set out in Article 2(1) and the Union 2030 and 2040 climate targets before adoption, and include that assessment in any impact assessment accompanying these measures or proposals, and make the result of that assessment publicly available at the time of adoption” (emphasis added).