Background

1. The European Ombudsman has long recognised the ‘revolving door’- whereby staff or members of the EU institutions leave to move into private-sector roles - as a phenomenon that can erode public trust if poorly managed.

2. A move from the EU public sector to the private sector can occur when (i) a member of an institution reaches the end of their mandate and decides to work for a private sector entity; (ii) an official seeks new employment because of retirement, resignation or during a sabbatical (upon taking a leave on personal grounds), or (iii) a temporary agent (hired on a contractual basis for a limited time) seeks employment in the private sector at the end of their contract.

3. The integration process in the EU relies heavily on detailed and often complex regulations within specialised policy areas. Organised interest groups, such as non­governmental organisations or industry associations, play a key role in this process by providing EU policy- and lawmakers with expertise, knowledge, insight, and information on how their interests are affected both at the European and national levels. However, in some cases, representation of such interests may also involve the hiring of individuals from the EU administration whose insider knowledge and personal connections can be of use to the interests of private entities[1].

4. Revolving door moves may create the perception that EU civil servants pursue private interests that conflict with their duties and, thus, with the legitimate interests of the EU administration. They may also risk that confidential information is disclosed or misused, or that former staff members use their close personal contacts and friendships with ex-colleagues to lobby.

5. In recent years, several high-profile cases involving senior staff members from across the EU administration have drawn attention to revolving door risks. These have also included senior staff from EU agencies, given the central role EU agencies play in implementing EU policies and providing technical, scientific, and legal expertise across key sectors. Following several inquiries, the Ombudsman issued recommendations and suggestions to improve how individual EU agencies manage staff transitions to the private sector.[2]

6. The growing reliance on temporary staff within the EU administration[3] - particularly in EU agencies, where most employees are not permanent officials - alongside the mobility of highly skilled professionals, may explain why this issue has gained in importance over time.

7. A particular feature in the structure of EU agencies concerns their governing bodies. While the specific governing structure varies, EU agencies typically have a Management Board (also referred to as a Steering or Governing Board), which may include members appointed by Member States or the EU administration through an open call, and which is responsible for adopting annual work programmes and budgets, as well as managing staffing matters. Some EU agencies have a Board of Supervisors, which adopts policy decisions. Their members may also pose conflicts-of-interest risks to the relevant agency through post-mandate activities in the private sector.

8. While it is crucial that revolving door moves are properly managed, any restrictions to such moves must be balanced with the fundamental right to engage in work. According to Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment”. In EU law, the first paragraph of Article 15 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights establishes the “freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work” and its second paragraph stresses that ”every citizen of the Union has the freedom to seek employment, to work, to exercise the right of establishment and to provide services in any Member State”[4].

9. Another key consideration is that the EU administration should be able to attract talented and qualified staff members. Measures to restrict moves to the private sector can be perceived as constraints on future career flexibility for highly mobile professionals, especially those in fields like law, finance or technology, thus discouraging such professionals from working for the EU administration.

10. In view of the above, EU agencies, whose staff is not permanent and whose Board members may move to other posts after their mandate, must thus strike a delicate balance between enabling them to pursue their careers outside the EU administration whilst ensuring the proper functioning of the agency.

11. Considering these challenges, the Ombudsman launched an own-initiative inquiry (the “inquiry”) to assess, from a systemic point of view, how EU agencies handle revolving-door situations involving both (senior) staff members and Board members. Previous Ombudsman inquiries[5] focused on the European Commission’s general approach to revolving door cases involving its staff members, leading the Commission to improve its practices and enhance the transparency around post-employment decisions.

The inquiry

12. As an initial step of the inquiry, the Ombudsman asked a sample of 15 EU agencies[6] to provide a list of cases relating to revolving door moves that they handled between January 2023 and the end of June 2025. Specifically, the Ombudsman asked for records of authorisations granted, refusals issued, and/or restrictions imposed in relation to:

• post-service activities of (former) senior or managerial staff members;
• external occupational activities undertaken by staff members while on unpaid leave; and
• post-mandate activities of (former) Board members.

13. The Ombudsman also requested copies of any relevant (internal) policies governing the management of revolving door situations.

14. Based on the lists of cases received, the Ombudsman inquiry team then inspected a sample of files related to cases handled by nine EU agencies.

15. Following the inspection of the requested files and policies, the Ombudsman inquiry team conducted meetings with representatives from five EU agencies to clarify outstanding issues.[7]

Inspection of sample files

16. The inspection covered a total of 54 files on revolving door moves, including:

• 34 notifications of former staff members’ post-service activities;
• eight requests for approval of staff members’ external activities while on unpaid leave; and
• 12 cases involving post-mandate activities of Board members.

17. Considering their confidential nature, the documents in question were submitted to the Ombudsman for the purpose of her inquiry on the understanding that any subsequent disclosure would be limited to overarching conclusions, excluding information that could lead to the identification of individuals or specific cases.

18. Of the notified post-service activities of staff members, only one was rejected. The remaining notified activities were approved, subject to reminders of applicable obligations and, in several instances, specific restrictions, such as being barred from:

• intervening on behalf of a private entity in any case or file that the former staff member was personally involved in during the last three years in service;
• professional contacts with former colleagues on behalf of private entities;
• lobbying towards the agency on behalf of clients;
• involvement in any public procurement procedure initiated by the agency.

19. About half of the notified post-service activities pertained to moves to private-sector roles. The second most common destination of former staff members were positions in other parts of the EU administration, international organisations, or national public administrations. Academic and non-profit sector roles were the least frequently pursued.

20. Regarding external activities undertaken by staff on unpaid leave, some files involved requests to renew approval of ongoing activities. Most of these activities related to roles within the EU administration or international organisations. All decisions were favourable, but some included restrictions.

21. With respect to post-mandate activities of former Board members, most new roles or activities were in the private sector, followed by participation in events such as conferences. While decisions were generally favourable, conditions were imposed or recommended in several cases. In one instance, an EU agency recommended a temporary prohibition of an activity, asking the former Board member to observe a cooling-off period before assuming the intended position, which was implemented by the former Board member’s national authority.

The Ombudsman’s assessment

22. The Ombudsman assessed how EU agencies manage revolving door moves of (former) staff members (A) and (former) Board members (B).

A. Managing revolving door moves of (former) staff members

Post-service activities

23. The EU Staff Regulations (‘SR’) govern the employment relationship between EU institutions, including EU agencies, and their staff. They impose several obligations on staff members regarding their conduct with a view to guaranteeing an ethical, accountable, and transparent EU administration. As such, the SR provide the legal basis for managing revolving door moves.

24. Article 16 SR provides that:

• EU civil servants are indefinitely subject to a duty to behave with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits. This duty applies even after they retire, resign, are dismissed or otherwise leave the EU civil service.[8]
• Staff members who intend to take up an occupational activity, whether paid or unpaid, within two years of leaving the service must inform the agency of their intentions. If the intended occupational activity is related to the work carried out by that person during the last three years they worked for the EU agency, and the work conflicts with the legitimate interests of the agency, the agency has the right to forbid the person from taking up the job. The agency can also make its approval of the new occupational activity subject to conditions designed to ensure that the legitimate interests of the agency are protected.[9]
• An EU agency must also prohibit its former senior staff members from engaging in lobbying and advocacy activities vis-à-vis their former agency’s staff on matters for which the former senior staff member was responsible during the last three years of service in the EU agency. The lobbying and advocacy ban should, by default, be imposed for the first year after the senior staff member left the agency.
• EU agencies also have to publish information on their implementation of the senior staff lobbying and advocacy ban[10], including a list of cases assessed.^[11]

25. In case of breaches of obligations in the SR, EU agencies may launch disciplinary proceedings against the staff member concerned. The process typically begins with an administrative investigation, during which the staff member concerned is informed of the allegations and given the opportunity to be heard. In the context of breaches of Article 16 SR obligations, possible sanctions range from a warning or reprimand to more severe measures such as a possible loss of pension rights in certain cases.

26. All but one[12] of the 15 EU agencies covered by this inquiry informed the Ombudsman that they have adopted the European Commission’s decision on the implementation of Article 16 SR[13] by analogy. The Commission revised this decision following several Ombudsman inquiries into how the Commission deals with revolving doors moves.[14]

27. The procedure put in place by the Commission when deciding on notifications of an intended post-service activity follows the steps set out below.

28. The Ombudsman noted important differences in the implementation of the above procedure[15] across the 15 EU agencies she analysed. The procedural differences stem mainly from policies and internal guidance documents and concern (1) how the agencies prevent non-compliance with ethics obligations, (2) how they deal with late or incomplete notifications, (3) how they assess notifications, (4) the nature of the mitigating measures imposed, as well as (5) the transparency of Article 16 SR decisions and (6) how any obligations arising from them are monitored.

1. Preventing non-compliance with ethics obligations

29. A strong integrity framework begins with prevention. Clear procedures detailing how the legal obligations are implemented are key in this respect. The Ombudsman found that some EU agencies have more detailed and comprehensive guidance on the implementation of the procedure in place than others.

Good practice

The European Food Safety Authority has adopted a standard operating procedure for assessing post-service activities procedurally, which comprises a clear step-by-step guide of its internal assessment, including responsible services, timelines, assessment criteria and possible mitigating measures.

30. Providing ethics training and guidance to staff members - upon joining an EU agency, during their employment, and at departure - serves as a critical safeguard. When staff members leave the agency, clear information about their obligations, the applicable procedures, and possible consequences in case of non-compliance can prevent breaches of the rules.

Good practices

The Ombudsman identified several examples of comprehensive training and guidance materials. Some EU agencies also conduct regular awareness-raising campaigns and communication initiatives to promote staff adherence to ethics rules. Notably, the European Aviation Safety Agency launched an information campaign on the subject while the Ombudsman’s inquiry was ongoing.

Several EU agencies have mechanisms in place for informing departing staff members of their obligations. The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, for example, has an offboarding tool that automatically sends the staff member relevant information and the Single Resolution Board uses offboarding flashcards to remind departing staff members of its applicable procedure. Other agencies, like the European Securities and Markets Authority and the European Medicines Agency, organise a meeting between their ethics and/or compliance teams and departing staff members to remind them of their post-service obligations.

31. The duty to avoid any risk of conflict of interest^[16] might imply that staff members disclose negotiations for employment or service contracts in a timely manner. In practice, this may require immediate information being provided to their agency if staff members enter employment or service negotiations with an external party. The Ombudsman recognises that early disclosure of such information can be sensitive for staff members.

Good practice

Some agencies encourage staff to contact their ethics and/or compliance teams when those staff members enter into negotiations for future employment or service contracts, even at an early stage. These teams can assist the staff member concerned to assess the possible risks and suggest further steps, including notifying the line manager, if appropriate.

2. Notifying post-service activities

32. In line with Article 16 SR, EU agency staff members intending to engage in post­service activities within two years of departure are required to notify their agency thereof. Agencies should then notify their decisions to the (former) staff members within 30 working days of being informed. This allows agencies to assess the intended activity and implement any necessary mitigating measures to safeguard their legitimate interests. Therefore, the Commission’s policy implementing Article 16 SR foresees that (former) staff members inform their agency at least 30 working days before the proposed starting date of their intended new job.[17]

33. Previous Ombudsman inquiries[18] showed that late notifications may undermine an agency’s ability to mitigate potential risks effectively. Furthermore, repeated delays in submitting such notifications may indicate insufficient awareness among (former) staff of their post-service obligations.

34. This inquiry revealed that EU agencies respond inconsistently to late notifications. For example, one agency reported that it pursues disciplinary action only in cases where a late notification results in an unmitigated conflict-of-interest situation. Another agency stated that its options for addressing late notifications were limited, especially in cases where the activity has already taken place.

35. Regarding unclear or incomplete notifications, the Ombudsman found that EU agencies typically request clarification or missing information promptly.

Good practices

Some agencies suspend the 30-working-day decision period, that is, the maximum timeframe for adopting a decision, until the notification is complete.

Other agencies start the clock of the 30-working-day period only once all necessary information is provided and any outstanding questions have been resolved.

Some EU agencies request that (former) staff members submit the formal description of their new job or related vacancy notice (if available) alongside their notification.

3. Assessing notifications

36. Notifications are typically first received by the ethics and/or HR compliance teams of the EU agencies. Once the notification is considered clear and complete, these teams conduct a preliminary assessment of potential conflicts of interest arising from the notified activity. In this regard, the Ombudsman considers it essential that the (former) staff member’s line manager is consulted at an early stage. This is because the line manager is usually best positioned to: (i) clarify the factual details of the notification, (ii) assess potential overlaps between the staff member’s role in the agency and the proposed new position; and (iii) contribute a substantive assessment of the risks posed by the move to inform the draft decision. From the Ombudsman’s inquiry it appears that the consultation of the line manager is not a mandatory step for all EU agencies within the scope of this inquiry.

37. Agencies should also consult their Joint Committee, which consists of members appointed by the agency and the agency’s staff committee, on notifications for post­service activities of (former) staff members.[19] The Joint Committee may either provide a detailed analysis of potential conflicts of interest and related reputational risks to the agency, or endorse the draft decision prepared by the responsible teams.

38. If an EU agency is considering imposing restrictions or temporary prohibitions on a notified job, it should always allow the (former) staff member to comment on the draft decision. Every staff member has the right to be heard before any individual decision adversely affecting them is adopted.[20] Currently, not all EU agencies systematically grant (former) staff members this right.

39. The Ombudsman’s inquiry also showed that, once such a decision is taken, only three EU agencies[21] covered by this inquiry have explicit provisions in place that would require them to inform (former) staff members of their right to challenge the decision.

40.  The Ombudsman also noted different practices in how EU agencies document their assessments of notifications and decision-making processes regarding post-service activities of (former) staff members.

Good practice

The European Securities and Markets Authority has implemented an internal document management and validation system for processing notifications related to staff transitions. This system consolidates all procedural steps, including the notification, the assessment of the ethics team and the line manager, the Joint Committee opinion, staff member comments (where applicable), and the Executive Director’s final decision, into a single file. Mitigating measures, such as revoking access to document management systems or excluding the staff member from relevant meetings while they remain in service, are integrated into the workflow. Additionally, the agency maintains ‘ethics logbooks’ to track staff members’ post-service activities.

4. Nature of mitigating measures imposed

41. (Former) senior staff members are, in principle, prohibited, for one year following their departure, from engaging in lobbying or advocacy activities vis-à-vis staff of their former agency for their business, clients or employers on matters for which they were responsible during the last three years in the service[22]. The Ombudsman notes that EU agencies may extend this period if necessary to protect their interests, and that agencies may also apply a lobbying ban to non-senior (former) staff members, where justified.

42. Restrictions, conditions and/or mitigating measures are usually imposed for a period of between six months and two years, aligning with the obligation to notify the agency of intended post-service activities. The most severe type of such restrictions is a permanent ban on an activity.

• In one case inspected by the Ombudsman, the agency prohibited a former staff member from taking up an activity with a company in a contractual relationship with the agency. The agency assessed the request by the former staff member to join that company, and came to the conclusion that the staff member’s intended move, if authorised, could cast doubt on its decision making in relation to the contract in question. Thus, the intended move was rejected.
• In one case, an agency prohibited a staff member from taking up a new position for a period of ten months counting from the moment the staff member last had access to sensitive non-public information. In such cases, the length of such a temporary ban should be based on a judgement call, whereby the agency concerned should factor in, for example, the seniority of the (former) staff member concerned, the nature of the non-public information that they had access to, the interests of the intended employer and the nature of the envisaged tasks that the former staff member would have had.

43. During the period in which restrictions apply, former staff members may, for example, be prohibited from handling files, cases, or matters related to their work in the final three years of their service.

Good practice

To facilitate compliance with its decisions, the European Chemicals Agency, in certain cases, provides the departing staff member with a list of relevant cases, files, or matters dealt with by the latter, thereby ensuring both compliance with and enforcement of the restrictions applied. This approach has the advantage that it makes the restriction concrete, as compared to general prohibitions on working on files in which staff members were involved while in service, which some other EU agencies impose.

44. A specific risk arises from former staff members intending to offer consultancy or legal services related to their service in the EU agency.

45. In accordance with the lifelong duty of former staff members to act with integrity and discretion, certain activities may be prohibited for periods exceeding the two-year notification requirement. For example, in line with the practice followed by the Commission, former staff members involved in legal cases should be prohibited from working directly or indirectly on any cases that fell under their responsibility while in service, or any cases directly related to them, including appeals in respect of those cases brought before the European Courts against a decision of the agency concerned.[23]

Good practices

The European Banking Authority adopted a guidance defining post-service activities that are most likely to present conflicts of interest. This would for example be the case where the prospective employer (i) is subject to, or affected by, the agency’s decisions, guidelines, recommendations, or opinions; or (ii) represents organisations in such a position. The Authority considers the risk of conflict is particularly acute when:
- the staff member held a senior role at the agency and/or had access to non­public information;
- the intended role involves a senior position; and
- the prospective employer exerts significant influence over, or has a significant interest in, the agency’s operational areas.

The European Medicines Agency imposes contact bans (or a ‘distance clause’) for a defined period, during which the former staff member in question must refrain from direct, individual contact with any agency staff member on work-related matters. This includes discussions relating to legal cases involving or connected to the agency. Such a contact ban is therefore broader than a lobbying ban, which is limited to direct or indirect lobbying and advocacy, such as promoting interests regarding matters with which they were concerned during the last three years of service. This is a practice that could be of interest also to other EU agencies, depending on the circumstances of individual cases.

5. Transparency of decisions taken under Article 16 SR

46. In line with Article 16 SR, EU agencies must publish annually information regarding post-service activities of former senior staff members where there is a risk of lobbying or advocacy targeting agency staff on behalf of their new employers, clients, or business interests. The Ombudsman has argued in the context of previous inquiries[24] that this requirement should be read taking into account the purpose behind the legal obligation, which is to ensure transparency so that businesses, civil society organisations and the public are aware of any restrictions that EU agencies have adopted, and can monitor whether they are complied with.[25] The information that EU agencies make public should include a list of assessed cases.

47. This inquiry showed that practices on the publication of the above information vary across EU agencies. For example, one EU agency applies the transparency provisions solely to the Executive Director, excluding senior managers and senior advisors. This limited scope significantly undermines the purpose of the transparency measures, rendering them largely ineffective.[26] Another EU agency has linked its transparency obligations to the two-year notification period for former staff members, even when certain restrictions that the agency adopted remain in force beyond this timeframe. Combined with the agency’s practice of annual publication, this results in the relevant information being publicly available for a relatively short period only. The Commission, for example, does not limit the availability of its reports containing summary information on Article 16 SR decisions to two years.[27]

Good practices

The European Banking Authority makes public information on the core elements of the decision on post-service activities of senior staff members, including of any applicable measures, on its website shortly after the related decisions are adopted.

Some EU agencies distribute details on restrictions to relevant staff on a need-to-know basis. This practice appears to strike an appropriate balance between supporting the enforcement of the decisions concerned, while respecting the (former) staff members’ right to privacy. This is particularly the case in the context of lobbying or advocacy bans.

Several EU agencies reported that they communicate conditional decisions regarding (former) staff members’ new job directly to the new employer.

6. Compliance and monitoring

48. Monitoring whether former staff members abide by conditional decisions concerning their post-service activities, as well as by their ethics obligations, can deter non­compliance, strengthen public trust, and allow for corrective actions to be taken swiftly. The Ombudsman’s review of the agencies’ policies on post-service activities of staff showed that only four[28] out of the 15 agencies covered by this inquiry have in place provisions on monitoring compliance with post-service restrictions.

49. During the inquiry, the Ombudsman inquiry team discussed with several EU agencies how they would react to breaches of post-service restrictions or confidentiality obligations by a former staff member. The agencies indicated that they would in such situations promptly establish the facts by contacting the former staff member and their new employer. Once the circumstances are clarified, the agencies indicated that they could initiate an administrative inquiry to assess the seriousness of the non-compliance, considering the former staff member’s seniority. In the most serious cases, this process could result in disciplinary follow-up.

Good practices

The European Banking Authority put in place a procedure for monitoring compliance of former senior staff members through annual verification, which includes:
- relying on former staff members’ line managers to flag any possible changes in post-service activities; and
- sending a reminder to the former senior staff member after a period of a year.

The European Food Safety Authority monitors compliance by carrying out an annual verification with former staff members concerning on-going compliance with Article 16(2) SR. This is done by searching publicly available information connected with the first name and family name of the former senior staff member by using online search engines and by sending reminders to the former senior staff member every six months for the period of two years.

External activities of staff while on leave on personal grounds

50. While the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon primarily concerns staff members leaving EU agencies, it also applies to staff intending to undertake external activities while on unpaid leave.

51. According to the SR, unpaid leave on personal grounds shall not be granted to an official or temporary staff member for the purpose of their engaging in an occupational activity, whether gainful or not, which involves lobbying or advocacy vis-à-vis their agency and which could lead to the existence or possibility of a conflict with the legitimate interests of the agency.^[29]

52. Authorisation for external activities is granted for periods of up to one year.^[30] To continue the activity beyond this term, staff members must submit a renewal request. The agency must then reassess the request, considering any new factual elements and operational requirements.

53. When assessing a request from a staff member on unpaid leave to engage in an external activity affecting the agency’s interests, the agency has broad discretion to either prohibit the activity or impose restrictions.

54. The authorisation procedure for staff members’ intended external activities while on unpaid leave generally comprises the following steps:

55. The Ombudsman’s inquiry showed that not all EU agencies covered by this inquiry currently have in place rules setting out the different steps that need to be followed, such as the consultation of the line manager or the responsible team, when assessing a notification for an external activity while on unpaid leave. Furthermore, none of the agencies explicitly grants staff members the possibility to comment on draft decisions prohibiting or restricting an external activity while on unpaid leave. The Ombudsman thus identified room for improvement when it comes to the policies in place.

56. Furthermore, the Ombudsman found that some of the inspected files contain limited reasoning regarding the assessment of conflicts of interest or the representation of third-party interests. While this is not problematic for external activities within the EU administration or international organisations, substantive assessments are essential for external activities in the private sector.

B. Managing revolving door moves of (former) Board members

57. The founding Regulations of EU agencies generally require the agency and/or their members of governing bodies to ensure independence in their decision-making, so that their actions serve the interests of the EU rather than any national or private interests. To uphold this principle, most EU agencies have established rules to prevent and manage conflicts of interest of Board members. These measures may include an annual obligation for Board members to declare their financial and other personal interests, or to raise conflict of interest concerns regarding specific items on the agenda before meetings. Depending on the scope of an EU agency’s activities, restrictions may also apply to the types of financial investments that Board members are permitted to make.

58. Furthermore, members of EU agencies’ governing bodies are bound by a duty of confidentiality, also known as professional secrecy, which extends beyond the end of their mandate. This obligation covers all non-public information.

59. When it comes to managing post-mandate activities of former Board members, it is important to distinguish between EU agencies with full-time Board members and those with part-time Board members. Part-time Board members are often appointed (and employed) by the relevant national competent authorities and remain subject to national ethics regulations which vary across Member States. This raises several questions. For example, while national rules may be inspired by the need to protect national interests, EU agencies operate EU-wide. Consequently, the legitimate interests that EU agencies need to protect may differ from those of national competent authorities.

60. It also appears that some EU agencies with part-time Board members consider that they lack a legal basis to adopt rules governing post-mandate restrictions. Other EU agencies with part-time Board members put in place rules on revolving door moves based on or supported by provisions on independence and professional secrecy in their founding Regulations.

61. Overall, the Ombudsman found that only seven EU agencies covered by this inquiry have adopted rules on managing conflicts of interest arising from Board members’ post­mandate activities.[31]

Good practices

The founding Regulations of the three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) originally included a provision according to which Article 16 SR applied to their Board members. However, with, amongst others, the revision of the founding Regulations in 2019, the reference to Article 16 SR was removed. The ESAs had, prior to that change, adopted policies on revolving door moves of non-staff, and these policies were kept in place after the removal of the reference to Article 16 SR. These policies have since been updated for all three ESAs with effect from 1 July 2025. They introduce notification obligations comparable to those under Article 16 SR for staff members. Restrictions adopted on post-mandate activities by the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority are taken by means of decisions. The two other ESAs  make recommendations, addressed to the national competent authority which holds the employment relationship with the Board member concerned.

62. Several EU agencies with part-time Board members have put in place notification requirements for post-mandate activities and have created transparency around such activities, by publishing information on their websites. The ESAs[32] and the Single Resolution Board have furthermore introduced a system by which they assess the post­mandate activities in terms of any conflict of interests that might arise for the agency. These are good administrative practices.

Conclusions

The issue of the revolving door has already been examined in the past by the European Ombudsman in a number of inquiries, primarily concerning EU institutions, including several own-initiative inquiries into how the Commission handles 'revolving doors' moves of staff members.

This own-initiative inquiry aimed to shed light on the applicable rules and practices adopted and followed by 15 EU agencies regarding ‘revolving door’ moves. For the Ombudsman, it is clear that all 15 agencies in question recognise that the issue of revolving doors, if not managed correctly, can have serious negative consequences for their reputation, and the reputation of the EU as a whole. Consequently, having in place a robust legal framework to deal with the notification, assessment and compliance with and monitoring of requests made by their staff wishing to take up employment in the private sector is essential. Such a framework is vital to maintaining citizens’ trust in the EU’s ability to safeguard its independence and the integrity of its decision-making processes from undue external interference and influence.

In particular, the purpose of this inquiry was to conduct a comparative assessment of the rules in question in order to identify good administrative practices. These practices should strike a balance between two key objectives: first, the EU administration’s interest in ensuring that its former staff members and Board members comply with applicable ethical rules governing post-term-of-office activities; and second, the right of those individuals to seek employment in the private sector.

Thus, based on the inquiry, the Ombudsman closes this case with the following conclusions:

EU agencies should adopt a robust procedure for assessing notifications of (former) senior staff to take up private-sector roles closely related to their former duties.

EU agencies lacking an internal policy to prevent conflicts of interest of Board (non­staff) members should encourage their governing bodies to adopt such a policy.

To assist EU agencies to improve their practices in relation to revolving door moves, the Ombudsman has adopted the enclosed ‘Good practice guidelines for handling revolving door situations’.

The 15 EU agencies covered by this inquiry will be informed of this decision.

Good practice guidelines for handling revolving door situations

1. Prevention

• Have a standard procedure for assessing revolving door situations which includes a clear step-by-step guide for the agency, its staff and Board members in relation to notifications, assessment, mitigating measures, transparency and compliance.
• Provide staff and Board members with comprehensive training and guidance materials and conduct regular awareness-raising campaigns and communication initiatives to promote adherence to the applicable ethics rules.
• Establish clear criteria for (i) prohibiting post-service or post-mandate moves, or (ii) making recommendations in cases involving certain part-time Board members appointed by national authorities, ensuring that prospective staff or Board members understand these restrictions before joining the agency.
• Once aware of a staff or Board member’s intention to take up new employment, promptly assess whether to revoke access rights or, in case of staff members, recuse them from specific tasks.
• Require staff members who intend to take up a new position to inform their ethics and/or compliance teams, which can help assess potential risks and advise on next steps, including informing the line manager.

2. Notification

For (former) staff members:

• In case of late notifications, instruct the (former) staff member to await formal approval before starting the new activity (where still possible), and explicitly remind them of their obligations to ensure future compliance with notification deadlines.
• In case of incomplete or unclear notifications, promptly request missing information and suspend the 30-working-day deadline for taking a decision until the notification is complete, or start the time limit only once all necessary information has been provided.

For (former) Board members:

• Ask (former) Board members to notify post-mandate activities for two years following the end of their mandate, and prior to beginning the intended post-mandate activities, by analogy to the rules applicable to staff members.

3. Assessment

• Ensure that (former) staff or Board members are given the opportunity to comment on draft decisions or draft recommendations proposing restrictions or prohibitions.
• Adopt a reasoned decision promptly, which informs (former) staff and Board members of their right to challenge the decision.
• Document the assessment of notifications and the related decision-making processes to ensure that all relevant information is captured and that effective oversight is possible.

For (former) staff members:

• Consult the (former) staff member’s line manager at an early stage.
• Consistently consult the Joint Committees on (former) staff members’ intended post­service activities in the private sector, or on other positions that may give rise to risks.
• Request that (former) staff members submit a formal description of their new role or the related vacancy notice (if available) alongside their notification.

For (former) Board members:

• In the absence of legally binding enforcement mechanisms, assess the post-mandate activities in terms of any conflict that might arise in relation to the agency’s legitimate interests and, where applicable, formulate corresponding recommendations to the relevant national competent authority. This should happen as promptly as possible, and ideally before the (former) Board member commences the notified activity.
• To ensure timely adoption of recommendations, implement written approval procedures for the relevant governing body, thereby avoiding potential delays caused by infrequent in-person meetings.

4. Mitigating measures

• Explore the full range of available measures when assessing post-service or post­mandate activities, such as cooling-off periods, contact and/or lobbying bans, and possible prohibitions on certain private sector roles.
• Where risks cannot be sufficiently mitigated, (temporarily) prohibit the person concerned from undertaking such activities. In case of a (former) Board member who represents a national authority, this determination may take the form of a recommendation to their national authority.

For (former) staff members:

• Where restrictions prohibit handling certain matters, facilitate compliance by compiling and sharing a list of those matters with the (former) staff member concerned.

5. Transparency

• Make public information on authorised post-service activities of former senior staff members, and post-mandate activities of former Board members, on the agency’s website, shortly after adopting the relevant decisions or recommendations.

For (former) staff members:

• Share conditional decisions with the new employer of the (former) staff member directly.
• Apply a sufficiently broad definition of senior staff when implementing the provisions in Article 16 of the EU Staff Regulations, to include all key managerial roles within the agency.
• Provide details on restrictions applying to former staff members to relevant staff on a need-to-know basis.

For (former) Board members:

• Share recommendations on (former) Board members’ post-mandate activities involving restrictions or prohibitions with the relevant national authority and with the agency’s governing bodies.

6. Compliance and monitoring

• Monitor compliance with any mitigating measures applied, as well as with the confidentiality obligation.
• In case of an alleged breach of compliance, promptly establish the facts, assess the seriousness of the non-compliance and, in the most serious cases, initiate (disciplinary) follow-up.

For staff members on unpaid leave:

Implement an automated alert system to notify both the staff members concerned and the responsible team of upcoming renewal deadlines for authorised external activities.

[1] See, B Sharon, “Exploring the revolving door phenomenon among European interest groups: triggers, conditions & potential benefit” (2024) at https://repository.uantwerpen.be/desktop/irua. See also, “Rules on 'revolving doors' in the EU: Post-mandate restrictions on members of EU institutions and parliamentarians in Member States”, In-Depth Analysis 24-04-2024, European Parliamentary Research Service at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_IDA(2024)762290

[2] See for example the Closing Decisions of the European Ombudsman in the following cases:

- 2168/2019/KR on the decision of the European Banking Authority (EBA) to approve the request from its Executive Director to become CEO of a financial lobby group: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/135141,

- OI/3/2021/KR on how the European Defence Agency (EDA) handled the notifications of its former chief executive to take on senior positions in a large aviation company: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/151826,

- 2091/2023/AML on how the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) dealt with the moves of two former staff members: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/200017.

[3] According to a 2024 report by the European Court of Auditors, the share of staff on fixed-term contracts (i.e. contract and temporary staff) increased between 2019 and 2023, rising marginally for contract staff from 22% of the total workforce in 2019 to 23% in 2024 and, more significantly for temporary staff (from 6% to 11%), see figure 7: https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/SR-2024-24.

[4] This right is recognised in the case law of the EU Courts, see inter alia, Case 4/73 Nold [1974] ECR 491, paragraphs 12 to 14, Case 44/79 Hauer [1979] ECR 3727, and Case 234/85 Keller [1986] ECR 2897, paragraph 8.

[5] See the following Decisions on how the European Commission manages ‘revolving door’ moves of its staff members: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/155953 (OI/1/2021/KR), https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/110608 (OI/3/2017/NF), and https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/71136 (joint inquiry into cases 2077/2012/TN and 1853/2013/TN).

[6] The fifteen EU Agencies in question are: the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), Agency for Support for BEREC, European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), European Banking Authority (EBA), European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), European Defence Agency (EDA), European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT), European Medicines Agency (EMA), European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), and the Single Resolution Board (SRB).

[7] See for the inspection meeting with EASA: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/doc/inspection-report/223855, for EBA: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/doc/inspection-report/223856, for EIOPA: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/doc/inspection-report/223857, for EMA: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/doc/inspection-report/223858, and for ESMA: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/doc/correspondence/223859.

[8] Article 16, first paragraph SR. The same applies to temporary staff or contract staff whose period of employment comes to an end.

[9] Article 16, second paragraph SR.

[10] Article 16, third and fourth paragraphs SR.

[11] In compliance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (Text with EEA relevance.), OJ L 295, , pp. 39–98, see: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1725/oj.

[12] The European Defence Agency (EDA) is the only EU Agency within the scope of this inquiry that does not apply the Commission Decision C(2018)4048 on outside activities and assignments and on occupational activities after leaving the Service, by analogy. The EDA instead applies its own implementing decision, which it adopted as a follow up to a previous European Ombudsman inquiry (OI/3/2021/KR). See: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/news-document/en/151929.

[13] Commission Decision C(2018)4048 on outside activities and assignments and on occupational activities after leaving the Service.

[14] See for example strategic inquiries OI/3/2017/NF and OI/1/2021/KR on how the European Commission manages ‘revolving doors’ situations of its staff members: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/110608 and https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/155953.

[15] The procedure is based on Commission Decision C(2018)4048 on outside activities and assignments and on occupational activities after leaving the Service, which all but one agency that is covered by this inquiry apply by analogy.

[16] In accordance with Article 11 SR, EU staff members must not deal with matters in which, directly or indirectly, they have any personal interest that could impair their independence, in particular family and financial interests. The prospect of future employment is such a financial interest. In case the possible future employer is covered by the activities of the EU Agency concerned, this personal interest could conflict with the staff member’s performance of their duties.

[17] As set out in Article 21(4) of Commission Decision C(2018)4048.

[18] See for example OI/3/2021/KR, which is linked in footnote 2.

[19] In accordance with Article 16 SR.

[20] See Article 41(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, available here: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT. See by analogy the judgment of the General Court of 3 February 2021 in the case of Giulia Moi v European Parliament, paragraphs 100 and 101 and the case law cited therein.

[21] These agencies are EBA, EFSA and FRA. After meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team in the context of their respective inspection meetings, EASA, EIOPA, EMA and ESMA indicated that they would consider including this step going forward.

[22] In accordance with Article 16 SR.

[23] See to this effect paragraphs 14 to 16 of the Ombudsman’s inquiry how the European Commission responded to concerns about a former senior staff member's job in the private sector (case 2231/2024/KR): https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/214676.

[24] See for example strategic inquiries OI/3/2017/NF (paragraph 52) and OI/1/2021/KR (paragraphs 53 to 56) on how the European Commission manages ‘revolving doors’ situations of its staff members. See, respectively: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/110608 and https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/155953.

[25] This principle of transparency is enshrined in Article 15(1) of the TFEU, which states that ”[i]n order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union's institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible.” Public information also serves the purpose of deterring former senior staff members from engaging in those prohibited activities.

[26] Article 16 of the SR, third paragraph, refers instead to all former senior officials as defined in the implementing measures adopted by the agency concerned.

[27] The European Commission reports are available here: https://commission.europa.eu/publications/occupational-activities-former-senior-officials-annual-report_en.

[28] Among the agencies within the scope of this inquiry, the BEREC, EBA, EFSA, and EIOPA actively monitor compliance with post-service decisions.

[29] In accordance with Article 40 SR and Article 17 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants (CEOS), see: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/1962/31(1)/2014-05-01/eng.

[30] The EU agency determines the duration of such leave, which may not exceed one quarter of the staff member’s length of service; or three months if their seniority is less than four years; or twelve months in all other cases. See Article 52 CEOS, “By way of derogation from the third paragraph of Article 17, the temporary staff referred to in Article 2(f) with a contract for an indefinite period may, irrespective of their seniority, be granted unpaid leave for periods not exceeding one year. The total length of such leave may not exceed twelve years in the course of the staff member's entire career.”

[31] The EIT, FRA, EBA, ESMA, EIOPA, EFSA and SRB have rules for the prevention and management of conflicts of interest in respect of Board members in relation to post-mandate activities. Some of the remaining agencies provide for conflict of interest rules for their Board members during their mandates, so including any possible notice period, but not for any period extending beyond their mandate. As their members are not staff members governed by the SR, and were appointed by national authorities, they remain subject to applicable national rules.

[32] EBA, ESMA and EIOPA.