Made in accordance with Article 4(1) of the Statute of the European Ombudsman^[1]

Background to the complaint

1. In February 2024, media reported[2] on internal documents obtained from the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex)[3] concerning allegations of ill-treatment of migrants by the Bulgarian authorities in 2022. The documentation included an overview of Serious Incident Reports (SIRs)[4] in which the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO) of Frontex “considers it established that the so-called pushbacks, often involving high levels of violence and other inhuman and degrading treatment, are a regular practice by Bulgarian border police”[5]. It also noted that “an analysis of previous [Serious Incidents Reports] indicates significant issues with national reporting and transparency”.

2. In May 2024, the complainant, a journalist, requested[6] public access to two documents held by Frontex: (i) the FRO’s opinion on the serious incidents reporting mechanism issued in January 2024 (FRO opinion on reporting); and (ii) the FRO’s opinion regarding Bulgaria issued between January 2024 and May 2024 (FRO opinion on Bulgaria).

3. In June 2024, Frontex refused access to both documents in their entirety, invoking the protection of the public interest as regards public security[7] and the protection of internal decision-making processes[8]. Frontex considered that partial disclosure was not possible because the redactions would be disproportionate in relation to the parts eligible for disclosure, undermining the principle of sound administration.

4. On 4 July 2024, the complainant asked Frontex to review its decision (by making a ‘confirmatory application’).  

5. On 24 July 2024, following a request for public access to documents, Frontex published SIRs related to Bulgaria covering incidents from 2023[9]. These reports provide an analysis of incidents investigated by the FRO, “shedding light on a wider pattern of fundamental rights violations by Bulgarian (border) police officers”[10]. In these reports, the FRO stated that it “believes that there exists a tacit practice of non-reporting of actions severely endangering fundamental rights of migrants”.

6. In August 2024, Frontex adopted its confirmatory decision, reiterating its position that the two FRO opinions could not be disclosed without (seriously) undermining the protection of public security and internal decision-making processes. Frontex also said that no partial access could be given.

7. Dissatisfied with Frontex’s decision, the complainant turned to the Ombudsman.

The inquiry

8. The Ombudsman opened an inquiry into the complaint against Frontex’s decision to refuse access to the documents at issue under Regulation 1049/2001.

9. In the course of the inquiry, the Ombudsman received additional views from Frontex. The Ombudsman inquiry team also inspected the two documents identified by Frontex as falling within the scope of the complainant’s access request.

Arguments presented

The protection of the public interest as regards public security and international relations

10. In the confirmatory application, the complainant recalled public statements of Frontex’s Executive Director made in 2023 according to which upholding transparency and cultivating a culture of openness were Frontex’s top priorities[11]. He also pointed out that the documents are likely to contain information that has already been made public, indicating, generally, that disclosure could not pose a risk to any of the interests Frontex invoked.

11. Regarding the protection of the public interest as regards public security, the complainant noted that the fact that a document relates to public security is not in itself enough to justify the application of the exception according to case-law. For the complainant, Frontex submitted general, abstract or generic justifications only, thus failing to demonstrate a risk that disclosure would pose to public security.

12. In the confirmatory decision, Frontex stated that the documents contain comprehensive details on (i) ongoing operations, (ii) the operational area, (iii) the number and profile of officers deployed in the operational area, (iv) reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities, and (v) sensitive operational information.

13. In essence, according to Frontex, disclosing this information would enable criminal networks to change their modus operandi to avoid controls. This would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger, or hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations to curtail criminal activities at the external borders. It considered that the risk to public security was reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical.

14. Frontex added[12] that disclosure of the FRO’s opinion on Bulgaria, because it contains a nascent unilateral perspective on fundamental rights observance, would also undermine the operational cooperation with the Member State in current and future joint operations. This would undermine the operational objectives of combatting cross-border crime and therefore would put at risk public security.

15. Frontex also invoked the protection of the public interest as regards international relations with third countries,[13] pointing out that the engagement with third countries is crucial for the security of the EU’s borders. It mentioned that the non-disclosed elements at issue include assessments of the cooperation with third countries and return activities applied in a third country. It considered that the release of such information would ultimately impede the collaboration and mutual trust between Frontex, Member States and third countries, and impact the ongoing and future engagement with other third countries or international organisations.

16. Frontex noted the wide margin of discretion of institutions when determining whether disclosure would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and international relations.

The protection of Frontex’s decision-making processes

17. In the confirmatory application, the complainant considered that Frontex had provided no evidence to support its claim that ongoing discussions within Frontex and under its auspices require ‘special protection’.

18. In relation to the FRO opinion on reporting, the complainant considered that the relevant internal decision-making process was closed when the confirmatory decision was adopted. He referred in that regard to conclusions of the Management Board of Frontex issued in June 2024[14].

19. Furthermore, the complainant considered that there was an overriding public interest in disclosure since an open debate was needed[15] regarding Frontex’s response to serious shortcomings identified by the FRO in relation to its reporting mechanism and serious fundamental rights violations in Bulgaria. The complainant referred to evidence indicating that Frontex previously disregarded the FRO’s repeated warnings[16]. He also stated that Frontex recently decided to expand its operational activities in Bulgaria, despite the FRO’s warnings. In these circumstances, the complainant considered that disclosure would enable citizens, including Members of the European Parliament and civil society organisations, to scrutinise Frontex’s response to these violations.

20. In its confirmatory decision, Frontex stated that, when a decision-making process is not of a legislative nature, it enjoys a wide margin of discretion in determining whether disclosure of a document would seriously undermine this process.

21. Frontex considered that disclosing the two FRO opinions at issue would reveal contentious positions of Frontex’s FRO and its senior management, making explicit references to the cooperation with Member States and third parties (such as third countries and civil society). Frontex argued that the relevant sections of the documents form part of a wider decision-making process, and would flow into “an ongoing adjustment of internal rules and procedures” concerning operational reporting mechanisms[17].  

22. According to Frontex, disclosure of the documents would result in the author practising self-censorship, thus seriously undermining the decision-making process[18]. Keeping the documents confidential would help fostering frank internal discussions, with a view to improving Frontex’s functioning and contributing to the efficient and effective running of its decision-making process[19].

23. Frontex emphasised that Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001 can also apply after the decision has been taken. It pointed out that the documents contain numerous opinions for internal use as part of the wider deliberations and preliminary consultations within Frontex to improve border management. It asserted that these deliberations require ‘special protection’ under Regulation 1049/2001[20]. Frontex further noted that the described risks to the decision-making process are not ’purely hypothetical’.

24. In its additional views, Frontex provided more context on the internal decision-making processes it seeks to protect. Regarding the FRO opinion on Bulgaria, Frontex referred to ongoing preliminary consultations within Frontex and between Frontex and the Chief Directorate of the Bulgarian Border Police regarding the implementation of the recommendations contained in the document.

25. Regarding the FRO opinion on reporting, Frontex specified that the conclusions adopted by the Management Board on the matter in June 2024 only partly addressed the issue. A decision to undertake procedural and operational change within Frontex was still pending[21]. Frontex stated that this decision-making process is expected to conclude later in autumn 2024 with an “Action Point List”. In that context, Frontex considered that partial disclosure of this opinion would result in “undue public pressure and premature conclusions as to the scope and content of the recommendations”[22].

26. For both opinions, Frontex stated that, once the ongoing internal decision-making processes are concluded, it “is ready to re-consider (partial) public disclosure of the documents”[23].

27. Frontex stated that most redacted elements in the two FRO opinions are protected by an absolute exception that cannot be overridden by a public interest in disclosure. For the remaining redactions, Frontex emphasised that, as it does not act in a legislative context, a higher threshold to prove the existence of an overriding public interest applied[24]. For Frontex, the arguments put forward by the complainant are too general to establish an overriding public interest.  

Partial access

28. Frontex argued that the administrative burden of redacting the two documents would be particularly heavy, and exceeded the limits of what may reasonably be required. Partial access would have been, in any event, meaningless due to the heavy redactions needed. Frontex also pointed to the specific nature of the documents and their sensitivity to justify deviating from the principle of partial access[25].  It also took into account the fact that no essential information included in the documents had already been made public.

The Ombudsman's assessment leading to a recommendation

The protection of the public interest as regards public security and international relations

29. The EU institutions enjoy a wide margin of discretion when determining whether disclosing a document would undermine the public interest as regards public security and international relations[26]. As such, the Ombudsman’s inquiry sought to determine whether there was a manifest error in Frontex’s assessment in that regard.

30. Having reviewed the documents at issue, the Ombudsman considers that those parts of the documents that Frontex withheld to protect the above interests do not seem to consist of sensitive information throughout. Thus, whilst, in principle, the Ombudsman accepts that, in light of Frontex’s wide discretion, the use of the exceptions for the protection of the public interest as regards public security and international relations was not manifestly wrong, she does not agree that the information at issue is covered by these exceptions in its entirety. 

31. The inspection of the documents showed that, while they include information such as the number of officers deployed, or some elements that can qualify as modus operandi, most of the information marked as sensitive for public security reasons appears generic, imprecise and, in some cases, already in the public domain. Examples of such information are included in the confidential annex to this recommendation.

32. Based on the explanations provided in Frontex’s additional views, the Ombudsman understands that Frontex considers that disclosing the FRO’s contentious assessment of the current policies of a Member State would deteriorate the cooperation with Bulgaria in current and future joint operations. This, in turn, would undermine the attainment of the operational objectives aimed at combatting cross-border crime and thus put at risk public security. 

33. The Ombudsman notes that national authorities have a duty to cooperate in good faith with Frontex[27]. Regulation 2019/1896 gives Frontex, and more specifically its executive director, powers to enforce such obligations. Notably, if an operational plan is not respected by the host Member State, the executive director may withdraw the financing of an activity or suspend or terminate it[28]. The Ombudsman is therefore not convinced that the fact that disclosure could impact Bulgaria’s operational cooperation and therefore public security can justify the document’s non-disclosure. In this regard, the Ombudsman also notes that Frontex has already made public the FRO’s concerns regarding a “tacit practice of non-reporting of actions severely endangering fundamental right of migrants” of Bulgarian authorities, in the SIRs published on 24 July 2024[29] (that is, before the adoption of the confirmatory decision).

34. In relation to the protection of the public interest as regards international relations, the Ombudsman’s review showed that only very limited parts seem relevant to the protection of international relations with regard to third countries[30].

35. In light of the above, the Ombudsman considers that Frontex’s application of the exceptions to protect the public interest as regards public security and international relations was excessive.

The protection of Frontex’s decision-making processes

36. EU institutions may refuse public access to a document related to a matter where a decision has not yet been taken, if disclosure would seriously undermine the decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure[31].

37. Frontex invoked the need to protect its ongoing decision-making processes to refuse access to both documents. It was, however, not clear from the confirmatory decision which decision-making processes were still ongoing. Based on the additional views provided by Frontex[32], the Ombudsman understands that, regarding the FRO opinion on reporting, Frontex sought to protect the decision-making process relating to the procedural and operational changes considered within Frontex following this opinion. Regarding the FRO opinion on Bulgaria, the decision-making process concerned the follow-up to the recommendations included in the opinion.

38. The Ombudsman considers that Frontex provided sufficient information, in its additional views, to show that it had not yet decided on the changes considered within Frontex following the FRO opinion on reporting at the time of the confirmatory decision.

39. Regarding the follow-up to the recommendations included in the FRO opinion on Bulgaria, Frontex did not provide any details as to what decision was still pending[33]. It is thus not clear to the Ombudsman what decision-making process was still ongoing at the time of the confirmatory decision.

40. In any event, the Ombudsman is not convinced by Frontex’s argument that partial access to the two FRO opinions would put at risk the above decision-making processes, assuming that they were ongoing at the time.

41. The justifications provided by Frontex are, in essence, based on the risk of self-censorship by the FRO in the future in light of the contentious positions taken in the opinions at issue. Given its duties,[34] the FRO is bound to issue sensitive and contentious opinions. If Frontex’s reasoning in this case was followed, any opinion of the FRO that relates to possible violations of fundamental rights would be considered confidential, presuming a risk of self-censorship, until the decision regarding a possible follow-up is adopted.

42. The ‘special protection’ invoked by Frontex to ensure the free exchange of views within Frontex is not supported by Regulation 2019/1896, which does not provide that the FRO’s opinions are subject to special confidentiality requirements. It states, to the contrary, that Regulation 1049/2001 applies to Frontex[35] and, according to the applicable case-law, general claims of a risk of self-censorship are not sufficient to refuse public access to a document to protect an ongoing decision-making process[36] nor, a fortiori, a closed one[37].

43. In addition, the Ombudsman notes that both FRO opinions include, to a significant degree, information that was already made public by Frontex at the time of the confirmatory decision, in particular, in the SIRs on Bulgaria covering incidents from 2023[38]. These parts of the SIRs that were disclosed go beyond the factual description of the incidents. They include the FRO’s critical assessment of these incidents and part of the FRO’s recommendations. In light of this, the risk of self-censorship seems redundant in relation to this information. Furthermore, it is not clear from the explanations provided by Frontex how the information that is not yet in the public domain, if disclosed, would put at risk the ongoing decision-making process(es). 

44. Frontex also referred in its additional views to a risk of “undue public pressure and premature conclusions as to the scope and content of the recommendations” in case of disclosure. However, such statement is not sufficiently specific and substantiated to establish the reality of external pressure and interference[39].  

45. Finally, Frontex’s position that it enjoys a “wide discretion” when applying the exception concerning the protection of a decision-making process in non-legislative matters is not supported by the case-law. It is undisputed that the EU courts have recognised a particularly high standard of transparency when it comes to documents that are drawn up or received in the context of legislative procedures[40]. However, it cannot be inferred from this case law that, in non-legislative matters, institutions have a “wide discretion”[41] in applying Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001. The Ombudsman is concerned by such interpretation of the case-law by Frontex, which is at odds with a culture of openness.

46. In light of the above, the Ombudsman considers that Frontex failed to show how, specifically and concretely, disclosing the opinions at issue would seriously undermine its decision-making processes.

47. In addition, the complainant put forward arguments for an overriding public interest in disclosure. In particular, he argued that disclosure would contribute to conferring greater legitimacy on Frontex by enabling the public to scrutinise its response to serious shortcomings identified by the FRO in relation to the Serious Incident Report mechanism and the FRO’s opinion on serious fundamental rights violations in Bulgaria. Based on documents he obtained via public access to documents requests, the complainant noted that the FRO had already warned Frontex of fundamental rights violations by the Bulgarian authorities and issues in reporting, and had questioned Frontex’s response to these issues.

48. The Ombudsman is concerned that Frontex did not engage with these arguments, despite the fact that they are relevant and specific[42]. Frontex is required to respond to the arguments put forward capable of calling into question the refusal[43], and to verify itself the existence of an overriding public interest[44].

Partial access

49. Frontex argued that giving partial access to the two FRO opinions would be too burdensome and make the documents unintelligible.

50. In this context, the Ombudsman considers that redacting two documents of 13 and six pages respectively cannot be considered as “particularly heavy” or “exceeding the limits of what may reasonably be required”[45].

51. The Ombudsman also notes that the case-law referred to by Frontex to derogate from the principle of partial access was adopted in particular circumstances that do not apply in this case (such as, the component parts of the documents were not easily removable[46], the document at issue would have been entirely deprived of its content[47], or the information at issue was presented in the form of graphs, maps, geographical coordinates and tables of technical characteristics, and removing the confidential information would have made the documents “largely unintelligible”[48]). 

52. In light of the above, the Ombudsman finds that Frontex’s refusal to grant access to the two documents at issue, in their entirety, constituted maladministration. She therefore makes a corresponding recommendation below.

Recommendation

On the basis of the inquiry into this complaint, the Ombudsman makes the following recommendation to Frontex:

Frontex should re-consider its position on the access request with a view to providing significantly increased access, taking into account the Ombudsman’s considerations in this recommendation.

Frontex and the complainant will be informed of this recommendation. In accordance with Article 4(2) of the Statute of the European Ombudsman, Frontex shall send a detailed opinion by 24 May 2025.

 

Emily O'Reilly
European Ombudsman

Strasbourg, 21/02/2025

 

[1] Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2021.253.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2021%3A253%3ATOC

[2] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2024/02/27/how-the-eu-is-overlooking-bulgaria-s-unlawful-migrant-pushbacks-ahead-of-its-schengen-entry_6562795_8.html.

[3] Under Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/1049/oj.

[4] “A Serious Incident Report (SIR) procedure [...] obliges every participant in Frontex operational activities to immediately report in the form of a Serious Incident Report any situation of possible violations of fundamental rights [...],” see: https://www.frontex.europa.eu/fundamental-rights/fundamental-rights-at-frontex/fundamental-rights-at-frontex/. 

[5] ‘Overview of SIRs 2022-2023’ accessed via Lemonde article at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24426126-fro-overview-of-sirs, also accessible via Frontex’s public register of documents since 18 August 2023 at: https://prd.frontex.europa.eu/document/bulgaria-serious-incident-reports-and-fundamental-right-office-april-july-2023/ in document entitled ‘PAD 2023 00266 point 2’.

[6] Under Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/1049/oj.

[7] Under Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

[8] Under Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001.

[9] https://prd.frontex.europa.eu/document/serious-incident-reports-concerning-bulgaria-covering-the-period-from-february-to-july-2024/

[10] See SIR 15123/2023 p. 2, available at: https://prd.frontex.europa.eu/document/serious-incident-reports-concerning-bulgaria-covering-the-period-from-february-to-july-2024/. 

[11]  https://x.com/LeijtensFrontex/status/1706970799440105978

[12] In its additional views dated 16 September 2024.

[13] In its additional views dated 16 September 2024, referring to Article 4(1)(a) third indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

[14] Entitled “Conclusions of the Management Board on Ensuring National Authorities’ Active Support and Cooperation in Serious Incident Investigations Conducted by Frontex’s Fundamental Rights Office”.

[15] Judgment in case T-529/09, in’t Veld, paragraph 93, cited above.

[16] https://balkaninsight.com/2024/02/26/schengen-in-sights-eu-and-frontex-overlook-violent-bulgarian-pushbacks/

[17] Confirmatory decision p. 10.

[18] Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 9 September 2008, MyTravel Group plc v Commission of the European Communities, T-403/05, paragraph 52, available at : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=67825&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=12490253.  

[19] Judgment of the General Court of 15 September 2016, Philip Morris Ltd v European Commission, T-18/15, paragraph 87 available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=183326&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=12490515.

[20] Judgment of the Court of 21 July 2011, Kingdom of Sweden v European Commission and MyTravel Group plc, C-506/08, paragraph 79, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=107935&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=12490755.

[21] When it provided the additional views on 16 September 2024.

[22] Additional views, p. 4.

[23] Additional views, p. 4

[24] Judgment of the Court of 14 November 2013, LPN v European Commission, C‑514/11 P and C‑605/11 P, paragraph 93, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=144492&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=13144405.

[25] Referring to the judgment of the Court of 6 December 2001, Council v Hautala, C-353/99 P, paragraph. 3, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=46923&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=27934688 .

[26] Judgment of the Court of Justice of 1 February 2007, Sison v Council, C‑266/05 P, paragraph 64, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=ecli%3AECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2007%3A75.

[27] The EU Treaties establish a duty of sincere cooperation between the EU institutions and the Member States; Article 4(3) TEU; Article 11 of Regulation 2019/1896 on the European Border and Coast Guard, OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1–131, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019R1896; see also: Judgment of 14 September 2022, Pollinis France v Commission, T‑371/20 and T‑554/20, paragraph 113: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-371/20&language=en.

[28] Article 46(3) of Regulation 2019/1896.

[29] https://prd.frontex.europa.eu/document/serious-incident-reports-concerning-bulgaria-covering-the-period-from-february-to-july-2024/. 

[30] A very limited part of Section 2.1 and of Section 3 of the opinion at issue.

[31] Article 4(3), first subparagraph of Regulation 1049/2001.

[32] Additional views provided to the Ombudsman dated 16 September 2024.

[33] Further information provided in the confidential annex in that regard.

[34] As set out under Article 109 of Regulation 2019/1896.

[35] Recital 115 and Article 114 of Regulation 2019/1896.

[36] Judgment in case T-51/15 cited above, paragraph 42.

[37] Judgment of the Court of 21 July 2011, Kingdom of Sweden v European Commission and MyTravel Group plc. C-506/08 P, paragraphs 86-90, available at https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=107935&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1533680.

[38] https://prd.frontex.europa.eu/document/serious-incident-reports-concerning-bulgaria-covering-the-period-from-february-to-july-2024/

[39] Judgment of the General Court of 9 September 2014, T-516/11, paragraphs 71-76 available at https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157442&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=13075844; and judgment in case T-51/15 cited above paragraphs 31-33.

[40] Judgment of the General Court of 22 March 2018, Emilio De Capitani v European Parliament, paragraphs 80-81, available at:  https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=200551&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=13076978.

[41] The EU courts have recognised that EU institutions have a wide discretion in applying the public-interest exceptions provided for under Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation 1049/2001, due to the “particularly sensitive and essential nature of the public interests concerned, combined with the fact that access must be refused by the institution” under this provision (see judgment of the General Court on 27 November 2019, Izuzquiza v. Frontex, T-31/18, paragraphs 64-66, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=221083&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=13077645.)

[42] Judgment of the Court of 16 July 2015, ClientEarth v. Commission, C-612/13 P paragraph 90, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=165903&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=13078468. 

[43] Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 6 April 2000, Kuijer v Council, T-188/98, 46, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=45228&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=13079113.

[44] Judgment of the General Court of 25 March 2015, Sea Handling v. Commission, T-456/13 paragraph 100, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30dd2678276f90cc453ba017bf0696938a4f.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxuPc3j0?text=&docid=163182&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=140063.

[45] Confirmatory decision p. 13-14.

[46] Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 12 July 2001, Olli Mattila v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, T-204/99, paragraph 73, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=46526&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1530572.

[47] Judgment of the General Court of 20 March 2014, Reagens v Commission, T-181/10, paragraphs 161, 162, 172 and 175: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-181/10&language=EN.

[48] Judgment of the General Court of 24 April 2024, Marie Naass, Sea-Watch eV v Frontex, T‑205/22, paragraph 97, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=285143&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1531224.