INTRODUCTION

Ladies and gentlemen, professors and participants!

I would like to first express my gratitude to Professor Anthony Molho and Professor Diogo Ramada Curto for having invited me to give the first presentation at this summer course.

It is not only an honour for me to speak in such a distinguished setting. It is also a great pleasure to have the occasion to interact with such a knowledgeable and profoundly interested group of participants.

I am keenly aware of the nature of the EUI summer courses as a space for dialogue and fruitful debates. In addition to presenting concrete information and attempted analyses, I will try to therefore highlight useful points for discussion.

As you now know, I am not a historian, but a professor of political science, and I currently work as the Ombudsman of the European Union with competence over the institutions and bodies of the European Union. Thus, my angle to the subject of migration is that of a non-expert but hopefully well-informed observer.

The organisers of this summer course have in my view done an excellent job in formulating a precise and indeed very helpful focus for the summer course. Quoting from the programme:

"Whatever one's position on this contemporary pressing issue, one must acknowledge that participants in the current discussion seldom recognize that such movements of people have continuously characterized the history of Europe from the earliest recorded times of its history. In this sense, what is happening today can be considered not so much a new phenomenon as a new chapter of a very long tradition."

I have understood this statement to contain not only a message from historians to other historians on an issue of academic interest, but to be also a statement that points out the sometimes populist and xenophobic nature of current public debate on migration.

I very much applaud the EUI's decision to tackle that issue, and to let other people benefit from historians' knowledge as well as their ability to put current events into perspective.

As you know, the perspective that I will talk about today and discuss with you is a recent one, i.e. migration rights in the European legal order in the post war era. I hope that this "contemporary" perspective can prove useful to the other lectures and their ensuing debates by providing a link between what might seem a long time ago and the present.

MAIN PART

The post-war era has been rich in the differences marking the various periods of European migration development. We may distinguish roughly four such periods:

(i) labour migration: approximately 1950-1974; characteristic for this first post war period of migration was that the issue of rights only very gradually became a central issue.

(ii) integration and family reunification: from mid-1970s until mid 1980s; during this period, it became clear that most of the Gastarbeiter would not return to their countries of origin, but wanted to stay and indeed expand their presence through immigration of family members; this compelled European countries to address more complex issues of integration and basic human rights.

(iii) asylum seekers/refugees: late 1980s until late 1990s; the increase in asylum claims throughout the 1980s increased the "visibility" of foreigners in the media, and arguably had an important general impact on European countries' migration policy.

(iv) the present - pan-European migration policies? Today, European countries are to an unprecedented extent facing multiple migration challenges, both internally, among themselves and vis-à-vis non-European countries.

Before looking at these periods in more detail, it is useful to be very clear about three issues from the outset:

first, the discourse on migration rights is clearly not "merely" (if I may use that word) a question of human or moral rights; while principles of human rights have played a crucial role in the development of European migration policies, it is equally clear that migration rights are also used as a tool to manage demographic developments and the accessibility of skills and work power.

second, migration within Europe is as important as migration from outside Europe's border, although the latter admittedly catches more headlines when overfilled boats attempt to reach the shores of our southern European countries.

third, migration in Europe has been as much about the right to actually leave one's country as it has been about the right to simply enter rich Western European countries. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 recognises the right to leave any country (including one’s own) and the right to return to one’s own country (Article 13). It is an important part of the history of European migration that the Continent was till recently divided into those who enjoyed this right to the fullest and those who had to wait until 1989 for that right to become a reality.

I very consciously make these points from the outset because they help us avoid getting hijacked by the migration discourses that focus solely on coloured migration and seek to create a them-us scenario.

1. Labour migration (immigration to Western European countries), 1950-1974

Migration within Europe between 1950 and 1974, as well as migration from outside Europe had the clear objective of reinforcing and indeed enabling economic growth.

The nature of migration differed significantly. Countries like France and the United Kingdom relied heavily (and quite naturally) on migration from their colonies or former colonies.

In a formal legal sense, migration from some of these colonies was initially not framed in the modern them-us style. The colonies were either considered an extension of the colonial power concerned, or the post-colonial relationship was sufficiently special to place some of these colonies in a space between domestic and foreign policy.

Thus, Britain had an open migration regime between 1948 and 1962. The 1948 British Nationality Act gave all subjects of the Crown in Britain and its empire the right to move to Britain. People from the colonies and the Commonwealth could state civis Britannicus sum (I am a British citizen) and access the same formal legal, social and political rights as other subjects of the crown.

In Britain, anti-immigration sentiments did, however, begin to influence migration rights significantly already in the early 1960s, and the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act introduced a system of permits ('vouchers') to control migration from the Commonwealth. In 1963, 30 130 vouchers were issued, in 1972 only 2 290.

As the migration expert Professor Andrew Geddes has pointed out, the discourse underlying these restrictions was partly based on populist arguments. He points to a statement by the Home Secretary of the time, R.A. Butler, who claimed that with the open regime around 800 million people were entitled to move to Britain. Then, as now, the fact was that the vast majority of persons who could migrate preferred to stay in their home countries.

In France, the migration issue was tackled very early on. Public immigration authorities were set up in 1945, and a system of residence and work permits was introduced. Labour recruitment agreements were furthermore made with 16 European and non-European countries.

Labour migration was, however, only to a limited extent managed or organised by the public sector. Until the 1970s, labour migration to France was primarily organised by the private sector. Many migrant workers entered France during the 1950s and 1960s without the appropriate papers and regularised their status after settling. Due to the comparatively open French naturalisation laws, many migrants even ended up becoming citizens of the Republic.

In Germany, Article 116 of the German Basic Law gave those of German descent the right to enter Germany and to obtain German citizenship. In the period 1945-1955, migration to Western Germany falling under this provision amounted to no less than 12 million individuals - by 1950, refugees or expellees accounted for 16 per cent of Western Germany's population.

Following this initial period, the German migration regime became strongly focussed on the economic rationale, even introducing the word Gastarbeiter into international vocabulary.

Germany made labour migration agreements with several European countries, for instance Italy in 1955, Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Portugal in 1964, and non-European countries such as Tunisia in 1965 and Morocco in 1963 and 1966.

German legislation made it quite clear that the rationale of the migration policy was purely economic - an example of this is the 1965 Foreigners Law, which contained no provision for family reunification.

The European level - by which I refer primarily to the European Economic Communities and the Council of Europe - had very little direct influence on migration rights and issues during this first phase of labour migration.

It is important, however, to distinguish between direct and indirect impact. Whereas the direct impact was limited, both the EEC and the Council of Europe were important sources of migration discourses and policies in Europe.

As you know, the Treaty establishing the European Communities was signed in 1957 and came into force in 1958. It laid down basic principles of free movement of workers. Article 8 of the Treaty provided for completion of a common market by 31 December 1969.

The free movement principles applied to citizens of the Member States of the EEC, and were clearly market orientated. Once, however, the status of "worker" had been obtained - and it should be noted that the European Court of Justice has given a generous interpretation of this concept - social rights were obtained for the Community worker and his or her family also.

The Council of Europe, with a membership comprising almost all Western European countries, sought to promote social rights of migrants through a number of international treaties, for instance the European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance (1953), the European Interim Agreement on Social Security Schemes relating to Old Age, Invalidity and Survivors (1953), the European Social Charter (1961), and the European Agreement on Social Security (1972).

The importance of these measures cannot be overstated, given that people movement within Europe accounts for the vast majority of European migration. According to recent statistics, 80% of foreigners living in Europe are originally from another Member State of the Council of Europe.

2. Integration and family reunification - mid-1970s until mid 1980s

During the phase of large scale labour migration to Europe, there was a strong presumption that the migration was temporary and that migrants would return to their countries of origin when economic conditions changed.

We could discuss at some length whether the Gastarbeiter-notion was genuine, or whether it was a deliberate fiction created by policy-makers to soothe concerns amongst anti-migration voters.

The fact was, however, that by the mid 1970s the majority of the "guests" had clearly decided to stay. Combined with the recession of the time, European countries were therefore within a short period of time confronted with an entirely new migration and integration context.

One example of how previous migration policies quickly became outdated is the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers. The drafting of this convention began under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 1966. It concerned the principal aspects of the legal situation of migrant workers, such as recruitment, medical examinations, occupational tests, travel, residence permits, work permits and so forth. It was based on the idea that "migrant workers who are nationals of Council of Europe member States should be regulated so as to ensure that as far as possible they are treated no less favourably than workers who are nationals of the receiving State in all aspects of living and working conditions".

By the time the convention was opened for signature in 1977, it was already out of date, due to the new context of economic recession and unemployment. It is furthermore characteristic of the mood prevailing at the time that this problem could not be addressed through an efficient response by the Council's member states.

Also within the EEC - where the basic philosophy was precisely to open borders - economic recession slowed down the implementation of the common market, thus effectively weakening the migration rights that existed on paper.

It was even argued that the Treaty provisions on free movement of workers within the EEC could not be relied upon by ordinary citizens before the national courts.

It is an important part of the history of the time that the European Court of Justice stepped in to place the right of free movement in the hands of internal migrants themselves. It did so in its famous Van Duyn judgement of 1974, when it decided that the Treaty provisions on free movement had direct applicability. That is to say, individuals could rely on the free movement provisions of the Treaty directly before national courts in the EEC.

This is one good example of how courts were in some cases willing to act against the political mainstream in the area of European migration rights.

An important example of a particularly contentious issue relating to migration rights was that of family reunification. This was not only an important issue because of the numbers of individuals involved, but also because it compelled European countries to address issues of basic human rights and equality.

From a rights-perspective, the general starting point for the issue of family reunification is the right to respect for family life. We find this right in Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights and in most national constitutions.

The Convention and national constitutions do not, however, regulate the specific issue of family reunification, and European countries were therefore free to adopt rules that fitted labour market aims only or even special notions of the family.

For instance, as previously noted, the German 1965 Foreigners Law made no provision for family reunification. In the UK, the legislation was based on the assumption that men were the breadwinners and women were dependants who would follow their husbands - legally resident women could therefore not apply for reunification with their husbands. And in France, the Government in 1974 simply suspended by ordinance all family reunification in response to the recession of that time.

The courts have several times been called upon to review national practices and laws, and have often received credit for protecting fundamental rights of migrants in this area.

In France, the Council of State found that the 1974 ordinance suspending family reunification was contrary to the French Constitution. The Court classed the right to lead a normal family life as one of the general principles of law, which foreigners residing legally in France should enjoy without distinction.

In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court confirmed the state's sovereign power to control access to the state territory, but at the same time reduced the capacity of the state to control family migration in the sense that an automatic right, albeit restrictive, to family migration was established. It did so in a case where the Federal Government had decided to allow family reunification with an 8-year residence qualification for the spouse and a 1-year wait for the partner. One Land had introduced a 3-year wait for the partner. The Court upheld the rule introduced by the Federal Government, while striking down the 3-year wait of the Land concerned [ Bavaria ].

At the European level, the European Court of Human Rights has left a large degree of autonomy to the individual countries to determine their policy on family reunification. Thus, the right to respect for family life does not imply a right to family reunification for migrants - in the field of international human rights, that right only exists in respect of involuntary migrants, i.e. refugees.

The Court of Human Rights has, however, found that the UK rules only allowing family reunification in respect of male migrants constituted a breach of the fundamental right to equality (decision in Abdulaziz, 1985).

Within the EEC, the question of migrating EEC workers and their families was dealt with through fairly precise legislative provisions. The basic rule that was established here was that the closest family was always entitled to reside with the Community worker who had migrated to another EEC state, and that all family members could enjoy all social rights on an equal footing with nationals of the receiving state.

3. Asylum seekers, "irregular" migration and integration: mid 1980s until late 1990s

The third migration period developed around the end of the Cold War in the mid 1980s.

A key aspect of this period was the significant focus on illegal migration. Whereas migration had previously been associated with the Gastarbeiter, more complex issues of asylum provoked significant changes to the ways in which migration was perceived and responded to.

An international legal framework covering the rights of asylum seekers and refugees developed after WW II. The Geneva Convention of 1951 contained rules intended to protect the rights of people who feared persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality or membership in a particular social group or political opinion.

The Geneva Convention was underpinned by ideas about human rights and the universal applicability of such rights. During the Cold War, the Convention was seen to work well in many cases. This, however, was often due to political factors rather than simply a moral recognition of the values of human rights. For instance, migrants who came from a region or country under communist threat or rule could usually quite easily obtain refugee status in a western-oriented country.

When the Cold War began to end, refugees in the 1980s and 1990s faced stronger attempts to restrict their inflows, including in particular more significant evidential requirements.

Whereas coming from a communist region or country had previously been sufficient to classify migrants as refugees, they now increasingly faced problems of having to prove that they had in fact been tortured or politically persecuted. In other words, they had to prove that they were not "bogus refugees".

In northern European countries, the long-drawn and seemingly chaotic processing of asylum claims was sometimes seen to indicate a poor rights-situation of refugees. In one sense this was correct, because the national systems clearly had difficulties coping with the asylum claims, and this naturally affected the human dignity and rights of the asylum seekers. On the other hand, the situation also proved, perhaps ironically, certain strengths in the international law regime for the protection of refugees. The very long and unsatisfactory processing-times of asylum claims would clearly not have been necessary if governments could very easily have rejected individuals as "bogus refugees".

Fairly early on and in the context of the political and social pressures generated by the rising number of migrants, migration debates became debates about integration and the identity and national self-perception of the receiving states. From a rights-perspective, an interesting shift was seen towards a debate with a dual focus: migrants did not only have rights, they should also have duties.

In France, for instance, it was proposed that an oath of allegiance be introduced and that formal assimilation be prescribed - including knowledge of the French language. In the Netherlands, rules on "civic integration" were formulated - one proposal was 500 hours of language training and 100 hours of "civil education". In other countries like Denmark, Germany and the UK similar debates and proposals emerged.

At first sight, the focus on migrants' duties seemed simply to address fears that migrants would be ghettoised, disloyal and even hostile to the recipient country. But the issue was more complex than that.

It was complex in two particular respects: first, it brought to the forefront of the debates the difficult issue of integration vs. assimilation; second, it created a contradictory element in anti-migration discourses.

As you know, the distinction between integration and assimilation is fundamental. The former recognises and respects cultural diversity, whilst focusing on the rights and duties of citizenship; the latter insists on assimilation to prevailing cultural norms. In public policy debates - and even in academic ones - the distinction is not, however, always clearly drawn.

Those who very strongly oppose assimilation have tended to effectively suggest a somewhat functional integration approach only: the immigrants should learn the language of the host-country and be able to work. But they should otherwise be left to pursue the habits consistent with their specific cultural background.

Those who strongly advocate assimilation have previously been attacked for wanting "them" to be like "us". They have therefore often been branded "racist", not always without justification.

After September 11 2001 in particular, the grey-zone between the "integrationists" and "assimilators" seems to have grown larger. It is to a greater extent popular and possible to talk about "common values" without receiving the anti-migration brand. And legislation has been introduced accordingly, such as the head-scarf legislation in France and recent legislation in Germany laying down quite demanding language requirements.

At the European level, the word 'assimilation' is very rarely used in policy-discourses. And to use it would clearly be a contradiction: even to the extent that it is also possible to talk about 'a' European culture, the diversity of the many different European cultures is a basic feature of European integration. In the cases of third country nationals, we therefore also find a classical pragmatic approach on the part of EU-policy makers.

For instance, in November 2000, the European Commission proposed a concept of civic citizenship to promote integration. This would enable migrants to acquire civic citizenship after a certain period of years, and should help many immigrants to settle successfully into society. The idea was that civic citizenship would guarantee a number of core rights and obligations to immigrants which they will acquire gradually over a period of years, so that they would eventually be treated in the same way as nationals of their host state, without being naturalised. This pragmatic idea of "progressive" acquisition of rights and duties is indeed seen in much of the concrete EU-legislation concerning third country nationals.

The contradictory element introduced by the discourse on duties is related to the factor that the earlier exclusive focus on rights had one advantage for those who opposed migration. This was so because, in popular debates, rights could still be perceived to be the product of generosity on the part of the recipient states, and by implication also something that could be withdrawn.

The discourse involving notions of duties, on the other hand, seemed to imply ideas of a reciprocal relationship – it thus effectively introduced notions of co-citizenship and equality. This, however, was not necessarily what the anti-immigration lobbies wanted, and the discussions on rights and duties were therefore often unclear in terms of pro and anti immigration sentiments.

The dual focus on rights and duties was in some respects the product of a control-approach to migration. It clearly built on the idea that states could not only control the inflow of migrants, but could and should also significantly influence migrants’ behaviour once they had arrived. It is no surprise that this focus was particularly prominent in the northern European countries.

In southern European countries, a different picture developed.

As you all know - and I have not had to point out this earlier in my presentation - following WW II, the countries of Southern Europe were the main contributors to migration to the industrialized nations of Northern Europe. The economic recession caused by the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 led to a sharp fall in this south-north migration.

In the 1980s, several of the southern European countries found themselves to be receiving countries of migration. This was a very sudden development that caught most these countries unaware.

In Greece, for instance, immigration grew at the beginning of the 1980s, when Asians, Africans, and Poles arrived and found work in construction, agriculture, and domestic services. With the collapse of the Central and Eastern European regimes in 1989, immigration in Greece was transformed into a massive, uncontrollable phenomenon. As a result, although Greece was at that time still one of the less-developed EU states, in the 1990s it received the highest percentage of immigrants in relation to its labour force in all the Union.

In Italy, the number of foreign-born people in Italy holding a residence permit was, in 1985, estimated at approximately 423,000. By 1991, that number had more than doubled, reaching 896,800. In 2000, the foreign population had reached nearly 1,388,200, with some 850,700 immigrants in Italy for employment reasons.

Similar developments could be observed in other southern European countries (Immigration to Spain from Magreb, Latin America, Eastern Europe and to Portugal from Brazil and former colonies)

A number of factors explain this inflow into previous providers of migration. In the context of illegal migration and asylum seeking, one factor of particular significance has been the relatively large share of the informal or grey economy. It has quite simply been easier for migrants to hide in the black market economy.

Even in the case of asylum seekers, this factor would appear to have played a role. Thus, one reason for the much lower number of asylum-seekers in the southern European countries is that more alternative migration routes were available. Migrants that in a country such as the UK would probably be classed as asylum-seekers are more likely to fall into the category of irregular immigrants in southern Europe.

At one point, these north-south differences gave rise to the general perception that Europe’s southern borders were an open door to migrants. Italy, for instance, was excluded from being one of the founding members of the border-free zone of Schengen because its borders were considered too “porous” and therefore a gateway of illegal migration to the other Schengen-states.

However, the notion of controlled migration in the north as opposed to open-gate borders in the south has been rendered increasingly hollow in the face of the significant problems faced by central- and northern European countries in controlling the influx of illegal migrants from Eastern Europe.

Not only the figures but also the character of illegal migration from this part of the world has added new key issues to rights-discourses on migration in Europe. Whereas migration rights in the first two periods were concerned with either the right to migrate as workers or as refugees, the appalling phenomenon of trafficking in women and children has become a basic element in discourses on the movement of people in today’s Europe.

The increasingly complex, multi-level and multi-frontier character of migration to, and within Europe, has given significant impetus to attempts to formulate common European migration policies. In the next part of my presentation, I will briefly outline these policies and the types of migration-related rights which they have given rise to.

The present

Migration policies at the level of the EC/EU can roughly be divided into the internal and the external dimensions.

Internal migration concerns the free movement rights that I have referred to earlier, and which are relatively clear and well-established in the European legal order.

To briefly summarise, the right to free movement established by the EEC Treaty was originally focussed solely on labour-mobility, but the creation of a European Union citizenship in 1993 opened up space and allowed for an extension of the right to other categories of internal migrants. The limitations that are still in place are primarily due to a perceived need to avoid “shopping” between the still very different social systems of different Member States.

One unique feature of migration and of the free movement rights of the EU is, of course, that these EU-rights have moved in the direction of the migrants to a much greater extent than the migrants have moved to the EU. This has happened through steady enlargement throughout 1980s, 1990s and lately through the record intake of ten new member states in the east and Mediterranean. It can safely be said that without these enlargements, we would talk very differently about the impact of migration in Europe from the mid-1980s.

In what follows, I will focus mainly on the EU dimension relating to third country nationals, i.e. on migrants entering or trying to enter the EU from the outside. It is important, however, not to lose sight of the fact that this aspect of EU migration policy is closely linked to – or, if you like, necessitated by – the enhanced internal migration rights in the EU. Indeed, it was the Single European Act of 1986 - i.e., the treaty that reinvigorated the internal market - which contained the political declaration that Member State were to co-operate on the entry, movement and residence of third country nationals.

The tension between the wish of national governments to co-operate closely on immigration policies and their reluctance to agree to a supranational approach to the issue has been one of the key aspects in the EU’s development towards common migration policies.

In the mid- and late 1980s, various working and co-ordinating groups were established to address movement and security issues relating to migration. In respect of asylum, the key measure introduced was the Dublin Convention of 1990. This convention established the important principle that only one state should be responsible for examining asylum claims, i.e., a one-stop-shop measure introduced to avoid “asylum shopping”. The convention did nothing to harmonise or otherwise “Europeanise” asylum procedures.

The difficulties of handling asylum issues is demonstrated by the fact that the Dublin convention was only ratified in 1997, i.e., seven years after the principle of one-stop shop had been agreed.

The important step of creating a treaty basis for co-operation on migration was taken with the Treaty of European Union in 1993. The Treaty of European Union recognised the following areas of common interest:

- asylum policy,

- external frontiers – particularly the crossing of these frontiers and the exercise of controls,

- immigration policy and policy regarding third country nationals,

- conditions of entry and movement by nationals of third countries on the territory of member states

- conditions of residence by nationals of third countries on the territory of member states, including family reunion and access to employment and,

- combating unauthorised immigration, residence and work by third country nationals.

Third country migration and asylum were not, however, subject to the supranational machinery of the EU. Community legislation could not be made in this field in the same way that legislation could be made on, for instance, agriculture or the free movement of EU citizens. Third country migration and asylum belonged to a so-called “third pillar” in the EU’s treaty framework, which concerned justice and home affairs. The many measures produced in the period between 1993 and 1999 were therefore of a somewhat obscure legal standing, most of them effectively non-binding.

The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 brought the field of migration and asylum closer to the EU’s normal method of regulation. And in 1999, the Tampere summit of the EU Member State governments laid down the focus of an EU migration policy. This included the following areas:

- Asylum measures should include a workable determination of the state responsible for the examination of an asylum application, common standards on processing applications, common minimum conditions of reception of asylum seekers, and the approximation of rules on the recognition and content of the refugee status;

- Fair treatment for third country nationals who reside legally on the territory of the EU’s Member States; and

- The management of migration flows based on co-operation with third countries of origin and transit.

Measures adopted in pursuit of these policies cover issues such as:

- a European Refugee Fund,

- minimum standards for giving temporary protection, in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons,

- minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, and

- criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national.

From a rights-perspective, an important aspect of these developments is that until the late 1990s, the EU policy was characterised by a focus on how to restrict immigration. The Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in 1999 enabled a more balanced approach, making it possible for the rights of immigrants to be better protected.

The Amsterdam Treaty in particular made it possible to look beyond the issue of entry and residence permits. It introduced a new Article 13 that extended anti-discrimination provisions to include gender, race, ethnicity, religion, age, disability and sexual orientation.

Two directives were issued in June 2000, covering the principles of equal treatment, irrespective of race or ethnic origin, and the establishment of a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.

The ‘race equality’ directive applies to the public and the private sectors, including public bodies. The ‘occupation equality’ directive applies to access to employment, including self-employment and occupation, vocational training and working conditions; social security and healthcare; social advantages; education; and the provision of goods and services available to the public, including housing.

These two directives are important because they aim to tackle both direct and indirect forms of discrimination and thus go beyond provisions in many member states. It has even been argued that the EU's 'race equality' directive actually established rights and duties that are stronger than the rights relating to gender discrimination.

CONCLUSION

In concluding my presentation, I first of all feel the need to emphasise a salient feature of the free movement rights in the European Union. I mentioned at the beginning of my presentation that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 recognises the right to leave any country (including one’s own) and the right to return to one’s own country [ Article 13 ]. International law does not, however, provide a general right to enter and live in other countries. The free movement rights in EU law do provide this right, and this is what makes them so important and innovative in global terms.

This feature of EU free movement rights is also an important background to the EU's recent policies on asylum and external migration, on which I would like to make a few remarks by way of conclusion.

The short summary that I just gave on this issue may seem to indicate that the EU’s recent policies on asylum and external migration are fairly comprehensive.

They are, however, only a minimal response to what is arguably the most complex and delicate period of migration so far in Europe's history.

As many migration experts correctly point out, it is wrong or at least simplistic to speak of an immigration crisis in Europe. Compared to the much greater flows of refugees and migrants in other significantly poorer regions of the world, Europe can hardly claim to be facing an issue that it has not got the resources to tackle.

However, compared to Europe's previous migration periods, today's challenges are either unprecedented in themselves or pose a much greater number of challenges than in the past.

One of these challenges brings us back to the concerns of this summer Academy. Europeans tend to fairly persistently hold the view that their respective country is not an immigration country. They may even define themselves as determined anti-racist and anti-xenophobic, but still maintain that the self-perception of their state should not be that of an 'immigration country'.

Many EU citizens go a little further, finding that there are quite simply too many foreigners in their country. Surveys have, however, revealed that Europeans persistently overestimate the actual percentage of foreigners living in their country.

To begin with, it is first of all clear that informed perceptions of "foreigners" rarely underlie such perceptions amongst ordinary citizens. I myself, for instance, would certainly have been considered a "foreigner" in a northern European country a couple of decades ago. Whether my present status as a European citizen would now make a significant change to that today still remains somewhat uncertain.

However, even when intelligent reflection would be expected, Europe still appears to be highly ambivalent regarding its own identity, as demonstrated only too clearly by the ongoing debates on Turkey's possible accession to the Union.

In some corners, these various perceptions regarding identity and foreigners might be considered marginal to the many other important issues that Europe has to tackle on a daily basis. The argument could even be that since Europe currently experiences recession and high unemployment, we don't need immigration anyhow. So it could be considered a purely ideological issue.

However, Europe has placed itself in a dilemma in that respect. Low birth rates and a very low level of mobility (as compared, for instance, to the US) have led experts and many politicians alike to conclude that we actually need immigrants.

There is broad consensus that immigration cannot be the panacea to our long-term demographic problems. However, it is equally a fact that immigrants contribute and have contributed very significantly to European economic prosperity. Most experts expect that immigrants both can and will do so in the future, and indeed in a more complex manner than previously. Immigrants will not only provide work power and skills, they will also constitute important long-term counterweights to ageing European populations, and will thus contribute to the viability of severely over-burdened social security systems.

Most governments recognise, albeit not always publicly, that the present situation is not economically viable. They are, however, under considerable pressure from their electorates regarding immigration policies.

The supranational European contexts, such as the EU and the Council of Europe (notably with its Court of Human Rights) do not provide quick or easy solutions to these problems. But what they do is to provide spheres where uninformed populist views pose much less of a threat to policy formulation than at the national level.

The policy-making opportunities thus offered have to a large extent been seized by the European institutions as well as their Member States. While some clearly consider the pace of pan-European developments on migration to be slow, it is my impression that the European level has been opened up to allow for rational discussions capable of acknowledging the realities of migration. In my view, this European involvement provides the best possible opportunity for pursuing policies that successfully combine purely demographic and economic concerns with full respect for the rights of migrants. While constructive criticism is always in place, it is my hope that general support can be maintained for a positive European policy field that is in fact only at its very inception.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention!