made in accordance with Article 4(1) of the Statute of the European Ombudsman^[1]

Background to the complaint

1. In May 2022, the European Commission issued a legislative proposal[2] laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse (the so-called ‘CSAM proposal’). Amongst other things, the proposed rules include an obligation for providers (such as webmail and messaging services) proactively to detect, report and remove child sexual abuse material (CSAM) on their services.

2. When preparing this proposal, the Commission consulted various stakeholders, including in the context of public consultations and direct exchanges with its staff. In this way, the Commission gathered input from civil society organisations, technology companies and public authorities.

3. The Commission’s proposal gave rise to some criticism, including from expert bodies such as the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), questioning the effectiveness, necessity and proportionality of the proposed rules. For example, concerns were raised about a possible generalised and indiscriminate scanning of content of electronic communications and the fundamental rights implications this would entail.[3]

4. The CSAM proposal is now being considered by the EU’s co-legislators, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. For this purpose, the Commission is gathering additional feedback from the public.[4]

5. In March 2023, the complainant, a journalist, made a request[5] for public access to documents to the Commission, asking for disclosure of “any documents (...) pertaining to the proposed [CSAM Regulation] and associated legislative decision-making process.”

6. When the complainant did not receive a reply within the prescribed time limit, he asked the Commission to review this implicit refusal of public access to the requested documents (he made a ‘confirmatory application’). In his confirmatory application, the complainant argued that there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.

7. The Commission then also failed to reply to the complainant’s confirmatory application. This prompted the complainant to turn to the Ombudsman in July 2023.[6]

8. Following the Ombudsman’s intervention, the Commission issued a decision in December 2023. Specifically, the Commission identified 121 documents as falling within the scope of the complainant’s access request. It gave wide public access to 88 documents, redacting only personal data. Regarding the remaining 33 documents, the Commission refused to give access to 28 documents in their entirety and to five documents in part. In refusing access, the Commission relied on a number of exemptions provided for under Regulation 1049/2001, namely the need to protect the public interest as regards public security, the need to protect personal data, the need to protect commercial interests, the need to protect legal advice, and the need to protect its decision-making.[7] In addition, the Commission redacted parts of three documents that it deemed to fall outside the scope of the complainant’s access request.

9. Dissatisfied with the Commission’s decision to refuse access to parts of five documents[8] and to 28 documents[9] in their entirety, the complainant again turned to the Ombudsman. The complainant did not challenge the redaction of personal data.

The inquiry  

10. The Ombudsman opened an inquiry into the Commission’s refusal to grant public access to (parts of) the 33 documents at issue in the complaint. The documents date from 2021 and can be divided into four categories:

· exchanges with interest representatives from the technology industry (documents 9, 11, 13, 14 and 106),

· exchanges with public authorities from Germany (documents 48 to 50),

· drafts of the impact assessment[10] conducted by the Commission when preparing its legislative proposal, and related documents (documents 61 to 69), and

· comments on the draft CSAM proposal from various Commission departments, including the Commission Legal Service (documents 56, 89 to 92 and 110 to 119).

11. In the course of the inquiry, the Ombudsman inquiry team inspected the documents at issue as well as limited additional information provided by the Commission.

Arguments presented

12. In his confirmatory application, the complainant argued that the documents at issue concern a legislative decision-making process and that, therefore, it was of utmost importance that wide public access is given to them.

13. The complainant also noted the public debate and the extensive criticism the CSAM proposal had attracted, including from civil society, legal experts, the European Parliament and the EDPS. He took the view that, based on the serious and credible concerns raised as regards the expected implications on the fundamental rights of citizens, there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.

14. As mentioned above, in refusing access, the Commission relied on a number of exceptions under Regulation 1049/2001.

15. In summary, as regards the protection of public security, the Commission said that documents 11 and 94 “contain some information on cooperation between law enforcement and industry in combating child sexual abuse” and that documents 9 and 94 “contain information on misuse of online infrastructure for the purpose of child sexual abuse.” Disclosure could thus “be to the advantage of bad actors” and “could serve to inform potential child abuse perpetrators of the ways investigations are carried out.”

16. The Commission also argued that documents 14 and 94 contain “commercially sensitive business information” of the companies with whom it had met. Disclosure of this information would affect the competitive position on the market of these third-parties and thus undermine their commercial interest.

17. Concerning the need to protect its ongoing decision-making, the Commission stated that all documents but one (document 94) contain preliminary views and policy options that are currently under consideration. It took the view that disclosure of the relevant parts of these documents would undermine its services’ ability to prepare a decision free from external pressure.

18. As regards legal advice, the Commission said that documents 106 and 110 to 119 contain information and views on legal issues that were gathered to ensure that (i) all relevant Commission departments have a say in the preparation of the legislation in question and that (ii) the Commission can conduct a wide-ranging assessment of impacts of all available policy options. Disclosure would harm its interest in seeking frank and objective input and legal advice.

19. The Commission also stated that the complainant had not put forward any arguments as regards a possible overriding public interest in disclosure and concluded that there was none.

20. In his complaint to the Ombudsman, the complainant considered that the redactions made by the Commission are excessive and that it had failed to explain how disclosure could undermine the interests invoked.

21. He challenged, for example, that disclosure of the comments on the draft proposal made by the various Commission departments concerned could undermine the Commission’s interest in seeking legal advice, given that they were then already more than 18 months old.

22. The complainant also questioned the Commission’s use of the need to protect an ongoing decision-making process. He argued that the documents at issue no longer have a direct bearing on the ongoing inter-institutional negotiations on the legislative proposal concerned. 

23. The complainant was also dissatisfied that the Commission had not considered the arguments he had put forward in his confirmatory application regarding the existence of an overriding public interest. He contended that the public interest in disclosure has in the meantime increased, given that there had been concerns about possible conflicts of interest and irregularities.[11]

The Ombudsman's assessment leading to a recommendation

The nature of the documents at issue in this inquiry

24. All documents at issue in this case were drawn up or received in the course of the drafting of the legislative proposal for a CSAM Regulation. Some of these documents contain positions or views of interest representatives from the technology industry or public authorities, which have, presumably, been shared with the Commission with the aim of informing and/or influencing the drafting of the CSAM proposal. Other documents contain comments on the draft CSAM proposal from various Commission departments, including the Commission Legal Service, or constitute drafts of the impact assessment and related documents, such as minutes of inter-service group meetings on the draft impact assessment and opinions of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board.

25. One of the core principles of the EU is openness in its decision-making.^[12] Openness facilitates public participation and ensures more accountability of the decision-makers.[13] This is even more important where the decision-making results in new legislation.[14] Openness in that respect contributes to strengthening democracy by allowing citizens to scrutinize all the information which has formed the basis of a legislative act.^[15]

26. The Commission is “a key player in the legislative process”,[16] as legislative acts are adopted on the basis of a Commission proposal, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. While EU case-law states that the legislative process formally begins with the transmission of the legislative proposal to the co-legislators,[17] the same case-law recognises that documents that form part of the basis of the legislative action are, in view of their purpose, also covered by the definition of “legislative documents” in Regulation 1049/2001.[18] While the cited case-law refers specifically to (draft) impact assessment reports and the accompanying Regulatory Scrutiny Board opinions, the Ombudsman considers that the same reasoning can be applied to other documents containing information that constitute important elements of the EU legislative process, specifically the input that feeds into a legislative proposal. The Ombudsman considers that, in the words of the Court, the disclosure of such input is “likely to increase the transparency and openness of the legislative process as a whole, in particular the preparatory steps of that process, and, thus, to enhance the democratic nature of the European Union by enabling its citizens to scrutinise that information and to attempt to influence that process”.

Application of the exceptions to public access in Regulation 1049/2001

27. Regulation 1049/2001 aims to ensure that the public is granted the widest possible access to EU documents.[19] This means, generally, that the EU institutions have to give access to documents upon request, unless disclosure would undermine one of the interests the legislator deemed worthy of protection.[20] Therefore, if an institution considers that access has to be refused, it has to explain how “specifically and actually” disclosure could undermine any of the protected interests. In addition, the risk that the interest concerned will be undermined must be “reasonably foreseeable and not be purely hypothetical”.[21]

The public interest as regards public security

28. The EU institutions enjoy a wide margin of discretion when determining whether disclosing a document would undermine the public interest as regards public security.[22] As such, the Ombudsman’s inquiry sought, first and foremost, to determine whether there was a manifest error in the Commission’s assessment on which it based its decision to refuse access to the relevant documents at issue (documents 9, 11 and 94).

29. The Ombudsman considers the information on the misuse of online infrastructure for the purpose of child sexual abuse contained in document 9 (“Snap input following EU Internet Forum Safety-by-Design meeting on 20 July 2023”) to be rather general in nature. In addition, it appears that this information is largely in the public domain already. It is therefore not clear in relation to which parts of the document the Commission invoked the need to protect public security. This can concern only very limited information, if any.

30. As regards document 11 (“Report, EU Internet Forum Safety-by-Design to prevent CSA online, 21 October 2021”), the Commission argued that it contains some information on cooperation between law enforcement and industry in combating child sexual abuse, the disclosure of which might be to the advantage of “bad actors”. Based on the inspection, the Ombudsman considers that, overall, the redaction of the information exchanged with the companies concerned based on the need to protect public security does not seem manifestly unfounded. However, the Commission clarified that these redactions encompass also the names of the companies concerned. It is not readily clear how disclosure of the names of the companies concerned could possibly undermine public security, if the information exchanged between the companies and law enforcement has been redacted.

31. The Ombudsman does not take issue with the redaction of sensitive information contained in document 94.

32. In light of the above, the Ombudsman is not convinced that all of the withheld information in documents 9 and 11 is covered by the exception for the protection of public security. The Commission’s application of the exception as regards this information was thus manifestly wrong.

33. The exception for the protection of the public interest as regards public security cannot be set aside by another public interest that is deemed more important.

The institution’s decision-making process

34. The EU institutions may refuse public access to a document related to a matter where a decision has not yet been taken, if disclosure would seriously undermine the decision-making process unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.

35. The Commission invoked the need to protect its ongoing decision-making process in relation to all but one (document 94) of the documents at issue. In doing so, the Commission stated that the documents relate to a decision that has not been taken, referring to both, its “impact assessment for a new initiative” and the “ongoing (...) preparation of a new proposal for a regulation”. It argued that, when preparing an impact assessment/a legislative proposal, its staff has to be able to gather evidence from a broad range of stakeholders and explore preliminary options that might not be reflected in the final proposal. It added that it had to protect its staff from external pressure.

36. The Ombudsman notes that, when the complainant made his request for public access to documents, both decision-making processes the Commission referred to in its confirmatory decision had long ended. In addition, the outcome of these processes, namely the CSAM legislative proposal as well as the related impact assessment (and the Regulatory Scrutiny Board’s opinion on it) had been made public on the Commission website.[23]

37. However, even if the legislative proposal had not yet been adopted, this in itself should not have prevented disclosure of the documents. As the EU Courts have held on multiple occasions, the public is perfectly capable of understanding that certain documents are provisional in nature and may thus be subject to change.[24] Crucially, the Court of Justice recalled that the expression by the public or interested parties of their views on the policy options envisaged by the Commission before specific legislative proposals are announced “is an integral part of the exercise by EU citizens of their democratic rights”.[25]

38. According to EU case-law, the risk of external pressure can constitute a legitimate ground for restricting access to documents related to the decision-making process. However, the reality of such external pressure must be established with certainty and ‘tangible evidence’ must be adduced to show that there is a reasonably foreseeable risk that the decision would be substantially affected owing to that external pressure.[26] The Commission must demonstrate that this pressure and influence would seriously affect, prolong or complicate the proper conduct of the Commission’s decision-making.

39. The Ombudsman understands that the EU administration may be reluctant to share its preliminary views that may be subject to public criticism and pressure. However, as the Court of Justice held, it is for the Commission to prevent any adverse impact in its decision-making process arising from such external pressure. Refusing public access to legislative documents cannot be used as a safeguard by EU institutions when faced with external pressure.[27]

40. The Ombudsman takes the view that the Commission has not established that the external pressure to which it might be subjected in the event of disclosure of the documents in question would be such as to risk impeding its capacity to act in a fully independent manner and exclusively in the general interest. The Commission has also not demonstrated that disclosure would seriously affect, prolong or complicate the proper conduct of the decision-making process, which, the Ombudsman understands, refers to the ongoing legislative procedure, rather than the adoption of the legislative proposal and the completion of the impact assessment (both of which had already taken place at the time the confirmatory decision was adopted).

41. In particular, as regards the input the Commission received from interest representatives, the Ombudsman notes that the Commission refused to give access to some of the information it had exchanged with the technology industry. It disclosed however other views that the technology industry had shared with it, as well as the input that it had received from other civil society actors. From the very general reasons for non-disclosure the Commission provided in its confirmatory decision, it is not clear why it considered the withheld “preliminary options” to be more sensitive than those that it had decided to disclose to the complainant.

42. In this regard, the Ombudsman also notes that the Commission has published the views it obtained from stakeholders in the context of its public consultations. Some of the documents to which the Commission refused access, partially or in full, indicate that the views contained therein should be considered as replies to the public consultation. It is thus not clear why these documents were not disclosed.

43. Finally, as regards documents 48 to 50, the Ombudsman considers that the exchanges the Commission had with different German authorities do not seem to contain any particularly sensitive information. Nor can these exchanges reasonably be deemed sensitive as such.

44. In light of the above, the Ombudsman finds that the Commission was not justified in invoking the exception at hand.

45. Irrespective of that, the Ombudsman considers that there would be an overriding public interest in disclosure of the documents at issue, that is, to assist the public debate about the proposal itself[28] and about possible conflicts of interest[29].

46. Disclosure of the documents at issue is therefore necessary for two reasons. Firstly, transparency will allow the public to scrutinise who and what informed the legislative proposal in question, and, if they so wish, to challenge that information. As a general principle, stakeholders who actively provide input to a decision-making process of a public authority should not be allowed to do so behind closed doors.[30] Secondly, in light of the public debate about possible conflicts of interest, access to the documents is also needed to verify whether the Commission acted in a fully independent manner and exclusively in the general interest when drafting the CSAM proposal.

47. The Ombudsman notes in this regard that, in his confirmatory application, the complainant had also argued in favour of an overriding public interest. However, given that, in line with its practice, the Commission did not process the complainant’s confirmatory application, it did not engage with the complainant’s arguments. The Ombudsman has already, in the context of her own-initiative inquiry on delays[31], set out her concerns in relation to the Commission’s practice of cancelling confirmatory applications. This case shows the practical, negative consequences of doing so, namely that the Commission did not engage with the complainant’s arguments in relation to an overriding public interest in disclosure.

Legal advice

48. Regulation 1049/2001 provides for the possibility to withhold documents containing legal advice if its protection is warranted. The Commission relied on this exception in relation to the refusal of access to 11 documents in their entirety (documents 106 and 110 to 119). Specifically, the Commission explained that these documents refer to exchanges and meetings between its services that aimed to ensure that all its relevant services, including its Legal Service, can share their views during the drafting process of the CSAM proposal. It argued that disclosure would jeopardise its “interest in seeking input from the perspectives of various policy objectives and receiving frank, objective and comprehensive legal advice.”

49. The Ombudsman first notes that document 106 originates from a technology company and thus an entity that pursues a private interest. In light of this and the information provided by the Commission in its confirmatory decision (where it referred to exchanges and meetings of its services), the Ombudsman presumes that the Commission did not mean to apply the exception for the protection of legal advice to this document and, in any case, considers that it would not be reasonable to do so.

50. As regards documents 110 to 119, the Ombudsman notes that these do contain views of various Commission departments on the draft CSAM proposal and agrees that this information can be considered ‘legal advice’ within the meaning of Regulation 1049/2001.

51. However, according to settled case-law[32], Regulation 1049/2001 “imposes, in principle, an obligation to disclose the opinions of an institution’s Legal Service relating to a legislative process.” Whilst this finding does not preclude a refusal of public access to legal advice per se, it is for the institution to establish that the legal advice at issue is particularly sensitive or has a particularly wide scope.[33] In this context, it is not sufficient that the related legislative context is considered particularly sensitive because it concerns a legislative initiative that has proved to be controversial.[34]

52. In light of this, the Ombudsman finds that the reasons provided by the Commission in its confirmatory decision fall short.

53. The Ombudsman considers that the legal advice concerned cannot reasonably be regarded as particularly sensitive or particularly wide in scope, and certainly not throughout. In addition, as set out above, the Ombudsman considers that there is an overriding public interest in disclosure of the documents at issue.

54. The Ombudsman therefore concludes that the Commission’s decision to refuse access to the legal advice contained in the documents was unreasonable.

Commercial interests of legal persons

55. Another interest that can be protected under Regulation 1049/2001 relates to commercial information, including intellectual property.[35] However, EU institutions cannot rely on the need to protect commercial interests simply because information relates to a company or its products. The relevant exception serves to protect commercially sensitive information, that is, information that, if disclosed, would undermine legitimate commercial interests of the entity concerned. This can be the case where information relates to an entity’s business strategy or its expertise (for example, a specific methodology unique to an entity and unknown to competitors).

56. In its confirmatory decision, the Commission stated that documents 14 and 94 contain commercially sensitive business information, disclosure of which would undermine the competitive position on the market of the companies concerned.

57. The Ombudsman is not convinced that the Commission’s arguments are such as to justify the non-disclosure of all the withheld information contained in document 14.

58. Specifically, it is questionable whether the information at issue can still be considered commercially sensitive, given that it is now almost four years old. The Commission should at least have consulted the company concerned to assess whether, and if so, how disclosure could still affect its competitive market position. To the Ombudsman’s knowledge, no such consultation took place.

59. In addition, as stated above, the Ombudsman considers that there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. The Commission should have taken this into account also in relation to the protection of commercial interests.

Other elements

60. The Ombudsman notes that the Commission considered parts of documents 11, 56 and 94 to fall outside the scope of the complainant’s access request. The Ombudsman finds the Commission’s position reasonable, except as regards document 94. The relevant information in this document does not only appear to fall within the scope of the complainant’s access request. It also cannot reasonably be considered to be sensitive.

61. Finally, the Ombudsman notes that some documents, in relation to which the Commission did not invoke the need to protect personal data, do contain personal data, namely the names of non-senior staff. This information could reasonably be redacted, given that the complainant did not put forward a necessity for having personal data transmitted to him and given that the complainant did not challenge the redaction of personal data in his complaint to the Ombudsman.

62. In light of the above, the Ombudsman finds that the Commission’s refusal to give wide public access to the 33 documents at issue constituted maladministration. She therefore makes a corresponding recommendation below.

Recommendation

On the basis of the inquiry into this complaint, the Ombudsman makes the following recommendation to the Commission:

The European Commission should re-consider its position on the access request with a view to providing significantly increased access, taking into account the Ombudsman’s considerations shared in this recommendation.

The Commission and the complainant will be informed of this recommendation. In accordance with Article 4(2) of the Statute of the European Ombudsman, the Commission shall send a detailed opinion by 26 July 2024.

Emily O'Reilly

European Ombudsman

Strasbourg, 29/04/2024

 

[1] Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1163/oj.

[2] Proposal for a Regulation laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2022%3A209%3AFIN.

[3] See, for example, EDPS, Briefing note on the CSAM proposal: “The Point of No Return”, available at: https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/our-work/publications/factsheets/2023-10-23-briefing-note-csam-point-no-return_en. See also Complementary impact assessment by the European Parliament dated April 2023: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2023/740248/EPRS_STU(2023)740248_EN.pdf.

[4] See (under “Commission adoption”, the feedback can be submitted until 21 May 2024): https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13073-Combating-child-sexual-abuse-review-of-EU-rules_en.

[5] Under Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/1049/oj.

[6] Inquiry into complaint 1251/2023/MIG: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/opening-summary/en/172317.

[7] In accordance with Article 4(1)(a), (1)(b), (2) first and second indent, and (3) first subparagraph of Regulation 1049/2001.

[8] Documents 11, 13, 14, 56 and 94.

[9] Documents 9, 48 to 50, 61 to 69, 89 to 92, 106 and 110 to 119.

[10] The final impact assessment is available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12726-Fighting-child-sexual-abuse-detection-removal-and-reporting-of-illegal-content-online_en.

[11] See minutes of the meeting of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament of 25 October 2023, agenda point 8: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/LIBE-PV-2023-10-25-1_EN.pdf.

[12] Article 15(1) TFEU.

[13] Article 10(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

[14] Article 12(2) and Recital 6 of Regulation 1049/2001.

[15] Judgment of the Court of 1 July 2008, Sweden and Turco v Council, C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, paragraph 46: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62005CJ0039&qid=1711530564196.

[16]Judgment of the Court of 4 September 2018, ClientEarth v Commission, C-57/16, paragraphs 87 f.:

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62016CJ0057&qid=1712587747391.

[17] Ibid, paragraph 86.

[18] Ibid, paragraphs 90 to 93.

[19] Article 1(a) of Regulation 1049/2001.

[20] In accordance with Article 4 of Regulation 1049/2001.

[21] Judgment of the Court of 17 October 2013, Council v Access Info Europe, C-280/11 P, paragraph 31: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62011CJ0280&qid=1711530952210.

[22] See, for example, judgment of the General Court of 11 July 2018, ClientEarth v Commission, T-644/16: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=203913&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=46943.

[23] See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12726-Fighting-child-sexual-abuse-detection-removal-and-reporting-of-illegal-content-online_en.

[24] Judgment of the General Court of 22 March 2018, De Capitani v Parliament, T-540/15, paragraph 120: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62015TJ0540&qid=1712587676840.

[25] ClientEarth v Commission (see footnote 16 above), paragraph 108.

[26]Judgment of the General Court of 21 April 2021, Pech v Council, T-252/19, paragraph 92, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=240171&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1916898.

[27] ClientEarth v Commission (see footnote 16 above), paragraph 124.

[28] See, for example, references at footnote 3 above.

[29] See, for example, hearing of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on 25 October 2023: https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/webstreaming/committee-on-civil-liberties-justice-and-home-affairs_20231025-1430-COMMITTEE-LIBE.

[30] This is also reflected in the Commission’s ‘Better Regulation Guidelines’ that set out that relations with stakeholders are governed by four principles, including the principle to “make the consultation process and how it has affected policymaking transparent to those involved and to the general public’: https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2021-11/swd2021_305_en.pdf (see Chapter II, point 3.).

[31] Own-initiative inquiry on the time taken by the European Commission to deal with requests for public access to documents (OI/2/2022/OAM): https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/case/en/60766.

[32] See, for example, judgment of the Court of 8 June 2023, Council v Pech, C-408/21 P, paragraph 42: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62021CJ0408&qid=1711458671967 and judgment of the General Court of 13 March 2024, ClientEarth and Leino-Sandberg v Council, T-682/21 and T-683/21, paragraph 34: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=283785&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=193878.

[33] Pech (see footnote 32), paragraph 43.

[34] Pech (see footnote 32), paragraphs 67 and 85.

[35] In accordance with Article 4(2), first indent of Regulation 1049/2001.