Background to the complaint

1. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) supports EU Member States and Schengen-associated countries in the management of the EU’s external borders. In particular, Frontex carries out tasks related to border management, migration management, rapid border interventions and return operations. 

2. EU migration policy includes the voluntary or forced return of irregular third-country migrants to their countries of origin. Individuals who have exhausted all legal avenues to legitimise their stay in an EU Member State receive a decision issued by national authorities instructing them to return, normally, to their countries of origin.[1] Those who do not leave voluntarily are subject to forced return operations. Forced return operations may be national, namely operated by a Member State (National Return Operations (NROs)), or joint, that is, coordinated, co-financed or fully financed by Frontex with several Member States taking part (Joint Return Operations (JROs)).[2]

3. In January 2025, the complainant, a researcher in the area of migration, made a request for public access to documents related to return operations. Specifically, he requested the following data:

“(1) the departure dates; (2) the flight numbers; (3) the organising Member States; (4) the participating Member States; (5) the departure countries and airports; (6) the destination countries and airports; (7) the layover countries and airports; (8) the flight schedules; (9) the total number of returnees involved; (10) the nationality of the returnees; (11) the number of accompanying staff, monitors and observers; (12) the cost of each operation; (13) the type of each operation; and (14) “all documents, contracts, agreements and contractual statements; operational plans; and (after-operation phase) evaluations and reports (Final Return Operation Reports) related to Return Operations for the year 2024”.

4. In February 2025, Frontex replied to the complainant’s request. It provided one document (excel table), containing some of the information requested about return operations flights.[3] However, Frontex refused to disclose information about the flight numbers, the departure and layover countries and airports, the flight schedules and the nationality of the returnees.[4]

5. In addition, Frontex provided broad partial access to 59 documents comprising “documents, contracts, agreements and contractual statements”[5] redacting the names of the beneficiaries, their contact and bank details. Frontex also provided partial access to two (out of the 126 identified) Final Return Operation Reports. Frontex refused access entirely to 46 documents comprising the Returns Operational Plan for 2024.[6]

6. To justify its refusal to provide (full) access, Frontex relied on several exceptions under the EU legislation on public access to documents (Regulation 1049/2001[7]), namely the protection of the public interest as regards public security[8] and international relations[9], the protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual[10], the protection of commercial interests[11] and Frontex’s internal decision-making processes.[12] Frontex did not provide a list of the documents that it had identified as falling within the scope of the request.  

7. The complainant asked Frontex to review its decision (by making a ‘confirmatory application’).

8. In its confirmatory decision of April 2025, Frontex identified additional documents (grant agreements and Final Return Operation Reports) falling within the scope of the complainant’s request. It provided wide partial access to the additionally identified grant agreements. Frontex also provided an updated link to a document containing information about the Final Return Operation Reports. Frontex maintained its position that no further access could be granted to the remaining documents and information about return operations.[13] In that final decision, Frontex provided a list of ‘identifying details’ (comprising operation references) of the final return operation reports (247 documents) and a list of the 46 documents comprising the ‘Returns Operational Plan for 2024’. Frontex did not include in these lists the grant agreements identified as falling within the scope of the request.

9. Dissatisfied with Frontex’s reply, the complainant turned to the Ombudsman in April 2025.

The inquiry

10. The Ombudsman opened an inquiry into Frontex’s refusal to grant (full) public access to the requested documents.

11. In the course of the inquiry, the Ombudsman inquiry team inspected a sample of the documents at issue and held a meeting with representatives of Frontex. The complainant provided comments on the meeting report.

Arguments presented

The protection of the public interest as regards public security and international relations

12. The complainant argued, in essence, that Frontex failed to demonstrate that (full) disclosure of the documents would constitute a “specific and actual risk” to the protected interests and that it relied on these exceptions in a wide and disproportionate manner. More specifically, he argued that disclosing information regarding past flights or the nationality of already returned persons would not fall into the category of operational information and thus could not harm public security.

13. In its confirmatory decision, Frontex relied on the need to protect public security and international relations and the commercial interests of those awarded the grants to justify its refusal to grant (wider) access. As regard the exceptions relating to the protection of public security and international relations, Frontex considered the nationality of returnees to constitute information on the engagement and cooperation with third countries. It would reveal ‘the modus operandi of law enforcement officials” and “detailed sensitive information obtained in cooperation with a Member State of the European Union regarding the effectiveness of border security measures”. Such disclosure “would endanger the public order as well as Member States’ security and, concretely, jeopardize the orderly conduct of return flights as well pose a hazard to the safety of aircraft, passengers and crew.” Additionally, disclosing the nationality of returnees constituted “information on third countries, the disclosure of which would undermine trust placed in Frontex by them”, which could lead those countries to refrain from cooperating with Frontex in the future. Frontex stated that disclosing information about past flights remain relevant for ongoing or planned operational activities. Further access posed more than a hypothetical risk, as “their disclosure, […] especially in combination with other sources [would enable] the extrapolation of technical-operational capabilities, flight routes, patterns and schedules of the deployment of human resources and assets”.

14. During the meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team,[14] Frontex’s representatives provided further clarifications as regards Frontex’s role in return operations, which is to assist Member States in full respect of fundamental rights and in compliance with international standards. However, the competent national authorities of a Member State are responsible for the final individual return decision. In light of its mandate, Frontex’s representatives said that Frontex “actively collects information on the destination of the return operations which was shared with the complainant, while retrieving information on the nationality of the returnees would require exceeding a simple routine search and compiling content of various documents thereby creating a new document. Even if retrievable, disclosure of the nationality of the returnees would be detrimental to public security and international relations.” Frontex representatives explained how it had interpreted the scope of the request and that some information within the documents, which may appear general in nature, in fact reveals the modus operandi of the Agency by disclosing the nature of the support provided by Frontex to Member States in return operations. Further, Frontex representatives explained the evaluation review cycle for return operations and how subsequent operational plans build on earlier ones, which affects Frontex ability to grant access to those earlier plans.

15. In his comments on the meeting report, the complainant reiterated his view that Frontex had failed to sufficiently demonstrate that disclosure would harm the protected interests. The complainant further argued that disclosing information on the nationality of returned persons would not require the creation of a separate document, since that information was contained in certain documents that Frontex had already disclosed.

The protection of commercial interests

16. The complainant argued that Frontex had failed to adequately substantiate its claims regarding potential harm to commercial interests concerning the “technical and economic information of the tenderer”. He considered that, even if such interests existed, they were outweighed by the overriding public interest in transparency about Frontex’s return operations, which have frequently been linked both to high expenditure and severe human rights violations. Therefore, the complainant argued that the public had a right to know in detail if the funds entrusted to Frontex are properly managed.

17. Frontex said that it had provided wide partial access to the grant agreements requested and that for those parts redacted, it relied on a general presumption of non-disclosure of tender documentation. It explained that the expunged parts contained sensitive commercial information such as “actionable details related to the awarding of the contract, including the price offer” and “details of the offers for the given tender procedure, inter alia the exact number of the requested flight hours per […] plane category or technical-operational details of the winning offers”. Disclosure would undermine the protection of sensitive commercial interests of the third party (expertise and technical know-how) and would also prevent Frontex’s ability to ‘participate in the market’ and to conclude similar contracts into the future.

18. In terms of overriding public interest, Frontex stated that the complainant raised only general hypothetical concerns that are not sufficient to establish an overriding public interest in disclosure. Further, Frontex stated that the complainant had not demonstrated how disclosure would be necessary to ensure scrutiny of public expenditure as financial data had already been provided. Frontex considered that providing the information about the cost of each concluded return operation satisfied its transparency and accountability obligations in its return activities.

19. During the meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team, Frontex representatives also explained that information regarding the beneficiaries of the agreements is considered sensitive and needs to be protected, in order to preserve Frontex’s ability to conclude future contracts.

20. In his comments, the complainant challenged Frontex’s explanations. The complainant maintained that there is an overriding public interest in disclosing information about Frontex’s return activities.

Partial access

21. The complainant contended that Frontex had failed to explain how providing partial access would constitute a disproportionate administrative burden.[15]

22. In its confirmatory decision, Frontex explained that the total number of non-disclosed documents exceeded 800 pages, and that manually reviewing them in order to redact the limited parts not falling under the applicable exceptions would cause a disproportionate administrative burden. However, Frontex provided access to an excel table extracted from its database with detailed information about each return operation for the requested period (July-December 2024), including the organising Member State, the number of people returned, number of Frontex’s staff participating in the operation and its total cost.[16] It said that the disclosure of short, extremely fragmented parts of the documents at issue would not be in line with the principle of sound administration and efficient use of public resources.

23. During the meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team, Frontex representatives stated that Frontex had interpreted the complainant’s request broadly, which led to the identification of a large number of voluminous documents. Frontex considered that it had dealt with the request in the most efficient manner by providing relevant data from its database concerning the information requested by the complainant.  

List of documents

24. The complainant argued that Frontex’s failure to provide a list of documents undermined his right to make an informed request for review. In its confirmatory decision, Frontex claimed that this would constitute the creation of a new document. Frontex nevertheless listed the ‘identifying details’ of 247 final return operations reports. It also listed in its decision, the 46 documents constituting the Returns Operational Plan for 2024.

The Ombudsman’s assessment

The protection of the public interest as regards public security and international relations

25. EU institutions and agencies enjoy a wide margin of discretion when determining whether disclosing a document would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and international relations.[17] As such, the Ombudsman’s inquiry sought to assess if there was a manifest error in Frontex’s assessment in that regard.

26. Based on the review by her inquiry team of a sample of the documents at issue, the Ombudsman confirms that the redacted parts (including the nationality of returnees and past flights) contain elements or information that are operational in nature. The Returns Operational Plan for 2024 covers operational procedures, including incident reporting and investigation (such as use of force), the division of responsibilities, workflow instructions and responsibilities of involved parties, operational training and briefings, together with the chain of command. Frontex’s position on this aspect is reasonable: disclosing this information could expose the working methods used in return activities and thus endanger Frontex’s and Member States’ efforts to enforce final return decisions and could jeopardize the orderly conduct of return flights as well as pose a hazard to the safety of aircraft, passengers and crew.

27. In light of the above, the Ombudsman finds that there was no manifest error in Frontex’s assessment that disclosure of such information would undermine the public interest as regards public security and international relations. Frontex’s position is further supported by the fact that, at the time of the access request, its reply and its meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team, the evaluation of return operations during 2024 was still ongoing.

28. That being said, and as Frontex acknowledged during the meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team, some parts of the documents at issue are descriptive in nature or contain generic content.

29. The Ombudsman notes that, in the meantime, Frontex has published its evaluation report concerning its return activities for 2024.[18] The evaluation report reflects some parts of the inspected sample of documents that would correspond in part to this generic content. Thus, some of the material contained in the expunged parts is now in the public domain. The issue of Frontex’s refusal to grant partial access to those parts of the requested documents is addressed further below.

The protection of commercial interests

30. In accordance with the first indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation 1049/2001, the institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of the commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual property, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.

31. Whilst there is no definition of the concept of 'commercial interests', the EU Courts have found that not all information relating to a company and its business relationships can be regarded as falling within the scope of the protection under this exception.[19] Further, it is not in principle sufficient, that the document relates to a commercial activity, as it must be demonstrated that disclosure would specifically and actually undermine commercial interests in a way that it is reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical.[20] In certain cases, the EU Courts have recognised general presumptions of harm depending on the nature of the categories of documents involved, including documents concerning tender specifications.[21] In those cases, disclosure of those categories of documents is presumed to harm the interest to be protected, unless there is an overriding public interest.

32. The inspection of a sample of grant agreements showed that, Frontex refused access to the name of the beneficiaries and their contact and bank details. To justify its position, Frontex relied on the existence of a general presumption of non-disclosure for documents comprising a tender specification. The Ombudsman welcomes that Frontex nonetheless carried out an individual assessment of the grant agreements and granted wide partial access and disclosed in particular the amount of its estimated financial support stipulated in the relevant grant agreement(s) that were identified as falling within the scope of the request.

33. The Ombudsman considers that Frontex provided reasonable explanations regarding why such information could harm the commercial interests of the parties involved, and specifically its ability to conclude agreements in the future.  

34. The exception pertaining to the protection of commercial interests can justify a refusal to grant public access to a document unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. The Ombudsman recognises the public interest in ensuring public scrutiny and oversight in how Frontex spends public funds in carrying out return operations. However, Frontex provided detailed information concerning the number of staff involved in each return operation and its cost as well as the total cost for its return activities for the period July-December 2024 thus satisfying the need to ensure transparency and accountability in its return activities. 

Partial access

35. As noted above,[22] the request concerned a large number of some voluminous documents. EU institutions and agencies can - in exceptional cases only - refuse to grant partial access if the administrative burden of redacting the requested documents is excessive,[23] if disclosure of the remaining parts of the documents would be meaningless,[24] or if the remaining elements of certain types of documents would be unintelligible.[25] The case-law also provides that it is not for the institution or agency to determine what is or is not useful for the applicant[26] and the burden of proof is on the institution or agency to demonstrate and explain the proportionality of its refusal to grant partial access in those circumstances. 

36. In this case, Frontex provided wide partial access to a large number of documents (grant agreements and related annexes). It also extracted certain requested information from its database and provided access to this data where it considered that it could be disclosed without harming the public interest as regards public security and international relations. The Ombudsman notes that some parts of the sample of documents inspected contain the generic and descriptive elements concerning the applicable legal framework relevant to different subject matters. This information may not, in isolation, be considered as protected under Article 4 of Regulation 1049/2001. However, as mentioned above, Frontex has since published its evaluation report concerning its return activities for 2024, and this report includes information considered generic in the sampled documents inspected. Moreover, it is not readily clear how disclosure of information on the applicable legal framework, which in any event is publicly available, would contribute to more transparency and accountability in Frontex’s return activities. In light of this, the Ombudsman considers Frontex’s overall position on how it provided partial access to the documents and information sought was reasonable.

List of documents

37. Finally, the Ombudsman notes that Frontex listed only partially the documents falling within the scope of the request (not including the grant agreements) and at confirmatory stage only. The Ombudsman has already taken the view that providing such a list, at the outset of handling requests for public access, enables requesters to understand the nature of the identified documents, the reasons to refuse (full) access, and to formulate reasoned requests for review, if necessary.[27] Therefore, the Ombudsman reiterates that, as a matter of good administration, Frontex should provide a list of documents it identifies as falling within the scope of their requests for public access to documents unless the very disclosure of a list would undermine the interest(s) to be protected. The Ombudsman trusts that Frontex will take her view into due consideration in the handling of request for public access in the future. The Ombudsman will continue to monitor Frontex’s practice in that regard, based on future complaints she may receive.

Conclusion

Based on the inquiry, the Ombudsman closes this case with the following conclusion:

There was no maladministration in how Frontex dealt with the complainant’s request for public access to documents.

The complainant and Frontex will be informed of this decision.

Teresa Anjinho
European Ombudsman

Strasbourg, 07/10/2026

 

[1] See, for instance, Article 6, 7 and 8 of the Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32008L0115.

[2] The Ombudsman has already conducted an own-initiative inquiry regarding Frontex’s role in Joint Return Operations. See, in this regard, Ensuring respect for fundamental rights in joint operations for the forced return of irregular third-country migrants (OI/9/2014/MHZ): https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/case/en/44272.

[3] Points 1, 3, 4, 6 (part), 9, 11, 12, and 13 of the request.

[4] Points 2, 5, 6 (only concerning the destination airport), 7, 8 and 10 of the request.

[5] Points 12 and (partly) 14 of the request.

[6] Point 14 of the request.

[7]  Regulation 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32001R1049.

[8] Article 4(1)(a), first indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

[9] Article 4(1)(a), third indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

[10] Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049/2001.

[11] Article 4(2), first indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

[12] Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001.

[13] In its confirmatory decision, Frontex did not invoke the protection of its decision-making process under Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001.

[14] The meeting report is available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/doc/inspection-report/234637.

[15] The complainant referred to the judgment of the General Court of 15 January 2013, Guido Strack v European Commission, Case T-392/07, paragraph 45: https://juris.curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=132366&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1982889.

[16] Available at : https://prd.frontex.europa.eu/document/final-reports-on-jros-nros-data-list-for-2024/.

[17] Judgment of the Court of Justice of 3 July 2014, Council v. In ‘t Veld, C-350/12 P, paragraph 63: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=154535&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=13541857..

[18]Available at: https://prd.frontex.europa.eu/wp-content/themes/template/templates/cards/1/dialog.php?card-post-id=2722&document-post-id=18288.

[19] Judgment of the General Court of 22 May 2012 in case T-344/08, EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg v Commission, paragraph 134: https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/document?source=document&text=&docid=122982&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=265898.

[20] Judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 January 2020 in cases C-175/18 P, PTC Therapeutics International Ltd v European Medicines Agency (EMA), paragraphs 95-96: https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/document?source=document&text=&docid=222502&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3093725. 

[21] Judgment of the General Court of 14 December 2017, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Parliament, T‑136/15, paragraph 62: https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/document/T/2015/T-0136-15-00000000RD-01-P-01/ARRET/197829-EN-1-html.

[22] See paragraph 22 above. 

[23] Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 7 February 2002, Kuijer v Council, T-211/00, paragraph 57: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=T-211/00.

[24] Judgment of the General Court of 20 March 2014, Reagens v Commission, T-181/10, paragraphs 161, 162 and 172: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-181/10&language=EN.

[25] Judgment of the General Court of 24 April 2024, Sea-Watch eV v Frontex, T‑205/22, paragraph 97: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-205/22.

[26] Judgment of the General Court of 6 December 2012, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, T-167/10, paragraph 78: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-167/10&language=EN; Judgment of the General Court of 5 December 2018, Falcon Technologies v Commission, T-875/16, paragraph 102: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-875/16&language=EN.

[27] See the Ombudsman’s decision in case 1129/2023/OAM: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/194082.