The case concerned the European Central Bank's (ECB) handling of procedural aspects related to a whistleblower report that the complainant[1] submitted in 2022. The whistleblower report concerned an alleged family relationship between a hiring officer and the person who was hired.

The complainant experienced behaviour by the alleged wrongdoers that they believed amounted to inappropriate behaviour (including harassment). The complainant requested a related administrative investigation.

The ECB decided to assess the whistleblower report jointly with the issue of the alleged inappropriate behaviour. It also informed the complainant that the evidence submitted did not warrant the opening of an administrative investigation. The complainant contested both points through an administrative complaint, which the ECB declared inadmissible for lack of individual interest (the joint handling of the two issues) or for lack of any challengeable decision (the failure to open an administrative investigation).

The complainant turned to the Ombudsman, contesting the ECB's decision of inadmissibility. In the course of the Ombudsman's inquiry, the complainant also asked the Ombudsman to look more closely into the handling of whistleblower reports and complaints at the ECB.

The Ombudsman found that the reasons given by the ECB for declaring the complainant's administrative complaint inadmissible were not convincing.

The Ombudsman also noted that, during her inquiry, significant developments in the matter had occurred and that related high-level internal investigations were still ongoing. Moreover, the ECB was finalising an own-initiative review of its reporting, investigation and disciplinary framework. In these circumstances, the Ombudsman concluded that no further inquiries were justified at that point in time, and closed the inquiry.

 

[1] For reasons of anonymity, including as regards the gender of the complainant, the text refers to the complainant as ‘they’/’their’/’them’.

 

EU agencies play a central role by implementing EU policies and providing technical, scientific, and legal expertise across key sectors. Any perception that their public servants pursue private interests that conflict with their duties can undermine public trust in their work. The European Ombudsman has consistently highlighted the risks of the “revolving door” phenomenon - where staff move to external roles, particularly in the private sector. Even a small number of high-profile cases can trigger public disquiet and reputational damage, as reflected in recent inquiries.

At the same time, the EU administration must attract skilled professionals to address priorities such as sustainability, digitalisation, and security. Measures such as cooling-off periods and job restrictions can affect career flexibility, especially in fields like law, finance or technology.

Against this background, this inquiry examined, from a systemic point of view, how EU agencies handle revolving door cases. The aim was to identify good practices and possible shortcomings in the policies and practices in place. To this end, the Ombudsman conducted a detailed review of the policies put in place by 15 EU agencies and inspected 54 files on individual cases dealt with by nine EU agencies. The Ombudsman inquiry team met with representatives of five EU agencies to clarify outstanding matters.

Almost all EU agencies that submitted documentation to the Ombudsman said that they had adopted the European Commission’s approach to implementing the legal obligations of staff transitioning to private-sector roles, whether upon departure or during unpaid leave. However, the Ombudsman found that some EU agencies have more detailed and comprehensive guidance on the implementation of these legal obligations than others. Differences that the Ombudsman identified concern how agencies deal with late or incomplete notifications of post-service activities, how agencies assess such notifications, the nature of the mitigating measures imposed, the transparency of decisions on notified post-service activities and how any obligations arising from them are monitored, as well as how agencies train staff on their ethics obligations.

Furthermore, the Ombudsman found that the rules and policies governing the post-mandate activities of non-staff, that is, members of the agencies’ Management Boards or Boards of Supervisors, differ markedly. Most agencies’ Board members are appointed by national authorities and represent their respective Member States, meaning that they remain subject to national ethics rules, which vary across Member States. To address potential conflicts of interest and reputational damage arising from revolving door moves, only a few of the governing bodies from the EU agencies examined in this inquiry have adopted policies regulating post-mandate activities of (former) Board members.

To assist EU agencies in further strengthening their rules on revolving door moves, the Ombudsman set out a series of good practice guidelines:

• A strong integrity framework begins with prevention: equipping staff and Board members with clear guidance, regular training, and ongoing awareness initiatives to ensure full understanding of ethical obligations is essential.
• This is reinforced by robust standard operating procedures for handling revolving door situations, which provide a clear, step-by-step approach to notifications, assessments, and compliance.
• Transparent criteria for restricting post-service or post-mandate roles must be established upfront, so that individuals are fully aware of limitations before joining.
• When a move to the private sector is signalled, agencies should act swiftly - by conducting thorough risk assessments, identifying potential conflicts of interest, and taking immediate precautionary steps such as revoking access rights or reassigning responsibilities where necessary.
• Decision-making should be fair, transparent, and well-documented, allowing individuals to comment on proposed restrictions while ensuring that risks are effectively managed through proportionate measures such as cooling-off periods, lobbying bans or, where needed, outright prohibitions.
• Timely, reasoned decisions must clearly outline rights of appeal.
• Beyond thorough decision-making, accountability depends on strong enforcement. This includes publishing summaries of authorised activities, actively monitoring compliance with imposed conditions, and upholding confidentiality obligations.
• Where breaches are suspected, agencies must respond promptly - establishing the facts, and pursuing disciplinary action in serious cases - to maintain trust and safeguard institutional integrity.

The Ombudsman concludes that EU agencies can learn a lot from each other’s practices. The Ombudsman intends to apply these good practice guidelines to cases that may be brought to her attention in the future.

The case concerned how the European Commission (EU Delegation to the African Union) handled a grant application and concerns regarding a potential conflict of interest.

The complainant took part in a call for proposals for a project to support pan-African electoral capacities. The Delegation rejected the complainant’s application because it sought EU funding above the maximum percentage allowed under the call. The complainant claimed that this was a typographical error and that the Delegation should have requested clarifications instead of rejecting its application. The complainant also claimed that an expert who had been involved in the development of the project funded under this call was working for an entity that submitted an application under the call.

The Ombudsman found that the Commission, based on its own internal guidelines, should have considered the complainant’s mistake as an ‘obvious clerical error’ and asked the complainant for clarification and/or corrected the complainant’s error. She also found that the Commission failed to adequately assess the complainant’s allegations of a potential conflict of interest. These two shortcomings amounted to maladministration. For both findings, the Ombudsman considered that it would not be appropriate to make corresponding recommendations, as in the meantime the grant has already been awarded. She nevertheless made three suggestions aimed at preventing such problems occurring in future similar cases.

The case concerned how the European Commission mitigated the conflict of interest risks related to a job in the private sector taken up by a former manager. The staff member, who had been in the past employed in the Commission’s competition department, moved to a transnational [redacted] company as a senior manager responsible for competition and regulatory matters, including for Europe. Before moving to the role with the [redacted] company, the former staff member had left the Commission and joined a global law firm. The Commission had authorised the move to the law firm, after the former staff member notified it of the intention to take up that job.

The Ombudsman found that, in the context of authorising the move to the law firm, the Commission had adopted measures to mitigate the risk posed by the former staff member working on files or cases that would be relevant for the job with the law firm. The Commission’s decision to authorise the move to the law firm also included several restrictions. For example, the former staff member was prohibited to work, directly or indirectly, on any cases that fell under the former staff member’s responsibility while in service, or any cases directly related to them. To help the former staff member identify the cases that could raise conflict of interest issues at any time after leaving the service, the Commission included a list of cases, which it updated after the staff member had effectively left.

The Ombudsman’s inquiry confirmed that the Commission adopted a robust approach to assessing, in the context of the former staff member’s subsequent role with the [redacted] company, whether competition cases that are not included in the abovementioned list could nonetheless lead to a conflict of interest because they are related to cases that the former staff member had been responsible for. The Ombudsman welcomed this approach.

The Ombudsman closed the inquiry concluding that there was no maladministration in how the Commission dealt with the conflict of interest risks related to the job in question.

The case concerned the European Commission’s system of expert groups, which plays an important role in informing the decisions taken by the Commission. In the context of an earlier Ombudsman inquiry, the Commission adopted new rules for these expert groups. In this follow-up inquiry, the Ombudsman assessed how the Commission applied these rules, especially in relation to the transparency of the membership and deliberations of expert groups.

The inquiry demonstrated that the Commission has in place internal guidelines for the implementation of the expert group rules, and that it provides training to relevant staff. The Commission has also put in place a dedicated internal network of coordinators to monitor and promote the correct implementation of the expert group rules, which the Ombudsman welcomed.

However, the Ombudsman identified a number of areas where the Commission could further improve the transparency of expert groups. First, the Commission should make its internal guidelines public to clarify what the public can expect from the Commission’s implementation. Second, when certain expert group documents are not disclosed proactively, the Commission should list these documents in the relevant expert group’s meeting minutes, to enable the public to request access if necessary. Third, the Commission should set deadlines for the publication of documents before and after expert group meetings. Lastly, the Commission should improve the search functions on the document registers that are relevant for expert groups.

The Ombudsman concluded that no further inquiries were justified and closed the inquiry.

The case concerned the European Defence Fund through which approximately EUR 8 billion will be disbursed between 2021 and 2027 for research and development on security and defence. In particular, the inquiry assessed how the European Commission, which is responsible for managing the Fund, ensures that there are no conflicts of interest with the external experts, who evaluate and conduct ethics reviews of the proposals, along with cost estimates.

The Ombudsman found that, to assess risks of (potential) conflicts of interest, the Commission largely relies on information submitted by candidate experts. While the Commission said that it also checks publicly available information to review whether there are links between the third parties who submit proposals and the experts, it appears to do so in a limited way only. The Ombudsman took the view that the Commission should not limit itself to the information that is submitted by the experts, and encouraged the Commission to be diligent in proactively looking for additional information that may indicate risks of conflict of interest.

The inquiry also showed that there is no systematic review of the financial interests of experts, for example investments and share ownership, as well as family interests. As such information is crucial for assessing risks of conflicts of interest, the Ombudsman suggested that the Commission ask candidate experts to complete a detailed declaration of interest, including categories of personal interests that are currently absent, such as financial and family interests.

The Ombudsman also found that, in instances where potential conflicts of interest were declared by experts, the experts in question were recused from at least the proposals concerned, to mitigate any risks. Nevertheless, the Ombudsman identified some issues in relation to how the Commission recorded its assessment of these potential conflicts of interest, and made a suggestion for improvement to address these.

The Ombudsman closed the case, considering no further inquiries were justified. The Ombudsman expects that the Commission will take the suggestions for improvement on board for the Fund’s mid-term review.