Background to the complaint

1. The main governance body of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) is its Management Board.[1] The Management Board is composed of one representative of each Member State and one representative of the European Commission. The Board comes together about four times a year and it provides Europol with strategic guidance while overseeing its activities. In accordance with the Europol Regulation[2], summaries of the outcome of the meetings of the Management Board are published on Europol’s website[3]. For day-to-day governance, an Executive Director heads Europol with the assistance of three Deputy Directors.

2. On 9 April 2024, the complainant submitted a request for public access to the complete minutes of Europol Management Board meetings and of Europol Executive Board meetings held between 1 September 2023 and the date of the access request.

3. In its initial reply of May 2024, Europol identified the meeting minutes of Europol’s Management Board meetings of 10-11 October 2023 and 12-13 December 2023 as falling within the scope of the access request. Europol refused access to the two documents in their entirety. In doing so, it invoked four exceptions under the EU legislation on public access to documents (Regulation 1049/2001^[4]). More specifically, Europol argued that disclosing the documents could undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security^[5], the privacy and integrity of the individual^[6], the purpose of audits^[7], and Europol’s ongoing and closed decision-making processes^[8]. Europol did not identify an overriding public interest in disclosure.

4. The complainant asked Europol to review its position on the access request (by making a ‘confirmatory application’), challenging Europol’s application of the exceptions to public access and its refusal to provide partial access.

5. Following its confirmatory decision of July 2024, Europol provided the complainant with partial access to the two documents at issue. To justify the remaining redactions, Europol relied on the exceptions invoked at initial stage and it added two further exceptions to public access, arguing that some of the redacted information could undermine the protection of the public interest as regards international relations^[9] and of legal advice^[10]. Europol reiterated that it did not identify an overriding public interest in disclosure.

6. Dissatisfied with this outcome, the complainant turned to the Ombudsman in October 2024.

The inquiry

7. The Ombudsman opened an inquiry into Europol’s decision to give only partial access to the requested documents under Regulation 1049/2001.

8. During the inquiry, the Ombudsman inquiry team inspected the two documents at issue.

The Ombudsman's proposal for a solution

9. The Ombudsman acknowledged that Europol’s mandate involves handling highly sensitive information concerning criminal investigations, intelligence reports, and public security assessments. However, Europol remains bound by Regulation 1049/2001. Based on her inquiry, the Ombudsman considered that Europol should have granted wider public access to the requested meeting minutes for the reasons set out below.

10. irst, the Ombudsman stressed that while Europol enjoys a wide margin of discretion when determining whether disclosing a document would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and international relations, it is still required to demonstrate a ‘specific and actual risk’ that is reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical.[11] The Ombudsman noted that the inspection of the requested documents had shown that it was not readily clear how such a risk would occur if some of the information redacted on the basis of these exceptions to public access were to be disclosed. While several discussion topics mentioned could concern public security or international relations, the reflection of these discussions of the Management Board in the meeting minutes is not detailed or specific throughout. Rather, some of the redacted information appeared to be generic.

11. Second, the Ombudsman pointed out that, to refuse access to parts of a document to protect legal advice, an institution must determine that the document, or parts thereof, relate to legal advice. Then, it must be examined whether disclosure would undermine the institution’s interest in seeking and receiving frank, objective and comprehensive legal advice.^[12] While the inspection of the requested documents confirmed that they reflect discussions and updates on the state-of-play of the European Data Protection Supervisor’s supervision of Europol, the Ombudsman considered that they do not appear to contain legal advice on these matters and that it was thus unclear why Europol relied on this exception to redact the relevant parts of the meeting minutes.

12. Third, the Ombudsman was not convinced that Europol could reasonably rely on the exception for the protection of the purpose of audits. While the inspection of the documents confirmed that some of the information redacted related to audits of Europol, it was not readily clear that those parts of the documents contain “sensitive details”. The Ombudsman added that, in any event, she was not convinced that disclosure of this information would undermine the purpose of these audits, and asked Europol to take into account if any audits mentioned had been concluded when replying to her solution proposal.

13. Fourth, the Ombudsman found that Europol had applied the exception for the protection of a decision-making process too broadly. She observed that Europol appeared to have applied this exception to three different categories of information: (i) information meant for internal use, (ii) information related to international relations and law enforcement responses and (iii) information on the views of Member State representatives. While information pertaining to the second category may come within the scope of the exceptions for the protection of the public interest as regards public security and international relations, the Ombudsman considered that Europol had not sufficiently substantiated how disclosure of any of the three categories of information would seriously undermine its decision-making process.^[13] As for the third category, the Ombudsman reminded Europol that it can, in case of doubt, consult[14] the relevant Member States on the possible disclosure of their views.

14. Finally, as regards the possible existence of an overriding public interest in disclosure, the Ombudsman emphasised that if Europol redacts parts of the documents based on the exceptions for the protection of legal advice, the purpose of audits or its decision-making process, it is necessary to assess the possible existence of an overriding public interest in disclosure. As the published summaries of the outcome of the meetings of the Management Board[15] are rather limited in content, the Ombudsman contended that it is all the more important that Europol grants the widest possible access to the detailed minutes, if requested.

15. In light of the above, the Ombudsman proposed[16] that Europol reconsider its position on the public access request with a view to granting wider access to the requested documents and provide further reasoning for any remaining redactions.

16. In addition, the Ombudsman asked Europol to clarify whether all minutes of meetings had been identified because Management Board meetings had also taken place on 26 January 2024 (summary published on 23 February 2024) and 19-20 March 2024 (summary published on 10 April 2024). The minutes of these meetings would thus seemingly fall within the scope of the complainant’s access request, which covers the period between 1 September 2023 and 9 April 2024.

Europol’s reply to the solution proposal and the complainant’s comments on the reply

17. In its reply to the Ombudsman’s proposal for a solution[17], the Europol Management Board acknowledged that Europol is bound by Regulation 1049/2001 by virtue of Article 65(1) of the Europol Regulation. It argued that the detailed minutes of its meetings are by nature covered by the exception for the protection of decision-making (Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001) because they are drafted for internal use and reflect opinions as part of deliberations and/or preliminary consultations within a non-legislative context. The Management Board is concerned that the free and frank discussions that take place during its meetings would be undermined and that the reflection and negotiation leeway of Board members would be limited, if such meeting minutes were to be disclosed. This concern is exacerbated by the sensitive strategic and operational context of law enforcement cooperation in which Europol operates.

18. Therefore, the Europol Management Board considered in its reply that the detailed minutes of its meetings “are by-design covered by the obligation of secrecy and confidentiality” and that their disclosure would “seriously [undermine] the very rationale of such meetings and [pose] a foreseeable and not hypothetical obstacle to the quality, impartiality and ‘diversity of thought’ that are instrumental to the decision-making in the sensitive environment of Europol”.

19. Furthermore, the Europol Management Board contended that Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001 should be read in combination with Article 65(4) of the Europol Regulation, which requires the proactive publication of summaries of the outcome of its meetings. It claimed that this provision implies that the legislator has acknowledged the sui generis character of the detailed meeting minutes.

20. Based on a combined reading of Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001 and Article 65(4) of the Europol Regulation, the Europol Management Board concluded that a general presumption of non-disclosure[18] exists for its deliberations and that “the satisfaction of public interest as concerns a suitably transparent access to the deliberations of Europol’s [Management Board] is, in principle, to be ensured through richer summaries rather than greater access to minutes that are covered, as such, [...] by Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001”.

21. Finally, the Europol Management Board added that democratic scrutiny of Europol’s activities is ensured by the supervisory role of the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG), bringing together the European Parliament and national parliaments.

22. The Europol Management Board agreed however with the Ombudsman that the published summaries of the outcome of its meetings are “rather limited in content to the extent they are no longer sufficiently well-equipped to fully satisfy the public interest”. Therefore, it committed to “[refining] its approach to such summaries by complementing the information currently made available therein with a more granular record of the Board proceedings to enhance the by-design visibility of its discussions”.

23. However, as for the detailed meeting minutes at issue in this case, the Europol Management Board indicated that it had already verified, at confirmatory stage, what public access could be given to supplement the information available in the public summaries. Although several exceptions to justify the redactions in the minutes at issue were relied on at confirmatory stage, the Europol Management Board considered that it can rely on a general presumption of non-disclosure based on Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001 and Article 65(4) of the Europol Regulation, and that it does not have to conduct an individual assessment of the meeting minutes. Consequently, it did not grant further access to the requested documents.

24. The Europol Management Board also clarified that no detailed minutes were produced of the meeting of 26 January 2024, and that the minutes of the meeting of 19-20 March 2024 were only adopted on 18 June 2024, thus after the complainant submitted their access request. In the meantime, the latter minutes were however partially released in reply to another access request.[19]

25. In their comments to the Ombudsman, the complainant noted that they are disappointed and alarmed by Europol’s response. While they welcomed the publication of more detailed summaries of the outcome of Management Board meetings, they stressed the importance of access to the meeting minutes given the Management Board’s central role in Europol’s decision-making. In this regard, the complainant added that the scrutiny role of the JPSG cannot in any event replace or weaken Europol’s transparency obligations.

26. The complainant claimed that Europol seeks to reduce its transparency obligations by carving out an exception from Regulation 1049/2001 for its Management Board. They considered that Article 65(4) of the Europol Regulation is meant to complement Europol’s transparency obligations under Regulation 1049/2001, and emphasised that Article 65(1) of the Europol Regulation explicitly states that Regulation 1049/2001 applies to documents held by Europol. Furthermore, the complainant said that the existence of a general presumption of non-disclosure of Management Board meeting minutes is not supported by the case-law invoked (in which the Court of Justice rejected the existence of a general presumption of non-disclosure), and that Europol has on numerous occasions provided partial access to these minutes.

27. Finally, the complainant regretted that Europol did not provide further reasoning for its redactions in the meeting minutes at issue.

The Ombudsman's assessment after the proposal for a solution

28. The Ombudsman welcomes Europol’s commitment to provide more detail in its published summaries of the outcome of Management Board meetings to enhance the transparency of its decision-making. Since Europol’s reply to the Ombudsman’s proposal for a solution, the summary of the Management Board meeting of 25-26 June 2025 was published[20] and shared with the Ombudsman, who welcomes the increased level of detail. As the Ombudsman has held before[21], proactive transparency is one of the primary means of securing public trust in the EU administration’s actions.

29. That said, the Ombudsman stresses that Europol’s efforts to proactively publish summaries of the outcome of Management Board meetings does not absolve the agency of its obligations under Regulation 1049/2001. Similarly, the JPSG’s supervision does not alter Europol’s transparency obligations. Article 65(1) of the Europol Regulation explicitly determines that Regulation 1049/2001 applies to documents held by Europol, including detailed meeting minutes of its Management Board.

30. In its reply to the Ombudsman’s proposal for a solution, Europol argued that a general presumption of non-disclosure exists for the detailed meeting minutes of its Management Board to protect the free and frank discussions in the meetings and the leeway of Board members to reflect and negotiate. In accordance with Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001, Europol considered that the detailed meeting minutes should not be disclosed to safeguard the quality, impartiality and ‘diversity of thought’ of the Management Board’s decision-making.

31. The Ombudsman observes that for a general presumption to be recognised, it must be shown that it is reasonably foreseeable that disclosure of a certain category of documents would be liable to undermine the interest protected by the exception in question[22]. In addition, the Court of Justice has stressed that general presumptions must be interpreted and applied strictly. In the case quoted by Europol, the Court of Justice found that the European Commission could not rely on a general presumption of non-disclosure to refuse access to documents drawn up in the context of an impact assessment. What the Court found was that general references to the need to preserve a space for deliberation or to the possibility of external pressures or influences adversely affecting an institution’s decision-making process do not suffice to establish such a presumption.[23]

32. As the General Court has held, the use of general presumptions “is no insignificant matter”, as they “restrict the fundamental principle of transparency”; therefore, “the use of such presumptions must be founded on reasonable and convincing grounds”[24]. As the Ombudsman has stated previously, general presumptions entail the risk that institutions invoke them automatically without considering the particular circumstances of the case at hand[25].

33. More recently, the General Court[26] set out that in each of the cases where a general presumption of non-disclosure was recognised by the EU courts, the refusal to grant access related to a set of documents which were clearly defined by the fact that they all belonged to a file relating to ongoing administrative or judicial proceedings[27]. Moreover, the General Court highlighted that, where the documents at issue fall within a particular area of EU law, general presumptions of non-disclosure are based on the fact that the exceptions under Regulation 1049/2001 cannot be interpreted without taking account of the specific rules governing access to those documents[28]. Finally, the General Court noted that the application of general presumptions is essentially dictated by the overriding need to ensure that the procedures at issue operate correctly, and to guarantee that their objectives are not jeopardised[29].

34. In view of the above, the Ombudsman considers that Europol cannot rely on a general presumption of non-disclosure to refuse access to detailed meeting minutes of its Management Board. Such a presumption is not supported by the case-law set out above. The arguments put forward by Europol are too general to demonstrate that the meeting minutes belong to a category of documents which should be protected by such a presumption. In particular, the review of the meeting minutes by the Ombudsman inquiry team has shown that it is possible to redact the parts that cannot be released. The Ombudsman also notes that Europol granted partial access to the meeting minutes at issue and the minutes of the Management Board meeting of 19-20 March 2024 in reply to another access request. Consequently, keeping such minutes confidential, in their entirety, and without considering their content, does not appear to be necessary to ensure the frank discussions in the Management Board meetings.

35. Therefore, the Ombudsman expects that Europol will continue to conduct an individual assessment of the detailed meeting minutes of its Management Board in reply to requests for public access under Regulation 1049/2001. She will make a corresponding suggestion below.

36. As regards the extent of partial access granted to the meeting minutes at issue in this inquiry, the Ombudsman regrets that Europol, in reply to her solution proposal, did neither grant further partial access to them nor did it provide further justifications for the redactions it applied. While the Ombudsman acknowledges that the discussions of Europol’s Management Board may touch upon sensitive topics of law enforcement within the EU, restrictions to the fundamental right of public access must be justified by explaining how an interest protected under Article 4 of Regulation 1049/2001 would be undermined by disclosure of (part of) a document. As the Ombudsman has recently held[30], Europol should provide applicants for public access with sufficiently detailed reasoning, allowing them to understand why (full) access cannot be granted.

37. Overall, while the Ombudsman welcomes the increased level of detail in Europol’s published summaries of the outcome of its Management Board meetings, she regrets that Europol did not grant further partial access to the specific meeting minutes at issue in her inquiry. Given that Europol confirmed its position in reply to her solution proposal, the Ombudsman takes the view that no purpose would be served by pursuing the matter in the context of this case. The Ombudsman expects however Europol to take her detailed assessment on board when it deals with future public access requests to meeting minutes such as those at issue.

Conclusion

Based on the inquiry, the Ombudsman closes this case with the following conclusion:

While the Ombudsman welcomes the increased level of detail in Europol’s published summaries of the outcome of its Management Board meetings, she regrets that Europol did not grant further partial access to the specific meeting minutes at issue in her inquiry. Given that Europol confirmed its position in reply to the Ombudsman’s solution proposal, the Ombudsman takes the view that no purpose would be served by pursuing the matter in the context of this case. The Ombudsman expects however Europol to take her detailed assessment on board when it deals with future public access requests to meeting minutes such as those at issue.

The complainant and Europol will be informed of this decision.

Suggestion for improvement

Europol should continue to conduct an individual assessment of the detailed meeting minutes of its Management Board in reply to future requests for public access under Regulation 1049/2001.

 

Teresa Anjinho
European Ombudsman

Strasbourg, 02/12/2025

 

[1] For more information, see: https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/governance-accountability.

[2] Article 65(4) of Regulation 2016/794 of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02016R0794-20220628.

[3] See: https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/publications/europol-management-board-meetings-summaries.

[4] Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32001R1049, applicable to Europol in accordance with Article 65(1) of Regulation 2016/794. The detailed rules for applying Regulation 1049/2001 are set out in Europol’s Management Board Decision of 13 December 2016, available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/decision_of_the_mb_rules_applying_reg_1049_2001.pdf.

[5] Article 4(1)(a), first indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

[6] Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049/2001. The complainant does not contest the application of this exception. Therefore, its application does not fall within the scope of this inquiry.

[7] Article 4(2), third indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

[8] Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001.

[9] Article 4(1)(a), third indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

[10] Article 4(2), second indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

[11] Judgment of the General Court of 27 November 2019, Izuzquiza and Semsrott vs Frontex, T-31/18, paragraphs 65-66: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-31/18.  

[12] Judgment of 1 July 2008, Sweden & Turco v Council, C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, paragraphs 37-45: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-39/05&language=en.

[13] Judgment of 7 June 2011, Toland v Parliament, T-471/08, paragraphs 71 and 78: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=T-471/08.

[14] In accordance with Article 4(4) and (5) of Regulation 1049/2001.

[15] In accordance with Article 65(4) of Regulation 2016/794.

[16] The Ombudsman’s proposal for a solution is available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/solution/215619.

[17] Europol’s reply to the Ombudsman’s proposal for a solution is available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/doc/correspondence/215620.

[18] Europol refers to the following case-law to support its position: judgment of 22 January 2020, PTC Therapeutics International v EMA, C-175/18P, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&td=ALL&num=C-175/18%20P and judgment of 4 September 2018, ClientEarth v Commission, C-57/16 P, paragraphs 79-80, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-57/16%20P.

[19] Available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Minutes_of_the_136th_meeting_of_the_Management_Board_19-20_March_2024.pdf.

[20] Public Summary of the 143rd Management Board Meeting, available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/MB_143__Public_Summary_25-26_June_2025.pdf.

[21] Recommendation on the time the European Commission takes to deal with requests for public access to documents (strategic inquiry OI/2/2022/OAM), paragraph 54, available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/recommendation/en/167661.

[22] ClientEarth v Commission, C-57/16 P, paragraph 80.

[23] ClientEarth v Commission, C-57/16 P, paragraphs 102-109.

[24] Judgment of 25 September 2014, Spirlea v Commission, T-306/12, paragraph 52, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=T-306/12.  

[25] Proposal of the European Ombudsman for a solution in case 1379/2020/MAS on the European Commission’s refusal to grant access to preparatory documents related to anti-dumping measures on imports of iron or steel fasteners from China, available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/solution/en/138837. See also: Decision on the European Commission's refusal to give public access to a note on the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (855/2025/ACB), available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/215601. 

[26] Judgment of the General Court of 10 September 2025, Nouwen v Council, T‑255/24, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&td=ALL&num=T-255/24.

[27] Nouwen v Council, paragraph 97. 

[28] Nouwen v Council, paragraph 98. 

[29] Nouwen v Council, paragraph 99. 

[30] Decision on how the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) dealt with a request for public access to documents related to the fundamental rights aspects of its work (case 851/2024/SF), available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/214746.