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CEPS webinar 'How could a rule of law approach to ethics help to restore institutional trust in the EU?' - Keynote speech
Speech - Speaker Emily O'Reilly - City Brussels - Country Belgium - Date Monday | 13 May 2024
Good afternoon and thank you for inviting me to speak on the topic of ethics and the rule of law. Ever since he emergence of the Qatargate scandal 18 months ago, people have wondered to what extent the issues at the heart of it would play a role in the forthcoming European Parliament elections.
It appears the answer is that, essentially, they won’t. The cost of living crisis, migration, geopolitical turmoil all appear to have relegated the alleged bribery and corruption at the heart of the parliament to the lower end of citizen concerns.
In addition, only 6% of respondents in a recent Eurobarometer poll believe that the next European Parliament should defend ‘the rule of law’ as a priority over competing values such as peace and democracy.
Perhaps this is to be expected or even welcomed. The rule of law is the operating system of democracy, the engine. When it functions well, it purrs away in the background unobtrusively. We take notice only when it fails.
Where the rule of law has been examined and debated in recent years, especially in Brussels, it has concerned the European Commission’s fight against the authoritarian drift that is evident in some member states.
In battles such as this, with billions of euros at stake, it is easy to think of the rule of law as a binary characteristic, something you either have or you don’t have. In truth, it is both a continuum, something you can have more or less of, and a composite, a combination of several distinct but related elements.
This needs to be kept in mind because if we say that the European Union institutions could benefit from a more forceful rule of law approach to its ethics framework, we should not draw an equivalence between an imperfect ethics system and the considerably more alarming rule of law deficits of some member states even though certain member states are quick to defend their own misbehaviour by pointing at Qatargate and other scandals.
Nonetheless, the European Union’s ethics framework is still badly in need of a rule of law update. This is not to say that there is an absence of rules. On the contrary, the defining feature of the system has been the accumulation of rules after every major scandal, from Cresson to Kaili.
Each public outcry has been followed by new codes of conduct, more stringent disclosure requirements, more detailed definitions and elaborate procedures. And yet the ethics violations continue. Less than six months after Parliament President Metsola completed her ethics reform plan, fresh allegations of MEPs accepting funds from Russian and Ukrainian sources in return for disseminating Kremlin talking points have emerged.
The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission’s rule of law checklist includes independence, impartiality and equality before the law, but ,crucially, also notes ‘the duty to implement the law’ through the consistent application of dissuasive sanctions, the operational independence
of bodies responsible for applying those sanctions and the adequate resourcing of those bodies.
These gaps are most apparent in those areas which have the highest risk of unethical conduct - lobbying and trading in influence. Two vital initiatives for regulating conflicts of interest in these areas arguably fall short of the Venice Commission checklist - the EU Transparency Register and revolving door restrictions.
The Transparency Register is the most important pillar in the EU’s efforts to show how policy is shaped. However, there are major concerns that it is under resourced and fails to capture what is needed for an accurate, forensic accounting of who influences EU legislation and how.
There have been repeated media and civil society reports of the disparity between what some entities report in terms of personnel and resources and the visible, on the ground reality.
Another issue with the accuracy of the register is the extent to which companies or sectors engage in “astro-turfing”, that is, whether seemingly independent grassroots or civil society organisations listed on the register turn out to be funded or controlled by private interests.
The credibility of the register as a tool to monitor possible conflicts of interest in the legislative process ultimately rests on the ability of the system to keep those who register, honest. Yet there are serious doubts that it can do so. Earlier this year, an Ombudsman inquiry made a finding of maladministration against the Transparency Register joint secretariat with regard to a complaint it received about possible astroturfing. We concluded that the Secretariat did not conduct a meaningful investigation into the complaint, relying on a highly formal tick-box approach to assessing claims that is not in the spirit of the register.
These concerns and findings are also echoed in a European Court of Auditors report on the register that was published last month.
On revolving doors, the Commission has put in place an impressive system for assessing risks and issuing formal restrictions on what activities its staff can engage in once they have left the service. However, multiple investigations by the Ombudsman across the institutions have shown that it is often impossible meaningfully to police these restrictions.
There is a reluctance to forbid ex-staff from taking up positions, even when such positions manifest the most serious conflicts of interest, such as when a former chief executive of the European Banking Agency decided to join Europe’s biggest financial services lobbying association.
The case of former Digital Affairs Commissioner Neelie Kroes who decided to take up a position on Uber’s Board of Directors, has also raised concerns
The fact that an OLAF investigation into the affair concluded that there was no evidence that she broke any rules may have been greeted as an exoneration by the former Commissioner, but others believed that it was the rules and OLAF’s evidence-gathering ability that were implicitly condemned by the report.
Our office has written to the Commission to ask them to reassure the European public that the system will survive another important test when the mandate of the current Commission expires later this year.
The Commission does at least recognize the potential of conflicts of interests when it concerns revolving door cases even if that recognition isn’t always backed up by action. At European Parliament level, the inherent conflict of interest on display through the right of MEPs to have side jobs is barely regulated. A recent survey by Transparency International showed that one in four have an income-generating side job, a survey which also instanced cases of side jobs appearing directly to conflict with the parliamentary work of the side job holder.
There is also a worrying tendency to minimise the impact of these phenomena on the integrity of our democratic decision-making processes, despite the fact that the impact on well-being and livelihoods is real and well documented. In the last decade, for example, Americans have experienced an unprecedented rise in mortality and a decline in life-expectancy unique in the developed world. Much of this increase is due to so-called ‘deaths of despair’ such as from alcohol and drug poisoning.
Much of the focus has been on the bribery and fraud perpetrated by one company, Perdue Pharma, however, overseeing the opioid crisis was the US Food and Drug Administration. In the Purdue case, the two principal FDA reviewers who originally approved Purdue’s oxycodone application both took up positions at Purdue after leaving the agency.
Over the past 20 years, several other FDA staff involved in opioid approvals also left the FDA to work for opioid makers.
Europe’s fatal addiction over the last decade has not been to prescription opioids but to Russian gas, an addiction that has proved no less deadly for thousands of Ukrainians as it very likely emboldened Putin’s regime to make the gamble it did in February 2022.
This dependency was steadily and deliberately nurtured through a strategy of co-opting members of the political elite across the EU, often via the revolving door into well-paying positions at Russian state-owned companies including most notoriously the ex-German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder who sits on the board of Gazprom.
I have no doubt but that in decades to come we will also be able to trace a line from failures to tackle the climate crisis to similar phenomena. How many lobbyists, how many former EU institutional insiders will be found to have worked to prevent, delay or dilute necessary climate action? How many lives and livelihoods will be lost as a result?
We cannot be complacent.
And yet complacency is written all over the final agreed text that is the basis for a new inter-institutional ethics body. The last-minute efforts of the European People’s Party to sabotage the proposal might have given the impression that this was a revolutionary proposal, but that is not really so.
We have seen in the two preceding examples that the flaw that runs through most ethics initiatives at EU level is twofold. Firstly, there is the failure to give adequate thought and resources to the challenging issue of implementation and, secondly, there is the reluctance to contemplate meaningful sanctions, a reluctance rooted partly in the absence of an adequate legal basis, but also in large part because ethical violations are judged by peers or former colleagues who lack the required independence.
Despite the welcome addition of five independent experts to its ranks, the new ethics body will not remedy this deep flaw. Its main function will be to agree common standards rather than to police existing ones, a task that will remain the responsibility of the patchwork of existing ethics committees that have been set up by each institutions. The independent experts will be consulted only should one of the institutions decide that difficult or contentious cases need a second pair of eyes, or another ten eyes in this case.
All of this shows the lack of any shared political appetite for the kind of robust ethics regime that many citizens would have imagined was originally proposed by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines. An inter institutional ethics body may exist in name but its nature is far from what was widely understood to have been implied back in 2019.
This is not to suggest however that nothing has changed or that improvements will not be made. The proposed new ethics body – even if toothless when it comes to investigating or sanctioning - could at least compel the institutions to look at their own ethics regimes, to compare and contrast them with those of other bodies, to defend their internal rules or be forced - if only by peer pressure- to strengthen them. At the very least it puts the matter of ethics much more front and centre of institutional thinking than was previously the case.
But key components of the rule of law - independence and the even-handed application of dissuasive sanctions - remain elusive. In its place we have, I would suggest, rule by lawyers - a highly legalistic system of rules and derogations that can be relied upon to give the institutions the answers that they want. The EU deserves better than this. EU citizens - on the doorsteps, in the town halls - should demand more.