made in accordance with Article 4(1) of the Statute of the European Ombudsman^[1]

 

Background to the complaint

1. In May 2024, the ‘Critical Raw Materials Act’ (‘CRMA’)[2] entered into force. This EU Regulation aims to ensure access to a secure and sustainable supply of essential minerals and materials with high economic importance and significant supply risk that are crucial for digital, green, and defence technologies.

2. Under the CRMA, certain mining, processing and recycling projects can be recognised as a ‘Strategic Project’[3], meaning that these projects obtain a priority status that requires national authorities and courts to carry out any administrative or judicial procedure related to the permit-granting of those projects as swiftly as possible. 

3. Decisions on the designation of the status of Strategic Project are taken by the European Commission, after consulting the ‘Critical Raw Materials Board’ that consists of Member State experts.

4. In May 2024, the Commission published the first call for applications for the recognition of critical raw materials projects as Strategic Projects under the CRMA.[4] In March 2025, the Commission designated the first 47 projects within the EU as Strategic Projects.[5] In June 2025, the Commission designated 13 projects located in countries outside the EU as Strategic Projects.[6]

5. In order to be designated as a Strategic Project, critical raw materials projects have to comply with certain criteria.[7] One criterion is that they would be implemented sustainably, which means that project promoters have to monitor, prevent and minimise any environmental or socially adverse impacts of their respective project.

6. In November 2024, the complainant, an environmental civil society organisation, requested[8] from the Commission public access to (i) a list of all projects that had applied for the status of ‘Strategic Project’, (ii) the Commission’s guidelines for the assessment of those applications, and (iii) documents that the mining companies concerned (‘project promoters’) had submitted to demonstrate their compliance with the requirements that environmental impacts would be monitored, prevented and minimised and that they would engage meaningfully with local communities.

7. In reply, the Commission provided the complainant with a copy of its guidelines related to the assessment of project applications. As for the remaining documents, the Commission refused to give public access, relying on the need to protect its (then) ongoing decision-making process[9] and the need to protect the commercial interests of the project promoters concerned[10].

8. In February 2025, the complainant asked the Commission to review its position (by making a ‘confirmatory application’), arguing − amongst other things − that there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. Specifically, the complainant considered that the documents contain environmental information, including ‘information related to emissions into the environment’[11], and that critical raw materials projects have a significant impact on the health and well-being of local communities who had not been consulted.

9. When it did not receive a confirmatory reply from the Commission within the prescribed time limit (which is considered an implicit negative reply[12]), the complainant turned to the Ombudsman, raising concerns about the delay incurred by the Commission in dealing with its access request and about the Commission’s refusal to disclose the documents at issue in the confirmatory application.

The inquiry

10. The Ombudsman opened an inquiry regarding the Commission’s implicit refusal to give public access under Regulation 1049/2001.

11. In the context of a strategic inquiry^[13], the Ombudsman had already found that the Commission’s systemic delays in processing public access requests amount to maladministration.^[14] Therefore, while the Ombudsman regretted the delay in the Commission’s response to the complainant’s confirmatory application, she did not open an inquiry into the reasons for the delay in this specific case. However, the Ombudsman is aware that the Commission continues to incur delays in dealing with public access requests and is closely monitoring the matter based on complaints submitted to her.

12. As a first step in the inquiry, the Ombudsman asked the Commission to issue an explicit confirmatory decision.

13. In reply, the Commission informed the Ombudsman that, due to its wide scope, it considered the complainant’s access request to entail an excessive administrative burden and that it had therefore proposed a ‘fair solution’[15] to the complainant. The complainant subsequently agreed to limit the scope of its access request to 12 projects within the EU that had in the meantime been recognised as Strategic Projects.

14. In the absence of an explicit confirmatory decision, the Ombudsman inquiry team proceeded to inspect the documents within the reduced scope of the access request as well as documentation related to exchanges with two of the project promoters concerned that the Commission had consulted by then.

15. In February 2026, the Commission issued a confirmatory decision. It identified 55 documents as falling within the reduced scope of the access request, consisting of four Commission decisions granting (or not) the status of Strategic Project, and 51 documents relating to the 12 successful project applications.

16. The Commission granted full access to its two decisions designating critical raw materials projects as Strategic Projects[16] and refused to disclose the names of the project promoters whose project applications had been unsuccessful (listed in the two remaining decisions), so as to protect their commercial interests.

17. As regards the 12 project applications falling within the reduced scope of the access request, the Commission maintained its position that access had to be refused to the relevant documents in their entirety, to protect the commercial interests of the project promoters concerned, arguing that a general presumption of non-disclosure applied. However, as regards two projects, the Commission granted full access to one and partial access to four documents, saying that it had consulted the project promoters concerned, given that their projects had already obtained an environmental permit from the responsible national authorities.

18. The Commission no longer relied on the exception for the protection of its decision-making process given that that process had in the meantime been completed.

19. The complainant remained dissatisfied with the access granted. The Ombudsman inquiry team therefore continued with the inspection of documents.

Arguments presented

20. As regards the 51 documents relating to the 12 successful project applications, the Commission argued in its confirmatory decision that the documents contain commercially sensitive information, such as the project promoters’ business plans, methodology, expertise, know-how and innovative approach, as well as information on the involvement of experts and other sensitive information on how the project promoters intend to implement their projects, including information on the measures to address the environmental and social impact of their project. It considered that this information illustrates the attractiveness and merits of an application and that disclosure could undermine the protection of the commercial interests of the project promoters, as competitors could use this information in their future applications in the still open call. The Commission also contended that the CRMA stipulates[17] that information acquired in the context of its implementation shall be used “only for the purpose” set out in it, arguing that the application of Regulation 1049/2001 cannot render this provision ineffective.

21. In light of the above, the Commission considered that the general presumption of non-disclosure that the EU courts have recognised in relation to documents forming part of tenders (that typically include a technical, economic and financial offer) submitted in the framework of EU public procurement applies by analogy.[18]

22. Specifically, the Commission stated that the rationale behind this general presumption is the need to preserve undistorted competition and legitimate interests of economic operators who participate in procurement procedures and that similar considerations can be applied to applications for the status of a Strategic Project. It argued that a principal objective of the CRMA is to organise a fair competition between project promoters, which includes ensuring that future applications “win on their own merits and not based on the methodology developed by others”, and improve the functioning of the internal market. Disclosure would undermine these objectives, as it would reveal the project promoters’ strategy towards implementing their project, including measures envisaged to monitor, prevent, and minimise the environmental impact of their project and to engage with the local communities.

23. As regards the existence of an overriding public interest, the Commission took the view that the interest in accessing environmental information could supersede the need to protect commercial interests only if the documents contained information related to actual or foreseeable emissions into the environment. However, the Commission considered this to be the case only for five documents related to the two projects that had already obtained an environmental permit at the time of their application. For the remaining ten projects, the Commission considered that any possible environmental information contained in the documents must be deemed hypothetical, as those projects still had to undergo the relevant national permit procedures, which may lead to changes in the planned monitoring, prevention and mitigation of environmental impacts. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the actual or foreseeable emissions of those projects would be determined at that later stage only.

24. Concerning the public interest in accessing information due to the expected social impact of the projects at issue, the Commission contended that it is “better placed to assess and evaluate that the required criterion is met.” It also stated that the complainant’s claim that local communities had not been consulted is based on an assumption and not corroborated by any evidence.

25. In view of the above, the Commission concluded that there is no overriding public interest in the disclosure of environmental information contained in the remaining 46 documents and of information related to meaningful public engagement in any of the documents at issue.

26. Finally, the Commission stated that the measures envisaged in the applications to engage meaningfully with local communities might not have become known to the public yet and that also those project promoters that had publicised the fact that they had applied had not agreed to the public disclosure of commercially sensitive information.

27. Concerning the two decisions not granting strategic status, the Commission argued that some of the unsuccessful project promoters had re-applied in the (still open) call and that their renewed applications are still being assessed. It argued that disclosure could undermine their reputation and lead to smear campaigns by market competitors that could distort competition and thus undermine theirs and the EU’s commercial interests.

28. In their comments on the Commission’s confirmatory decision, the complainant challenged the use of a general presumption of non-disclosure. It argued that the process for the designation of Strategic Projects is not competitive and, unlike tender procedures, does not involve a comparative examination of bids.

29. The complainant added that, at the time of their application, project promoters had usually already taken certain steps to advance their project, such as determining the basic project design and potential environmental impacts.

30. The complainant also questioned the possibility for project promoters to copy each other’s application, given the unique set of facts related to each project and its unique location. The criteria to be met under the CRMA depend heavily on the specific environmental conditions, social fabric and specific need of each project and any measures must be uniquely tailored. For the complainant, the method of presenting how these criteria are met should not be regarded as “know how”.

31. In addition, the complainant contended that disclosure would not undermine the project promoters’ commercial interests, as it was not seeking access to any business plans or other financial information. It noted that not all information concerning a company can be regarded as sensitive and argued that, to consider information related to the environmental and social impacts of a mining project as sensitive would go against the core objectives of EU law of ensuring transparency and public participation in relation to the environmental impact of mining projects.[19]

32. The complainant further argued that the environmental information contained in the documents is either already public or will become public in the context of national permitting procedures, given that the same information must be included in any environmental impact assessment.

33. The complainant also reiterated its view that there is an overriding public interest in disclosure as the information in the documents must be regarded as ‘information related to foreseeable emissions into the environment’. In addition, the complainant contended that there is an overriding public interest in disclosure given that the documents concern a decision-making process related to projects that will significantly affect the environment and the health and well-being of local communities, and that the CRMA does not envisage any formal involvement of the local communities in this process. Those communities thus have a right to receive information about the evidence presented in support of the claim that their rights are fully protected.

34. As regards the Commission’s two decisions not granting strategic status, the complainant argued that the Commission has not adequately justified how a failure to secure the status of a Strategic Project could undermine the project promoters’ commercial interests.

The Ombudsman's assessment leading to a recommendation

35. EU institutions can refuse to give public access to a document requested under Regulation 1049/2001, if there is a reasonably foreseeable and non-hypothetical risk that its disclosure would undermine the commercial interests of a natural or legal person. However, EU institutions cannot rely on the need to protect commercial interests simply because information relates to a company or its business relations. The exception serves to protect commercially sensitive information, such as information relating to the business strategy or specific know-how of a company.[20] Accordingly, when invoking this exception, EU institutions have to explain how disclosure could specifically and actually undermine the legitimate commercial interests at stake.[21]

36. In this case, the Commission relied on the need to protect the commercial interests of the project promoters concerned, arguing that a general presumption of non-disclosure could be applied to those documents that form part of project applications. Where this is the case, the EU institution concerned does not have to examine the documents at issue individually nor to explain the specific harm that disclosure of their content would entail. Rather, they can presume that, because the documents are part of a particular file or category of documents, they must remain confidential in their entirety.

On the general presumption of non-disclosure

37. The Commission took the view that the general presumption that disclosure of bids of tenderers in public procurement procedures would undermine the commercial interests of the tenderers concerned, as recognised by the EU courts, could be applied, by analogy, to documents relating to the designation of critical raw materials projects as ‘Strategic Projects’ under the CRMA.

38. In essence, the Commission contended that applications for the status of Strategic Project can be deemed to contain sensitive commercial information that could be used by competitors in the context of their own project applications, thereby distorting competition in subsequent procedures and undermining the legitimate expectations of the project promoters that have already applied.

39. The Commission’s position is not convincing. Most notably, the public procurement procedure is of a different nature than the process for determining whether or not a critical raw materials project should be granted the status of a Strategic Project under the CRMA. The public procurement procedure is a comparative selection procedure that requires the institution concerned to compare various commercial offers from different tenderers about the same service in order to select the best one. Only the successful tenderer will be awarded a service contract. The public procurement procedure is therefore competitive in nature.

40. By contrast, the process for designating critical raw materials projects as Strategic Projects is not based on bids, costs or competition among market operators, but on public interest criteria. When assessing applications for the status of Strategic Project, the Commission has to determine whether or not the relevant project meets the statutory requirements laid down in the CRMA, exercising administrative discretion. If the Commission considers that a project meets those criteria, the project will be recognised as a Strategic Project. This decision is taken irrespective of the content of other project applications. In other words, in theory, all projects applying for the status of Strategic Project in a given call can be successful.

41. In addition, it appears unreasonable to presume that the (relevant parts of) project applications like the ones at issue in this case contain commercially sensitive information throughout. The documents have been provided by the project promoters concerned to illustrate whether and how their respective project would be implemented sustainably, that is, how they would prevent and minimise negative impacts on the environment and society.

42. This information will normally also be part of the mandatory Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) that project promoters have to conduct in line with the national regulatory framework applicable to them and/or Environmental and Social Impact Assessments that project promoters might carry out on a voluntary basis or in the context of meeting funding requirements. A core feature of such assessments is typically that they are meant to be made publicly available. Also, in light of the size and significant impact of critical raw materials projects, project promoters usually engage with a broad range of stakeholders, to improve public perception of and obtain support for their project, or because the applicable rules require them to do so. In this context, information that project promoters have to provide to the Commission under the CRMA to demonstrate compliance with the requirement for meaningful engagement with the local communities involved when applying for the status of Strategic Project becomes public.

43. Based on the inspection of documents, the Ombudsman is not convinced that the relevant parts of the application forms at issue contain much information that would reflect the project promoters’ specific expertise and know-how or could be deemed sensitive for other reasons. Rather, much of the information contained therein is rather general in nature. In the application forms, project promoters describe, for example, which domestic laws apply to their project, which voluntary frameworks they adhere to and where they are in the process of obtaining the necessary permits for the implementation of their project. As regards specific measures that the project promoters envisage to mitigate the environmental and social impacts of their project, the information in the application form is often not very detailed but constitutes a summary of information that has already been lawfully made public elsewhere, such as in the framework of the project promoters’ corporate reporting obligations, the permit granting process for the projects (including through public hearings), proactive transparency measures by the project promoters or their engagement with local communities.

44. Concerning the supporting documents at issue, the Ombudsman notes that a significant number of these documents (and/or summaries or other language versions of them) is already publicly available, including on the respective project promoter’s website and/or on the website of the responsible national authority.

45. The Ombudsman also notes that the methodology used by the project promoters in formulating and structuring their applications is set out in a guidance document[22] provided by the Commission as well as in the relevant application form itself. Accordingly, the kind of information included in the application forms is very similar in nature and the supporting documents are of the same kind too. In addition, where EIAs or similar documents have been provided, their structure follows national legislation and/or guidelines from national authorities. It is therefore unlikely that, in all circumstances, their disclosure would give other project promoters an unfair advantage in terms of copying each other’s approach.

46. What is more, the project applications that the Commission reviews in relation to a given round of the call do not concern the same or even similar projects. Rather, critical raw materials projects tend to be unique due their geographical location, the raw materials to be extracted or processed, the national regulatory framework that applies to them, the environmental factors that might be affected and the needs of the local community concerned. Accordingly, the impact that each project may have and how best it can be addressed are unique as well.

47. Finally, it should be noted that the Commission itself has made some of the information contained in the project applications public, namely, in its reply to a ‘request for internal review’[23] by a consortium of civil society organisations that was issued prior to the adoption of the confirmatory decision in this case.[24]

48. In light of all this, the Ombudsman considers that it was unreasonable for the Commission to presume that the documents forming part of project applications would contain sensitive information throughout and, thus, that a general presumption of non-disclosure could be applied to them. Thus, the Commission should have conducted an individual assessment of the project applications, with a view to granting wide partial access.

On the existence of an overriding public interest

49. Where an EU institution has established that granting public access to documents would reasonably undermine the protection of commercial interests, it must refuse access unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.[25]

50. In this regard, the complainant, referring to the Aarhus Regulation[26], argued that the documents are likely to contain environmental information, including ‘information related to emissions into the environment’[27], and that such information would have to be disclosed irrespective of its commercial sensitivity.

51. The Aarhus Regulation aims to ensure that ‘environmental information’ is progressively made available and disseminated to the public.[28] The purpose of access to this information is to promote public participation in the related decision-making process, thereby increasing accountability and contributing to public awareness of and support for the decisions taken. A public interest to access ‘environmental information’ is thus deemed to exist and the EU institutions should take this into account when assessing requests for public access.[29]

52. However, the public interest in accessing ‘environmental information’ does not automatically override the interest to be protected by non-disclosure of the requested documents. Instead, it must be assessed based on an individual examination of the documents and their context.[30] This is different where a specific kind of ‘environmental information’ is concerned, that is, information which ‘relates to emissions into the environment’. For this specific kind of environmental information, an overriding public interest is presumed to exist when it comes to the protection of commercial interests.[31]

53. The notion of ‘information related to emissions into the environment’ is not limited to information on ‘actual emissions’. It also comprises information that allows the public to know “what, it may be foreseen, will be released into the environment (...)”[32] and information relating to the effects of those emissions[33].

54. In this case, the Commission took the view that the documents forming part of project applications related to all but two of the projects concerned do not contain any information that could reasonably be regarded as ‘information related to emissions into the environment’, because the environmental permits for those projects were still pending at the time of their application under the CRMA. For this reason, the Commission considered that any information on emissions into the environment that might be contained in the project applications must be regarded as purely hypothetical rather than actual or foreseeable.

55. The Ombudsman finds this position not convincing.

56. Under the CRMA, the Commission is not required to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the environmental impact of a project applying for the status as a Strategic Project. Rather, it is for the responsible national authorities to make a full and detailed environmental assessment when projects apply for the required environmental permit. However, in order to verify whether a critical raw materials project would be implemented sustainably, the Commission has to “take into account an overall assessment of a project’s compliance with relevant Union or national law as well as relevant supplementary evidence, taking into account the location of the project”.[34] This means that project promoters have to provide the Commission with extensive environmental information so as to enable it to assess whether the environmental impacts of their project would be sufficiently monitored, prevented and minimised.

57. As the inspection showed, the documents forming part of project applications do indeed contain detailed information qualifying as ‘environmental information’ under the Aarhus Regulation, including information about past and expected future emissions of the projects and the impact of those emissions on the environment. This information appears to be based on an evaluation by independent experts, laboratory testing and/or the experience of the project promoters with respect to mining activities in the same or similar locations. In addition, this information has also been submitted to public authorities in order to illustrate that the projects meet the relevant statutory requirements for the status of Strategic Project and/or for the granting of an environmental permit.

58. As noted above, the concept of ‘information related to emissions into the environment’ covers “information on foreseeable emissions into the environment”.[35] The Ombudsman understands that information on emissions will be deemed to be foreseeable if that information is based on a concrete assessment of objective data. In contrast, information on emissions will be deemed to be purely hypothetical if that information is not based on a concrete assessment of objective data but rather on conjecture.

59. Based on the inspection of the relevant documents, the Ombudsman considers that the information related to estimated future emissions of the projects contained therein is based on a concrete assessment of objective data, and, thus, that these emissions are likely to occur based on the nature and scale of the envisaged works. While it is not impossible that the planning of a project might still change slightly (or that a project might not be implemented in the end), the information on emissions that has been submitted to the Commission under the CRMA should therefore, at least, be considered “foreseeable” and thus to be covered by the concept of “information [which] relates to emissions into the environment” in the EU Aarhus Regulation. After all, the Commission accepted it as a basis for its assessment of the sustainability of the projects concerned.

60. In addition, it is clear that the critical raw materials projects at issue will have a major impact on the environment and the lives of people in extended areas of the countries where they are located. Therefore, if the Commission recognises a critical raw materials project as a Strategic Project, it should be able to explain to the public why it considered that a project’s environmental impacts would be sufficiently monitored and addressed.

61. That the public can scrutinise the Commission’s decision to designate a project as a Strategic Project and hold the Commission to account seems particularly pressing in one case. In it, the critical raw materials project concerned had obtained an environmental permit in the past, but the permit was revoked by national courts, prior to the submission of the project’s application for Strategic status under the CRMA. Amongst the reasons for the revocation were a lack of a proper environmental impact assessment, a lack of involvement of independent experts and a lack of engagement with the local community. Without this permit, the project cannot go ahead. Despite this, the Commission decided to recognise the project as a Strategic Project, which means that the project promoter can now expect privileged treatment from public authorities and easier access to public financing. As this example shows, there is a strong public interested in understanding on what information the Commission based its decisions to designate the projects at issue as Strategic Projects and to scrutinise this information.

62. It also seems that more than two projects (or parts thereof) had already obtained an environmental permit or a “positive environmental impact statement” from the competent national or local authorities at the time of the adoption of the Commission’s confirmatory decision. It is unclear why the Commission did not take this into account when replying to the complainant’s confirmatory application.

On the partial access granted to the two decisions listing unsuccessful projects

63. The Commission has published its two decisions recognising critical raw materials projects within and outside the EU as Strategic Projects under the CRMA.[36] However, the Commission did not publish its decisions listing those projects that have been unsuccessful. At the complainant’s request, the Commission gave partial access to these decisions, redacting the names and contact details of the project promoters concerned. In doing so, the Commission argued that disclosure would undermine the project promoters’ commercial interests, their reputation and could be used against them by competitors. The Commission also noted that some project promoters had re-applied in the second round of the call and that their applications are currently being examined.

64. According to the CRMA, the Commission is required to publish decisions granting the Strategic Project status under the CRMA.[37] In contrast, there is no such obligation with respect to applications that were unsuccessful.

65. The Ombudsman considers that the refusal of access to information related to the identity of the project promoters concerned appears generally reasonable. While some of the project promoters have openly communicated about their failed attempt to obtain the Strategic Project status, this does not mean that there is no risk. Nor could the Ombudsman identify an overriding public interest in disclosure of this information. The Commission’s refusal of access in this regard thus seems justified.

On the (partial) access granted to parts of five documents related to two projects

66. As regards two of the projects at issue, the Commission contended that, because they had already obtained an environmental permit prior to their application for the Strategic Project status, the emissions into the environment related to those projects, as described in their applications, could be regarded as ‘foreseeable’. In other words, the Commission acknowledged that an overriding public interest in accessing this information is deemed to exist.

67. In light of this, the Commission conducted an individual assessment of those parts of the five documents that contain information related to the environmental impact of these projects and consulted the two project promoters concerned. Based on this, the Commission decided to give public access to these documents in full or in part.  

68. Regarding one project (Talga), the Commission disclosed all relevant parts of three documents related to its environmental impact. While the Commission made limited redactions with respect to the indicated timeline for the implementation of the project in the application form, this information falls arguably outside the scope of the access request.

69. Concerning the second project (Aguablanca), the Commission disclosed one document (that is already publicly available) in full and gave partial access to the relevant parts of the application form[38]. In doing so, the Commission referred to the consultation with the project promoter concerned who had objected to the disclosure, arguing that the way certain elements are summarised, re-organised and connected in a condensed manner in the form would allow for a selective interpretation or the use of aggregated information outside its original regulatory context, thus undermining the project promoter’s commercial interests. The Commission did not explain why it considered these arguments reasonable.

70. Based on the inspection, it is not apparent why the redacted information in relation to the second project should be considered sensitive. In particular, it appears that the same information is also included in the document that has been disclosed in full and that has been published in the context of the national environmental permit-granting procedure. While the information consists of extracts and thus is not reproduced in exactly the same manner, it has not undergone much editing. It is therefore not clear why the Commission considered that any risks to the project promoter’s commercial interests should prevail over the need for the public meaningfully to participate in the environmental decision-making.

71. Concerning those parts of the documents that concern the projects’ social impact and that were not individually assessed by the Commission, the Ombudsman notes that these do not seem sensitive throughout. More specifically, some of the measures described had already been implemented at the time of the application, as also indicated by the Commission, which means that they were already known to the local communities concerned. Other parts had already lawfully been disclosed by public authorities, either in the context of the national permit-granting procedures or in the context of the financing of the projects. This illustrates, once more, that the use of a general presumption in relation to this part of the application forms appears unreasonable and that the Commission should have conducted an individual assessment.

72. In light of all the above, the Ombudsman finds that the Commission’s refusal to grant wide public access to all documents at issue constituted maladministration. She therefore makes a corresponding recommendation below.

Recommendation

On the basis of the inquiry into this complaint, the Ombudsman makes the following recommendation to the Commission:

The European Commission should re-consider its position on the public access request with a view to granting wide public access. Where needed, the Commission should consult the project promoters concerned.

The Commission and the complainant will be informed of this recommendation. In accordance with Article 4(2) of the Statute of the European Ombudsman, the Commission shall send a detailed opinion by 15 October 2026.

 

Teresa Anjinho

European Ombudsman

Strasbourg, 15/07/2026

 

[1] Available at: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1163/oj.

[2] Regulation 2024/1252 of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj.

[3] See, in particular, Articles 6(1), 7 and 10 of Regulation 2024/1252.

[4] Available at: https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/calls-expression-interest/call-applications-strategic-projects-under-critical-raw-materials-act_en.

[5] The Commission’s decision listing all projects within the EU that were designated as Strategic Project is available at: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/circabc-ewpp/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/1958718b-21e9-40f4-9c9f-42a58dc4c5a3/download.

[6] The Commission’s decision listing all projects outside the EU that were designated as Strategic Project is available at: https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/808502c2-21c7-4ca8-855f-ff0b528f91c4_en?filename=C_2025_3491_1_EN_ACT_part1_v4.pdf.

[7] In accordance with Article 6(1) of Regulation 2024/1252.

[8] Under Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/1049/oj.

[9] In accordance with Article 4(3), first subparagraph of Regulation 1049/2001.

[10] In accordance with Article 4(2), first indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

[11] Within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Regulation 1367/2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (‘Aarhus Regulation’): http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/1367/oj.

[12] In accordance with Article 8(3) of Regulation 1049/2001.

[13] Strategic inquiry OI/2/2022/OAM on the time the European Commission takes to deal with requests for public access to documents: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/case/en/60766.

[14] Decision in the above strategic inquiry OI/2/2022/OAM: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/175321.

[15] In accordance with Article 6(3) of Regulation 1049/2001.

[16] See footnotes 5 and 6 above.

[17] Article 46 of the CRMA.

[18] The Commission referred, amongst other case-law, to the Judgment of the General Court of 29 January 2013, Cosepuri v EFSA, T-339/10 and T-532/10, paragraph 101: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62010TJ0339 and the Judgment of the Court of Justice of 14 February 2008, Varec SA v Belgian State, C-450/06, paragraphs 34 and 35: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62006CJ0450.

[19] As an example, the complainant referred to Article 6 of Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/92/oj.

[20] See, for example, judgment of the General Court of 7 February 2018, PTC v EMA, T-718/15: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=199044&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=13039858.

[21] See, for example, judgment of the Court of Justice of 4 September 2018, ClientEarth v Commission, C‑57/16 P, paragraph 51: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=205322&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=19039430.

[22] The latest version of this ‘Guide for Applicants’ is available at: https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/strategic-projects-under-crma/guide-applicants_en.

[23] In accordance with Article 10 of the Aarhus Regulation.

[24] See the Commission’s detailed assessment annexed to its reply dated 2 December 2025: https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/3b48eff1-b955-423f-9086-0d85ad1c5879/library/74edffdc-0eb5-4658-bb6c-a5674127feb1/details.

[25] In accordance with Article 4(2) of Regulation 1049/2001.

[26] Regulation 1367/2006, see footnote 11 above.

[27] Article 2(1)(d) of the Aarhus Regulation.

[28] Article 1(1) of the Aarhus Regulation.

[29] See also the Ombudsman’s Decision in cases 1132/2022/OAM and 1374/2022/OAM (https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/168684), paragraph 34.

[30] See also the Ombudsman’s Decision in cases 1132/2022/OAM and 1374/2022/OAM, paragraph 35.

[31] In accordance with Article 6(1) of the Aarhus Regulation.

[32] Judgment of the General Court of 11 July 2018, Rogesa Roheisengesellschaft Saar mbH v Commission, T-643/13: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62013TJ0643.

[33] See, for example, Judgment of the General Court of 13 November 2024, PAN Europe v Commission, T-104/23, paragraph 66: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62023TJ0104.

[34] In accordance with paragraph 5 of Annex III to the CRMA.

[35] See also Judgment of the Court of Justice of 23 November 2016, European Commission v Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and Pesticide Action Network Europe (PAN Europe), Case C-673/13 P, paragraph 74: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62013CJ0673.

[36] See footnotes 5 and 6 above.

[37] In accordance with Recitals (14) and (16) of the CRMA.

[38] Referred to as ‘document 5’ in the confirmatory decision.