Executive Director EUROPOL

 

Dear Ms De X,

I am writing to share with you my preliminary findings in the above inquiry.

The inquiry concerns how Europol dealt with the moves of two former staff members to positions related to combatting online child sexual abuse. The first staff member joined a private entity (Thorn) active in that field in early 2022, and the second joined that same entity as a board member in 2023. The complainant, a former Member of the European Parliament, was concerned that these moves gave rise to conflict of interest risks.

I would like to thank Europol for facilitating the inspection of documents it holds on this matter. I would also like to thank your colleagues for their cooperation during meetings with my inquiry team, and for the additional information shared in that context.[1]  Please find attached, for your information, the complainant’s comments on the meeting report.

Based on this, I have reached the following preliminary findings.

1. How Europol dealt with a risk of conflict of interest during service

The inspection showed that the work carried out by the first former staff member at Europol was linked to their future duties with their new employer.

Despite this, Europol did not conduct an assessment of whether this could constitute an actual conflict of interest while in service. The staff member remained in service for almost two months between the date of his notification and the moment when he joined Thorn. Europol did not consider if mitigation measures were necessary during this period.

My preliminary view is that this was not in line with the conflict of interest provisions of the Staff Regulations[2] nor with Europol’s Guidance[3] on conflict of interest.  The Staff Regulations prohibit a staff member from dealing with a matter in which they have a direct or indirect personal interest. Europol’s Guidance defines conflict of interest as a situation where the personal interests of a staff member could actually or potentially impair, either directly or indirectly, their professional independence in the performance of the duties for Europol. It explicitly refers to envisaged employment as an example of such personal interests. The Guidance requires managers to ensure adherence to its principles, and, as some of these managers were involved in assessing the post-service activity request, the content of that request should have led to mitigating measures within Europol.

2. How Europol assessed conflict of interest in relation to post-service activities

The inquiry showed that Europol puts a special emphasis on commercial considerations when assessing risks of conflict of interest related to post-service activity requests.

It is of course of utmost importance that Europol protects its financial interests. However, an exclusive focus on procurement risks Europol failing to adequately identify conflicts of interest (including perceived conflicts). The term ‘conflict of interest’ has a broad meaning, as reflected in the diverse factors that the Appointing Authority must take into account when processing post-service activity requests. Those factors are described in the Commission Decision on outside activities and assignments and on occupational activities after leaving the Service,[4] which Europol applies. These factors are helpful to identify any lobbying, integrity and reputational risks when conducting a conflict of interest assessment in the context of post-service activities.

In my view, Europol applied the notion of conflict of interest in the post-service activity request of the first staff member too narrowly. This was not in line with the Commission’s Decision, and therefore with Europol’s own internal rules. Had the assessment considered all existing risks, a lobbying cooling-off period should have been imposed.

Moreover in the case of the second staff member where more stringent conditions were imposed by the Appointing Authority, I remain concerned that the input and assessment underlying that decision still relied on a narrow understanding of conflict of interest that failed to capture all risks associated with the move.

3. How Europol processed post-service activity authorisation requests internally

Finally, my inquiry team detected a number of shortcomings in how both requests for post-service activities were handled by Europol. In the case of the first staff member, there was a contradiction between the opinion of the Joint Committee and that of the Appointing Authority, and Europol was not aware whether the then Appointing Authority had in fact considered the opinion of the Joint Committee at all. In the case of the second staff member, some of the information provided by the staff member was not recorded in Europol’s internal consultation process and the omission was detected only after the Appointing Authority had taken the final decision on the request.

In both cases, the shortcomings arose during Europol’s internal processing of the authorisation request forms. This internal processing seems vulnerable to human error. The result was that in the two cases at issue, the Appointing Authority based its decision on incomplete information. 

Good administration requires that the information necessary to take a decision is recorded and stored properly, and that this information is then considered in order to reach an informed conclusion. This does not seem to have happened in the context of Europol’s internal processing of the post-service activity requests in these two cases.

I would be grateful to receive Europol’s reply to the above preliminary findings by one month of receipt of this letter. The delays encountered in the course of this inquiry, resulting from requests for additional time from your services, mean that an extension of this deadline is not possible.

Please note that I intend to share your reply with the complainant and it should be drawn up with this in mind. Should Europol need to share confidential information with us at this stage, it should be clearly marked accordingly.

Finally, I would appreciate it if Europol could confirm to my Office whether it considers any information contained in this letter to be confidential, if possible by 18 October 2024. Should Europol consider that the letter contains no confidential information, I intend to share it with the complainant and to publish it on the Ombudsman’s website.

The responsible inquiries officer is Ms Amandine Le Bellec.

Yours sincerely,

Emily O'Reilly

European Ombudsman

Strasbourg, 11/10/2024

 

NB: Some parts of these preliminary findings are confidential and have been removed.

 

[1] This includes the email exchanges between Europol and Thorn shared in the context of case 1167/2023/PB, as well as the overview of Europol’s decision-making on post-service activities authorisation requests from 2021 to 2024, which was shared with my inquiry team on 14 June 2024.

[2] Article 11a of the Staff Regulations, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A01962R0031-20240101

[3] Guidance to Europol staff on conflict of interest, 4 October 2017, available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/guidance_to_europol_staff_-_conflict_of_interest.pdf

[4] C(2018) 4048 final, applicable by analogy to Europol and available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EDOC%231339872_DECISION_OF_THE_MANAGEMENT_BOARD_OF_EUROPOL_on_the_entry_into_force_at_Europol_of_Commission_Decision_C%282018%29_4048_on_outside_activities_EDOC%231009554-v2A-PUBLIC-.pdf