Made in accordance with Article 2(10) of the Statute of the European Ombudsman[1]

Background to the complaint

1. One of the tasks of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) is to conduct independent administrative investigations into serious misconduct by staff and members of the EU institutions. Following its investigations, OLAF can make recommendations for actions to be taken by the EU institution concerned, including ‘disciplinary recommendations’ aimed at sanctioning any wrongdoing by staff and members of EU institutions.[2] Through its annual report, OLAF informs the public about the number of disciplinary recommendations it made to the EU institutions concerned in a given period and whether the institutions followed-up on these.[3]

2. The complainant, a journalist, wanted to know more about OLAF’s findings and the EU institutions’ follow-up. To this end, he made several requests[4] for public access to documents to relevant EU institutions, including, in June 2024, to the European Commission concerning a closed investigation referred to in OLAF’s annual report for 2022. According to this annual report, the investigation concerned possible financial irregularities and breaches of statutory obligations by an EU staff member, consisting mainly of allegations of favouritism of external contractors and potential conflict of interests with family members[5]. OLAF issued a recommendation to the Commission to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the EU staff member concerned.

3. More specifically, the complainant asked for:

• Copies of all communications between OLAF and the Commission relating to this matter, including OLAF’s recommendation;
• The Commission’s case file on the related disciplinary proceedings including (a) a copy of any final written report and appendices, (b) a copy of any preliminary report and appendices and (c) correspondence between the Commission and the staff member in question.

4. In July 2024, the Commission replied to the request, identifying 23 documents[6]. It refused access to all 23 documents in their entirety, stating that disclosure would undermine the protection of privacy and the integrity of individuals under the EU legislation on public access to documents (Regulation 1049/2001) and personal data protection (Regulation 2018/1725).[7]

5. The complainant asked the Commission to review its decision (by submitting a ‘confirmatory application’).

6. After a delay,[8] the Commission issued its final decision, in which it confirmed the refused access.[9] In doing so, the Commission invoked a general presumption of confidentiality arising from the protection of the purpose of investigations.[10] The Commission also argued that public access cannot be granted to the personal data contained in the documents[11].

7. Dissatisfied with the Commission’s refusal to grant any public access to the documents requested, the applicant turned to the Ombudsman.

The inquiry

8. The Ombudsman opened an inquiry into the Commission’s refusal to give public access to the documents requested.

9. In the course of the inquiry, the Ombudsman inquiry team carried out an inspection of the documents at issue at the premises of the Commission. The inspected file consists of three types of documents:

1) 15 cover letters or letters of a procedural nature (such as formal notifications to the person concerned[12]);

2) Two documents that include the comments of the person concerned at different steps of the procedure;[13]

3) Four documents that include the substantive analysis and conclusions of the relevant bodies involved in the disciplinary proceedings[14].

10. The Ombudsman also invited the Commission to provide any additional views on the complaint. The Commission did not provide any additional views, referring to the arguments provided in its confirmatory decision.

Arguments presented

The protection of the purpose of investigations

11. The Commission considered that the documents form part of the administrative file of an IDOC investigation to which a general presumption of confidentiality based on the protection of the purpose of investigations[15] applies. To support the application of this general presumption, the Commission noted that the Court of Justice has recognised in the past that an institution may rely on general presumptions to refuse access, where considerations of a generally similar kind are likely to apply to requests for disclosure relating to documents of the same nature. The Commission referred in particular to a general presumption recognised by the Court of Justice in relation to State aid files[16]. It also referred to case-law recognising a general presumption of non-disclosure in relation to documents in OLAF investigation files[17].

12. The Commission noted that one of the criteria for the recognition of a general presumption is the existence of specific rules set out in the relevant legal act. The Commission considered that the specific rules applicable to IDOC investigations share similarities with the rules applicable to State aid files and OLAF investigations. In particular, the Commission noted that the rules in both procedures limit access to the file for “interested parties” in State aid and to “persons concerned” in OLAF investigations.

13. Based on this, the Commission considered that a general presumption of confidentiality should apply also to IDOC investigation files, because:

• The documents requested form part of a category of documents, that is, an IDOC investigation file;
• That category of documents falls within the scope of a specific legal framework (Annex IX of the Staff Regulations,[18] and the General Implementing Provisions[19]), which contains specific accessibility rules, for which a consistent application of Regulation 1049/2001 is necessary. In particular, the Commission noted that the legal framework applicable to IDOC investigations does not grant third parties a right of access to the documents in the file;[20]
• Of the “high sensitivity of the investigation and the implications for personal data”, given that the IDOC investigation file contains information that is “sensitive non-classified” and accessible only on a “need to know” basis pursuant to the definition set out in the Decision on Security in the Commission;[21]
• The documents requested, pertaining to the IDOC pre-disciplinary and disciplinary procedure, contain and are based on information gathered and findings established in the framework of the OLAF investigation. The OLAF legal framework therefore also applies.[22]

14. According to the Commission, the application of a general presumption is justified by the need to ensure the proper operation of IDOC procedures and that their objectives are not undermined.

15. The Commission added that the documents describe in detail the activities and responsibilities of the staff member concerned and analyse whether the person concerned dealt with a matter in which, directly or indirectly, they had any personal interests such as to impair their independence, and in particular whether family and financial interests were at stake. The case concerned a very specific matter involving contacts of the Commission with external contractors.

16. The Commission further noted that, in relation to State aid files, the General Court considered that the presumption applied regardless of the stage of the State aid review process, extending to closed procedures[23]. Therefore, the fact that the sanction in this case was issued in April 2024 and became definitive in July 2024 does not change the Commission’s assessment as regards the application of the general presumption.

17. According to the Commission, the protection of confidentiality of IDOC investigation files is essential to the effective conduct of IDOC investigations. It stated that it is in this light that Article 4 of its Detailed Rules for the application of Regulation 1049/2001[24] “establishes that there is a presumption that access to documents being part of IDOC investigations undermine the interests protected by Article 4(1) to (3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001”[25].

18. The Commission further stated that it is of utmost importance to encourage the full cooperation of the person concerned, witnesses and other actors involved. This would be jeopardised by the prospect of disclosure. The Commission referred by analogy to the reasoning of the General Court in a case related to the disclosure of documents in OLAF case files[26]. This risk of harm would be foreseeable considering the particularities of IDOC investigations which require confidential cooperation of all actors involved (that is, the person concerned, external stakeholders, and staff members).

19. The Commission considered that the arguments of the complainant were too general to demonstrate the existence of an overriding public interest in disclosure[27]. The Commission added that there is sufficient information already in the public domain given that OLAF publishes an annual report on its activities. In addition, the IDOC annual report provides an exhaustive statistical overview of the cases treated and the sanctions imposed. It also provides an anonymised summary of certain cases. This anonymised report strikes a fair balance between the private interest of the persons concerned and the public interest in transparency and accountability of the EU institutions and their personnel.

20. While IDOC annual reports are not proactively published, they are accessible upon request under Regulation 1049/2001. The IDOC annual report of 2023 already allows the public to know which penalties were imposed in cases of undeclared conflicts of interest.

21. Furthermore, the Commission observed that the fact that IDOC promptly identified and sanctioned a breach of the Staff Regulations committed by a Commission staff member proves the efficiency of the IDOC disciplinary system. Therefore, the Commission considered that the motivation behind the request to access details about this IDOC investigation is mere curiosity and does not respond to any overriding public interest.

The protection of personal data

22. The Commission noted that the documents in the administrative file of the IDOC investigation at issue contain a wide range of information about the person concerned which, by its very nature, constitutes personal data. Disclosure of this information would risk causing reputational damage to the person concerned.

23. The Commission referred to a judgment of the Court of Justice according to which information like the gender, nationality and profession of the person concerned, as well as responsibilities or information regarding specific projects carried out by the person concerned may, taken together, allow the identification of the person concerned, in particular by those working in the same scientific field and who are familiar with the person’s professional background.[28]

24. Based on the information in the file, the Commission considered that it becomes possible to identify the person concerned as having been the relevant actor on the side of the Commission. The nature of the relationship between the person concerned and another person is also clearly documented throughout the case file.

25. The Commission added that the complainant did not put forward any need to obtain access to the personal data for a specific purpose in the public interest. In any case, the Commission emphasised that there are reasons to assume that the legitimate interests of the data subjects concerned would be prejudiced by the disclosure of their personal data, as there is a real and non-hypothetical risk that such disclosure would subject them to unsolicited external contacts.

26. The Commission argued, in addition, that granting partial access would still expose the person concerned to the risk of identification, as it is not possible to anonymise the documents without depriving them of their meaning.

27. In his confirmatory application, the complainant noted that it is common practice to redact personal data from requested documents to balance transparency with privacy and thus doubted the Commission’s position that it is impossible to redact the documents without rendering them meaningless.

28. He also contended that, in this specific case, given the severe nature of the findings and the confirmed imposition of a sanction, the full disclosure of the names of the individuals involved was justified. The public interest in knowing the identities of those who committed ethical breaches within a public institution outweighs their right to privacy, particularly when their actions have already been subjected to disciplinary action.

29. In his complaint to the Ombudsman, the complainant stated that the Commission’s refusal to grant partial access undermines the principles of transparency and accountability that are essential in cases involving serious ethical breaches by public officials. He argued that the public has a right to scrutinise the handling of such matters to ensure confidence in the EU institutions.

The Ombudsman's assessment

The application of a general presumption of confidentiality

30. The Court of Justice of the EU has, to date, not assessed whether the documents included in the administrative file of an IDOC investigation could be covered by a general presumption of confidentiality.

31. The Court has held that the use of general presumptions “is no insignificant matter”, as they “restrict the fundamental principle of transparency”; therefore, “the use of such presumptions must be founded on reasonable and convincing grounds”[29]. As the Ombudsman has stated previously, general presumptions entail the risk that institutions invoke them automatically without considering the particular circumstances of the case at hand[30].

32. The Ombudsman considers that even if a general presumption were to be recognised by the Court for documents included in the administrative file of an IDOC investigation, such general presumption would most likely be limited in time. Otherwise, it would be at odds with the general presumption of confidentiality recognised by the General Court in relation to OLAF investigation files. The general presumption of confidentiality in relation to documents in OLAF investigation files, which is based on the need to protect the purpose of its investigations,[31] is time-limited.[32] The presumption applies during the investigation and related follow-up proceedings, provided that a reasonable time for this follow-up has not yet elapsed[33].

33.  There is no apparent reason why, when it comes to IDOC investigations, a general presumption of confidentiality should apply after the relevant follow-up has been concluded.

34. The European Commission’s Detailed Rules for the application of Regulation 1049/2001 referred to in the confirmatory decision do not affect this conclusion. It is not clear to what extent the Commission relied on these rules to justify the refused access in this case. It seems that it was not a conclusive element in its legal reasoning.

35. In this case, the disciplinary sanction was imposed in April 2024 and became effective in July 2024, that is several months prior to the adoption of the confirmatory decision.

36. Overall, the Ombudsman finds that the Commission’s reliance on a general presumption of confidentiality of IDOC investigations files, after the disciplinary sanction had already been imposed in this case, was not reasonable.

Individual assessment of the documents

Protection of the purpose of investigations

37. The Ombudsman inquiry team inspected the documents in this case.

38. Based on an individual assessment of the documents, it appears that there is only limited information that would need to be redacted to protect the purpose of investigations. While the documents may need to be redacted to some extent to prevent witnesses, informants or other actors involved being discouraged from cooperating in the future, this does not concern the entirety of the documents.

39. For example, while the documents may reveal which step of the disciplinary procedure was taken when, the disciplinary procedure is set out in Annex IX of the Staff Regulation[34]. The part of the procedure covered by the Financial Regulation (involving the “Panel”) is also set out in the legislation.[35] The documents at issue thus seem to merely implement and describe the applicable procedures which are known to the public.

40. Regarding information that the Commission may, after an individual assessment of the documents, consider to be confidential in order to protect the purpose of investigations, it is relevant to assess whether there would be an overriding public interest in disclosure.

41. In that regard, the Ombudsman considers that it was reasonable for the Commission to conclude that the arguments put forward by the complainant fall short of the standard set by the case law[36]. This is because the complainant mainly referred, in general terms, to the principles of transparency and accountability as essential in cases involving serious ethical breaches by public officials.

42. For the sake of completeness, the Ombudsman takes note that IDOC issues an annual report that includes anonymised summaries of certain cases, to which access may be granted upon request. This should be acknowledged as a positive step towards transparency. However, such reports are not proactively published, nor do they provide the same level of information as the documents at issue, even if partly redacted, could give to the public on how disciplinary proceedings at the Commission function in practice.

The protection of personal data

43. The concept of ‘personal data’[37] is very broad. It covers any information related to an identified or identifiable person. The information does not need to be linked to a person’s private life. Information concerning a person’s professional activity can also constitute personal data, namely if it allows for the identification of the individual concerned.

44. In addition, according to a recent judgment, an institution that assesses whether disclosing specific information could lead to the identification of a natural person should take into account not only the average reader, but also the persons familiar with the individuals’ professional background.[38] It must be noted, however, that in the specific case underlying the judgment, the institution concerned published rather extensive information about the person concerned.[39] 

45. Based on the inspection of the documents at issue, the Ombudsman considers that, while some parts of the documents might need extensive redactions to prevent the identification of individuals, the documents do not contain personal data throughout.

46. Rather, it would seem that parts of the documents at issue could be disclosed whilst protecting the privacy and integrity of individuals. More specifically, the Ombudsman finds that the redacted documents could still provide an overview of the facts taken into account, the applicable staff rules and the analysis and conclusions at each step of the proceedings from the different bodies involved, as well as the ultimate outcome, including the nature of the sanction imposed.

47. Concerning the parts of the documents that do contain personal data (such as the name of the person concerned, grade, position, the names or references of projects), any disclosure must fulfil the conditions for transfer of personal data set out in Regulation 2018/1725. According to these rules, EU institutions must follow a three-stage analysis in considering whether they can grant public access.[40] First, they must assess whether the applicant established a specific need for disclosure of the personal data that is in the public interest. Second, if such ‘necessity’ exists, they must assess whether disclosure might undermine the legitimate interests of the individual(s) concerned. Third, if this is the case, they must establish that, in light of the objective pursued by the applicant, disclosure would be proportionate nevertheless.

48. As regards the necessity for disclosure, the complainant argued that, given the severe nature of the findings and the fact that a sanction was imposed, full disclosure of the names of the individuals involved was justified to ensure accountability. According to the complainant, the public interest in knowing the identities of those who committed ethical breaches within a public institution outweighs their right to privacy, particularly when their actions have already been subject to disciplinary action.

49. Whilst the Ombudsman considers that the objective pursued by the complainant is legitimate, she is not convinced that disclosure of the identity of the person concerned would be necessary to achieve it. In particular, as noted above, the Ombudsman considers that parts of the documents at issue do not reasonably constitute personal data. Therefore, partial access should be possible which would allow for public scrutiny of the investigation and its outcome.

50. In addition, staff members who breach their obligations under the EU Staff Regulations[41] do not forfeit their right to privacy. Such misconduct is addressed by the relevant administrative procedures, including investigations by OLAF and possible disciplinary measures. As the inspection showed, these procedures have been applied here. The complainant did not explain why, in this case in particular, the identity of the staff member concerned would be required to achieve accountability.

51. In light of this, the Ombudsman finds that the complainant did not establish a necessity for disclosure of the personal data at issue, as required by Regulation 2018/1725. The assessment of the second and third stages of the test described above in relation to the personal data at issue is therefore unnecessary.

The proposal for a solution

Based on the above findings, the Ombudsman proposes that the Commission should re-consider its decision to refuse public access with a view to providing meaningful partial access to the requested documents, whilst protecting the privacy and integrity of the individuals mentioned in the documents.

The Commission is invited to inform the Ombudsman by 27 October 2025 of any action it has taken in relation to the above solution proposal.

Teresa Anjinho
European Ombudsman

Strasbourg, 25/08/2025

 

[1] Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2021.253.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2021%3A253%3ATOC.

[2] For more information, visit: https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/about-us/what-we-do_en or https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/investigations/internal-administrative-investigations_en.

[3] See, for example, the OLAF report 2022:https://ec.europa.eu/olaf-report/2022/investigative-activities/investigative-mandate/investigating-within-the-eu-institutions_en.html.

[4] Under Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/1049/oj.

[5] https://ec.europa.eu/olaf-report/2022/investigative-activities/investigative-mandate/internal-investigations_en.html#family-ties-and-conflict-of-interest.  

[6] Describing the author, addressee, date, title and reference number of each document.

[7] Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32001R1049 ; Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1725/oj/eng.

[8] This delay in issuing a confirmatory decision was the subject matter of the complaint in case 1935/2024/ACB.

[9] It also specified that that OLAF’s final report with recommendation was not covered in the confirmatory decision in the present case because it was dealt with directly by OLAF. The handling of this part of the request by OLAF is the subject matter of another complaint to the Ombudsman (case 2327/2024/ACB).

[10] Under Article 4(2) third indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

[11] Under Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049/2001.

[12] Within the meaning of Article 93 of the Financial Regulation available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R2509#:~:text=Article%C2%A093,of%20a%C2%A0member%20of%20staff

[13] Documents 5 and 9 as listed in the initial reply.

[14] Document 8 - Opinion of the Panel; Document 10 - Disciplinary Report; Document 17 - Opinion of the Disciplinary Board; Document 19 - Disciplinary decision.

[15] Under Article 4(2) third indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

[16] Judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 June 2010, Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau (TGI), C-139/07 P, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=84749&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4554454.

[17] Judgment of the General Court of 26 May 2016, IMG v Commission, T-110/15, paragraph 33, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=178781&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4555542.

[18] Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, consolidated version available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/1962/31(1)/2014-05-01/eng#tocId312. 

[19] Recital 3, Articles 3(1), 7(1) and (4), 15(1), 23(2), 33 and 41(4)

[20] Article 2(2) of Annex IX of the Staff Regulations states that when the IDOC investigation ends, the appointing authority communicates the conclusions of the investigation report and, upon request, the documents directly related to the allegations only to the person concerned, and that subject to the protection of the legitimate interests of third parties

[21] Article 9(5)(b) and 9(6) of Commission Decision 2015/443 of 13 March 2015 on Security in the Commission https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2015/443/oj/eng.

[22] In particular Article 10(2)-(3) of Regulation 883/2013 of 11 September 2013, concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02013R0883-20210117.

[23] Judgment of the General Court of 26 May 2022, Múka v Commission, T-214/21, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=266807&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4556706

[24] On 5 December 2024, the European Commission adopted Decision 2024/3080 including as annex a revision of the detailed rules for the application of Regulation 1049/2001, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02000Q3614-20200423#anx_1:~:text=DETAILED%20RULES%20FOR%20THE%20APPLICATION%20OF%20REGULATION%20(EC)%20No%201049/2001%20OF%20THE%20EUROPEAN%20PARLIAMENT%20AND%20OF%20THE%20COUNCIL%20REGARDING%20PUBLIC%20ACCESS%20TO%20EUROPEAN%20PARLIAMENT%2C%20COUNCIL%20AND%20COMMISSION%20DOCUMENTS.

[25] Confirmatory decision dated 8 January 2025, p. 10.

[26] Judgment of the General Court of 26 May 2016, IMG v Commission, T-110/15, paragraph 35, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=178781&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4555542.

[27] Judgment of the General Court of 26 July 2023, Troy Chemical Company v Commission, T‑662/21, paragraphs 113-118, available at https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=275848&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4570288; Judgment of the Court of Justice of 11 May 2017, Sweden v Commission, C-562/14 P, paragraphs 55-57, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=190582&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4570624. 

[28] Judgment of the Court of Justice of 7 March 2024, OC v Commission, C-479/22 P, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62022CJ0479. 

[29] Judgment of the General Court of 25 September 2014, Spirlea v Commission, T-306/12, paragraph 52, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157983&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=245014.

[30] Proposal of the European Ombudsman for a solution in case 1379/2020/MAS on the European Commission’s refusal to grant access to preparatory documents related to anti-dumping measures on imports of iron or steel fasteners from China, available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/solution/en/138837.

[31] Under Article 4(2) third indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

[32] Judgment of the General Court of 1 September 2021, Homoki v Commission, T-517/19, paragraphs 60-63, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=245503&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=8662129.

[33] Judgment of the General Court of 26 May 2016, IMG v Commission, T-110/15, paragraphs 33-35 available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62015TJ0110.

[34] Referred to at footnote 20 above.

[35] See Article 93 of the Financial Regulation referred to at footnote 12 above.

[36] Judgment of the Court of Justice of 2 October 2014, Strack v Commission, C-127/13, paragraphs 128-131 available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=158192&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4677990.

[37] Article 3(1) of Regulation 2018/1725 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1725/oj/eng.

[38] Judgment of the Court of Justice of 7 March 2024, OC v. Commission, C-479/22P, EU:C:2024:215, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=283526&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2926581.

[39] The OC judgment referred to at footnote 28 above, paragraph 22.

[40] Article 9(1)(b) of Regulation 2018/1725.

[41] Regulation 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1962/31(1)/2014-05-01.