Speech by P.Nikiforos Diamandouros

Jean Monnet Lecture

School of Law, University of Bristol, 5 May 2011

Introduction

Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,

I am delighted to be here to deliver the Jean Monnet Lecture at the University of Bristol. I would particularly like to thank Professor Koutrakos for giving me the opportunity to share with you my views on the role of the Ombudsman in encouraging ethical behaviour by civil servants.

In the "Politics", Aristotle states that we can become good citizens and good persons through critical thinking and virtue exercised within the legal framework of the state. But the virtues of civic life are not the same as the virtues of good life. Everybody should strive to become a good citizen, but success in this endeavour does not necessarily imply that one would also become a good person.

In our own day, the current economic situation puts the issue of ethics high on the agenda and invites renewed questions about governance, compliance, and ethical practices. It seems that, nowadays every pronouncement, every speech, every public utterance includes an obligatory call to raise ethical standards. Codes of conduct and committees on ethics have been or are being established in most organisations, public or private, including this very University, which requires each of its faculties to have a properly constituted Committee for Ethics, responsible for giving support to researchers and providing a structured approach to ethical considerations.

Ethics, as a set of moral rules and principles, provide a rational justification for behaviour. They define individual and group priorities, and in the end, they may arrive at a systematic body of moral norms, as individual and group practices get interwoven.  Put otherwise, the concept of ethics is a broad one and does not merely mean compliance with legal obligations.

Mercifully my aim today is by no means to venture into the complex territory of the relationship between law and ethics. For present purposes, it is enough to say that ethical rules and principles are not necessarily legally binding. Within the general field of ethics, "professional ethics" refers to the ethical requirements that attach to specific roles, such as that of a doctor, lawyer, or civil servant. Within the boundaries set by general moral norms, professional groups define their own ethics. They give priority to one or other social objective. They hierarchically organize their values and beliefs. Here again, there are legal rules and principles governing these professions, but the notion of professional ethics is broader than that of legal rules and principles.

However, it is worth pointing out that, at least as regards ethics in the public administration sector, there is a tendency towards legal regulation of the various aspects of ethics, that is, towards making the unethical also illegal. The relevant regulatory arrangements aim to lay down rules of conduct and to provide mechanisms for scrutiny and imposition of sanctions. As a result, a number of legally binding rules and mechanisms have been put in place in a wide range of public administration settings that deal, directly or indirectly, with ethics. In parallel, a body of moral principles that cannot be legally enforced and which forms part of what it is often labelled "soft law", aims to regulate public officials' conduct. No doubt, it is essential to have both set of rules. It is also equally important to maintain a balance between legally binding rules and non-legally binding principles, as well as between various control mechanisms. 

At the European Union level, the European Ombudsman constitutes an extra-judicial mechanism that can encourage the development of, and compliance with, both the law and ethical principles. Unlike a court, the Ombudsman cannot annul unlawful acts or award damages, nor are his or her views legally binding. Contrary to what you might be inclined to think, however, this is not a weakness of the ombudsman institution, but rather a strength. It is precisely because he does not make legally binding rulings that the Ombudsman can draw on ethical principles to encourage the EU administration to do more than merely avoid illegality in its relationship with citizens.  

In my speech today, I would like to explain to you how the institution of European Ombudsman uses its role as a flexible, alternative remedy, to foster the highest standards of behaviour in the EU public service (III). Before I explore this issue, however, I will first have a more general look at ethics in public administration (I) and I will make a brief presentation of the institution and work of the European Ombudsman (II).

I. Ethics in the Public sector

In the public sector, including the EU public administration, ethics seek to address the fundamental issues relating to the public administrators' duty to act as a "steward" for the public. In other words, the core values which should guide the judgment of public servants on how to perform their tasks in daily operations.

Most importantly, ethical considerations provide the standards of accountability that are used to scrutinize the work being conducted by civil servants. Sound public administration involves public trust. Citizens expect public servants to serve the public interest, to manage public resources properly on a daily basis, and to make individual decisions fairly. Fair and reliable public services and predictable decision-making inspire public trust. The integrity, transparency and accountability of public administrations are prerequisites for, and underpin, public trust, as a keystone of good governance.

Trust depends on a belief in the integrity of officials, who are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that will bear the closest public scrutiny. I hasten to add that this obligation is not fully discharged just by acting within the law. Trust also requires that officials make recommendations and decisions only with an eye to serving the public interest, that is, not in order to benefit themselves, their friends, or their families.

On the other hand, misconduct on the part of those who have been entrusted with guarding the public interest and resources has implications for public institutions, in terms of trust and also confidence. Nothing erodes trust faster than unethical conduct, particularly when such conduct could be seen as the result not only of individual acts but also of systemic failure and as evidence of “weak governance.”

(A) Rules on conduct

As with any other professional activity, ethical behaviour in the civil service is promoted both through substantive legal rules and non-legally binding ethical principles.

1. Legally binding rules

Concerning substantive legal rules, in modern democratic orders, including the EU, the conduct of public bodies and of officials is regulated and limited by law. This applies especially to their competencies and to the exercise of discretionary powers and constitutes an essential feature of the rule of law. The conduct of such bodies and officials is also limited by the obligation to respect the rights of individual citizens, including human rights and fundamental rights. Individual rights include rights that derive from the application of administrative law principles, for example, proportionality, non-discrimination and legitimate expectations.

At the EU level, a number of legal instruments, such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, already contain general statements of human and fundamental rights. These legally-binding texts define the obligations of civil servants towards citizens. The Staff Regulations and the Financial Regulation also contain provisions that regulate the conduct of civil servants and introduce transparency into official decision making. Illustrative examples of such provisions are those obliging officials to declare conflicts of interest or to abstain from taking action/decision in case of such a conflict. Non-compliance with rules imposed by legal instruments entails illegal behaviour and may be invoked in proceedings before the courts or before the Ombudsman.

2. Non-legally binding instruments

In addition, there are other instruments, which are not legally binding as such. These include codes of conduct and statement of principles. Basic concepts of ethics and rules of conduct are set out more and more in written rules and codes of conduct drawn up, for example, by international organisations, by EU institutions, and Member States authorities. In the private sector, business associations, interest groups and trade unions often produce and apply similar instruments. The purpose of such instruments is to provide a consistent set of principles and to create a standard.

The importance of articulating ethical principles and the values that define and underpin the public service cannot be overstated. In a democratic legal order, it is essential to provide both public officials and the public at large with a common frame of reference regarding the principles and standards to be applied and in assisting public officials to develop an appreciation of the ethical issues involved in effective and efficient public service delivery. In addition, where a code of conduct has been adopted, the institution adopting it voluntarily assumes responsibility to act in accordance with the terms of such a code in its relations with those who may place reliance upon it.

Failure to observe these rules does not normally constitute illegality, though a kind of bridge exists, through which the obligations voluntarily assumed by an institution can crystallise into legally-binding obligations. More frequently, however, failure to respect such rules is invoked, as we will see later, before extra-judicial control mechanisms, such as the Ombudsman, and can be taken into consideration when interpreting and applying legal rules. 

(B) Watchdog bodies and control mechanisms

Any discussion about living up to ethical standards needs to involve not just clear and effective legislation which coexists with moral principles, but also recognition of the importance of independent, well-crafted and strong watchdog bodies and control mechanisms. Unethical behaviour that amounts to illegality can, in principle, be challenged before the Courts. Nevertheless, it is crucial that, in parallel, scrutiny be also entrusted to extra-judicial mechanisms including for example, auditors, protectors of personal data and ombudsmen. For the purposes of this presentation, I will focus only on the role of the European Ombudsman.  

II. The European Ombudsman

The office of European Ombudsman was created in 1993, as part of the citizenship of the Union. The idea was to help bridge the gap between citizens and the Union's institutions. The European Parliament elected the first Ombudsman in 1995.

The Ombudsman has power to carry out inquiries into maladministration in the activities of the Union's institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, with the exception of the Court of Justice, when acting in its judicial role. He can act either on his own initiative or in response to complaints and is completely independent in the exercise of his duties.

Every citizen of the Union has the right to complain to the Ombudsman. Residents, companies and associations may also complain.

The concept of maladministration is particularly broad and includes all forms of inadequate or deficient administration. Specifically, there is maladministration when a body fails to act in accordance with the law, fails to comply with the principles of good administration or infringes fundamental rights.

If a complaint is justified, the Ombudsman seeks a friendly solution, whenever possible. This may involve a suitable remedy, such as changing a decision, offering an apology, or providing compensation. The Ombudsman cannot compel an institution to put maladministration right, but if an institution fails to comply with his recommendations, he can criticise it publicly. If the issue is serious enough, he may submit a special report to the European Parliament.

As well as providing an independent and impartial service to complainants, the Ombudsman also works proactively to improve the quality of administration and to encourage full respect for citizens' rights.

III. Fostering the highest standards of behaviour in the Union's institutions

As I have already pointed out, in the public sector, once trust is lost, civil servants can no longer perform their jobs effectively. One of the central aims set out in the European Ombudsman’s mission statement is "building trust through dialogue between citizens and the European Union and fostering the highest standards of behaviour in the Union's institutions."

My role as European Ombudsman is to assist the EU institutions in maintaining that essential trust. This can be achieved in various ways. The most obvious is, no doubt, monitoring the institutions' conduct in particular cases brought to my attention by complainants. Through complaints-handling I have the opportunity to recommend courses of action that comply with the principles of good administration and are inspired by the highest standards of ethical conduct. Nevertheless, the Ombudsman's contribution is broader than merely resolving individual cases. For the sake of conceptual clarity, it can be divided into the following three categories:

1)  Making ethical rules more visible;

2)  Interpreting legal obligations in light of ethical principles; and

3) Engaging with the institutions

1. Making ethical principles more visible

Identifying and codifying the principles that should guide the professional conduct of the EU civil servants in their relations with the public has always been part of the Ombudsman's agenda. Such initiatives are needed for two reasons:

firstly, they enable officials to be fully aware of the rules they should abide by and apply when coming into contact with the public and refer them to the best administrative standards;  secondly, they explain to citizens exactly what they can expect from the European administration.

These two main considerations underpinned the Ombudsman's own-initiative inquiry which resulted in the drafting of the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour. The same reasons inspired my decision earlier this year to prepare a draft statement of public service principles for EU civil servants and to launch a public consultation, which I hope will assist me in arriving at a final text.

a. Code of Good Administrative Behaviour

The need for a code of good administrative behaviour was emphasised very early on by the first European Ombudsman, Jacob Söderman. It was he who, in November 1998, launched the own-initiative investigation I just mentioned to find out whether the EU institutions and bodies were prepared to adopt such a code.  After having consulted his colleagues in the (then) 15 Member States of the EU, the Ombudsman drafted the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, which was adopted by the European Parliament in its resolution of 6 September 2001. 

The Code is an excellent example of how legally binding rules can coexist with ethical principles, as well as of how the Ombudsman can foster high standards of behaviour in the EU civil service through a non-legally binding text. Let me explain these two aspects in more detail. 

The Code brings together into an easily readable and understandable document both legally binding rules and non-legally binding principles. Drawing inspiration from the case law of the Court of Justice and the administrative law of the Member States, the Code contains a number of substantive and procedural principles of administrative law, such as the principles of lawfulness and proportionality, the prohibition of discrimination, the rights of defence, and the duty to state grounds for decisions.

At the same time, it contains requirements, such as courtesy, that are not legally enforced. Article 12 stipulates that officials must be service-minded, correct, courteous and accessible in relations with the public. When answering correspondence, telephone calls and e-mails, officials must try to be as helpful as possible and to reply as completely and accurately as possible to questions, put to them. They must also direct citizens to the appropriate official, if they are not responsible for the matter concerned, and must apologise for any error they make which has negative effects on the member of the public in question.

The principle of courtesy is one that attracted a great deal of attention when the European Ombudsman first proposed the Code a decade ago. One Member of the Parliament's Legal Affairs Committee questioned the objectivity of such a principle, and asked how the Ombudsman could ever determine whether it had been respected.  Some years and many complaints later, I can reassure you that the Ombudsman has often used the principle of courtesy as a standard for the evaluation of the administrative behaviour of EU institutions and bodies.

Let me give you an example. A Bulgarian national complained to my services that the tone of the reply that he received from a Commission official regarding a selection procedure was unprofessional, arrogant, and inconsistent with the Code of Conduct and the highest standards to which EU officials should adhere.

The Ombudsman considered that the contested reply was clearly inappropriate, unprofessional, and offensive and invited the institution to try to resolve the case informally. The Commission offered the complainant an apology and the Ombudsman closed the case after he had invited the Commission to take the necessary measures in order to sensitise its staff to the need of being courteous and service-minded with a view to building up and maintaining trust between citizens and the European public administration.

b. Statement of public service principles for EU civil servants

The Code of Good Administrative Behaviour has had significant influence and impact on the civil service of the EU. It has also proved to be an important tool of empowerment for citizens. In fact, EU citizens who feel their rights have been infringed and who complain to the Ombudsman themselves very often refer to the Articles of the Code.

This experience led me to believe that European citizens expect people working at all levels of the EU to behave in accordance with high ethical standards. For this reason, I suggested at a Public Hearing on European Citizenship in 2009 that it would be useful to draft a document that identifies, in a succinct and easily understandable form, the ethical principles that should apply to the handling of EU matters.

In pursuit of this goal, I contacted the national ombudsmen within the European Network of ombudsmen with an eye to obtaining information on national statements of ethical principles in public life. Subsequently, I have prepared a draft statement on "public service principles" that takes account of best practice in the member states and invited citizens, interest groups, and other organisations to submit comments on the draft which is available on my website. The public consultation is still open and comments can be submitted until 15 May 2011.

As regards substantive content, the draft identifies five principles:

• commitment to the European Union and its citizens
• integrity
• objectivity
• respect; and
• transparency.

"Commitment to the European Union and its citizens" means that officials need to be, at all times, conscious that the EU administration exists to serve the Union and its citizens and to act accordingly. They should carry out their functions to the best of their abilities and aim to set a good example to others.

Integrity includes, of course, honesty, but is also linked with the question of conflicts of interest. Officials should not place themselves under financial or other obligations that might reasonably be thought to influence their professional performance. In claiming expenses and allowances, officials should not seek to maximise their benefits but should act with a sense of propriety. At all times, they should conduct themselves in a manner that would withstand the closest public scrutiny. I note that this obligation is not fully discharged merely by acting within the law.

As regards the principle of objectivity, civil servants should be open-minded and ready to correct mistakes. They should base decisions only on merit. They should not allow the fact that they like or dislike a particular person to influence their professional conduct.

EU officials should equally adhere to the principle of respect for others. They should be polite, helpful, and co-operative with each other and with citizens. Furthermore, they should act as transparently as possible, by explaining their actions and by welcoming public scrutiny.

Let me immediately point out that these draft principles are not new. They are brought together from various sources with the aim of presenting them in an easily intelligible form. The draft statement is intended to complement existing instruments, including the Staff Regulations, the Financial Regulation, and the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, which contain general rules and principles governing the behaviour of civil servants.

A statement of ethical principles can complement these other instruments because, unlike them, it would neither be legally binding, nor drafted with the idea that it could be made legally binding in the future. It will help civil servants to focus on the spirit in which the law and other applicable rules should be understood and applied, as well as serve as the starting point for reflection when a situation appears not to be covered by the law or other applicable rules. This is useful because, whilst ethical principles include compliance with legal rules, they are not limited to such compliance. Put otherwise, being able truthfully to say “I broke no legal rule or principle” is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for ethical conduct.

It follows that the relevant question for an official considering a particular course of conduct should not be: “am I doing the minimum necessary to comply with the ethical principles?”, but rather: “would a reasonable person think this is how an official should behave in the light of the ethical principles?”

Such an approach will promote good administration and make maladministration less likely to occur.

In parallel, by clearly setting out the fundamental principles and values, which the behaviour of EU civil servants should reflect, the statement aims to promote citizens’ trust in the European civil service and the EU institutions that it serves.

Some reactions to the public consultation we have already received question whether a statement of ethical principles is really necessary and argue that the EU administration already subscribes to high standards of ethical behaviour. To my mind, however, this misses the point. The idea of producing a succinct statement of public service principles is not to introduce something new, but to remind existing officials of their content, educate new officials and inform the public. Furthermore, when it comes to applying the principles, there is always room for improvement. I regularly receive complaints about revolving doors in the EU administration, alleged conflicts of interest, and lack of transparency. I am, therefore, convinced that the statement will be beneficial to EU civil servants by providing clear guidance in their professional behaviour.

2) Interpreting legal obligations in light of ethical principles

I often surprise my audiences, especially the legal ones, by stating that there is “life beyond legality”. I use this formulation in order to explain the relationship between maladministration and illegality and to encourage and persuade the institutions to do more than merely avoid unlawful behaviour.

I have consistently taken the view that unlawful behaviour constitutes, by definition maladministration. However, as the EU courts have confirmed, maladministration may exist even in the absence of illegality.

In a number of instances, institutions have acted in a manner which complied with their legal obligations, but which, nevertheless breached certain ethical standards, thereby giving rise to maladministration and to grievances on the part of individuals. My mission as Ombudsman is to persuade the institutions to adopt a different position; one which will be both in compliance with the law and, in addition, constitute better administration than the original decision. Whenever possible, I try to propose interpretations and solutions that are not imposed by legal provisions alone, but also take account of ethical standards.

Even if I sometimes still receive replies from Institutions, including the Commission, which can be paraphrased as saying: “our position complies with the law and we will not change it unless ordered to do so by a court”, the institutions have, over time, become increasingly ready to accept the Ombudsman's suggestions.

Let me use an example to illustrate this point.

Avoiding conflicts of interest is an issue that concerns both law and ethics. There are countless rules defining conflict-of-interest issues in both the public administration and the private sector. They range from legal provisions to recommendations and guidelines. In 2008, an NGO, Friends of the Earth Europe, complained to the Ombudsman that two high ranking Commission officials had accepted VIP tickets from a sportswear supplier for the Rugby World Cup in Paris. According to the complainant, this could have resulted in a conflict of interest, since both officials dealt with anti-dumping cases in which the sportswear supplier could be interested.

In its opinion, the Commission pointed out that it had already developed a set of rules and principles regarding ethics, including a Practical Guide to Staff Ethics and Conduct, an Ethics Action Plan, the pertinent provisions of the Staff Regulations and the Commission's Code of Good Administrative Behaviour. It appears that the two officials had asked for permission to accept the tickets, which was granted in accordance with the above rules.

Drawing inspiration from the OECD’s Recommendation on Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service, I took the view that in order to maintain public trust and confidence in its activities and to protect its staff from unjustified suspicion, the Commission, should do its utmost to avoid not only actual conflicts of interest, but also apparent conflicts of interest.

The Commission acknowledged that it would have been better not to have allowed the officials to accept the tickets and informed the Ombudsman that it was updating its internal rules relating to the acceptance of gifts.

In this case, it is clear that the Commission had not infringed any legal provision and was under no legal obligation to review its rules. Nevertheless, it accepted the Ombudsman's proposal with a view to improving ethical standards.

The institutions' reactions are not always positive when I urge them to do more than respect their legal obligations. That is particularly true when it comes to considering whether to replace administrative decisions which can no longer be challenged before a court by taking into account of court judgments delivered in similar cases. Let me give you two examples.

In the first case, the complainant, a European Parliament official with a severely disabled child, asked the Parliament to reconsider its previous position and retroactively pay him an allowance by taking account of a decision that the Court of Justice had taken in a similar matter. Parliament refused on the grounds that the court judgment only applied to the parties in the legal proceedings.

In the second case, an official requested a re-examination of his situation in relation to another allowance. In so doing, he invoked the evolution of the case-law since the original decision was made in 1990. The Economic and Social Committee refused its request, invoking the principle of legal certainty.

The position I have always adopted regarding these cases draws a clear distinction between legality and good administration. It can clearly not be disputed that a decision which has not been challenged within the legal deadlines for judicial review becomes definitive and can no longer be challenged in court. Nevertheless, unless there would be prejudice to third party rights (which was not the case in the two examples I gave), nothing prevents the administration from replacing its first decision with another decision. While the institutions are not legally obliged to adopt new decisions replacing existing ones, with a view to taking into account the evolving case-law of the Union Courts, they are certainly not legally prevented from doing so. Put otherwise, it is within their margin of discretion to do so. 

Such a course of action is, under certain circumstances, required by the ethical principles that should guide the EU administration. To use the example of the child allowance, high ethical standards required that the situation of an already heavily burdened parent of a severely disabled child had to be taken into consideration. Regrettably, in that case the European Parliament refused to follow my draft recommendation.

3) Engaging proactively with the institutions

Following my re-election by the European Parliament in January 2010, I developed a strategy for my new mandate. The strategy outlines a series of objectives and priorities, which are designed to achieve the Ombudsman's overarching aim of, first, ensuring that EU citizens enjoy their rights fully, and, second, enhancing the quality of the EU administration. One of these objectives is to "have a positive impact on the administrative culture of the EU institutions".

Engaging in a regular and structured dialogue with the institutions constitutes a central part of my deeply held view that the Ombudsman should not be regarded as an institutional expression of a culture of blame, which tends to breed a defensive mentality in the institutions and their staff.  My objective rather is to promote a culture of service to citizens and of active respect for their rights. As part of that same philosophy, I have intensified my efforts to reach out to, and co-operate with, the EU institutions, bodies and agencies. 

An integral part of my efforts to achieve that aim is a systematic examination of the follow-up to all the critical and further remarks I issue to the institutions. Critical and further remarks contain constructive criticism and suggestions from the Ombudsman, resulting from inquiries conducted on his own initiative or following complaints.

These remarks are meant to serve as a stimulus for the institutions to reflect on whether the experience of handling a complaint has provided any information that can be used to raise the quality of its administration in the future. In particular, further remarks are intended to help the institution concerned improve its practices so as to enhance the quality of service provided to citizens. Critical remarks, on the other hand, inform the institution of what it has done wrong, so it can avoid similar maladministration in the future.

The overall results of these studies have been very encouraging. Most institutions have adopted a constructive and positive approach both to criticism and to suggestions.  As a result of the follow-up to the Ombudsman's remarks, real improvements have been introduced in a wide range of institutional practices. Where the follow-up is considered to be exemplary, I identify the cases involved as "star cases" in order to acknowledge the efforts made by an institution and to further motivate its staff. 

Let me use as an example of such a case the Parliament's reaction to my further remark in a complaint from a participant in the Parliament's traineeship programme for persons with disabilities. In my further remark, I invited the Parliament not only to take action to ensure that disabled people are not denied opportunities by reason of their disability, but also to be conscious of the need to respect their dignity. In its reply to this remark, the Parliament provided the Ombudsman with a detailed report of the steps it has taken to improve its practices in this area, including concrete actions in the area of traineeship and recruitment.  To be sure, not all responses are exemplary. On the whole, however, they are encouraging and suggestive of a gradual shift in mentality that is consonant with the principles of a service culture.

As part of my efforts to engage proactively with the institutions, I also hold regular meeting with the heads of institutions, with senior officials and staff members with a view to explaining my role and to offering advice, based on my experience, on how to ensure good administration and to promote a culture of service. A related initiative that will come to fruition later this year is a new publication specifically for the staff of EU institutions, to help them understand better the Ombudsman's approach to handling complaints and to administrative problems. It will explain how best to respond to complaints, but also how to avoid complaints in the first place. One of the key ideas underlying this new publication is that the way in which an institution reacts to complaints constitutes an important indicator of the extent to which it subscribes to a culture of service.

Where the culture of service in an institution is strong, its staff will be ready to engage in dialogue and to look for alternative solutions that are more citizen-centred than the ones originally put forth. The first question in dealing with an Ombudsman inquiry should therefore not be “how can we best defend our actions?”, but rather “how can we arrive at a win-win solution to this complaint and we can profit from the Ombudsman in attaining this goal?”

Let me point out that, when adopting an alternative solution, the institutions and their services are not necessarily admitting that the original decision was wrong. However, the willingness to acknowledge and apologise for mistakes when they occur and to put the matter right, as far as possible forms an integral part of a culture of service.

In the past, I often had to criticise institutions for failing to acknowledge and apologise for mistakes. I am delighted to report that a significant learning process has taken place in the meantime, and that many institutions are now willing to offer apologies on their own initiative. This is a profound cultural shift. An apology is a very powerful tool with which to restore confidence in a responsible administration, and to bring satisfaction to a harmed citizen. Let me, in this regard, share with you a pertinent recent example.

A retired Commission official submitted a complaint about the Commission's actions when investigating allegations casting doubts over the complainant's real residence. Despite its initial refusal to accept the Ombudsman's proposal for a friendly solution, and then his draft recommendation that it pay the complainant compensation, the Commission, after a subsequent meeting with the Ombudsman, offered the complainant EUR 1 000 compensation for non-material damage, and a letter of apology personally signed by the Commissioner for Inter-Institutional Relations and Administration.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that a central part of my role as European Ombudsman is to help ensure that the EU public administration subscribes to a culture or service to citizens and tries to meet their increasingly high expectations. Although we are not quite there yet, significant progress has been made to date. As we move along this path towards a top class EU administration, I seek to ensure that the institutions see the Ombudsman as an ally, not a foe. Rather than merely pointing out where things have gone wrong, the Ombudsman goes further and proactively offers the EU institutions guidance on how to provide a better service and how to abide by the highest ethical standards, going beyond a narrow and rigid adherence to legality.

Unlike Groucho Marx who famously said: "Those are my principles and if you don't like them... well, I have others", I am afraid that when it comes to the subject of this evening's discussion, or, in other words, to the issue of ethical standards, as a necessary complement to legality in defining principles for public service conduct [subscribing to the logic of an administrative culture of service], I do not have other principles to offer.

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to responding to your questions and remarks.