Background to the complaint

1. One of the tasks of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) is to support Member State police and border patrol authorities to coordinate cross-border anti-smuggling operations.[1]

2. The complainant, a researcher, made a request for public access to documents from Europol on 12 November 2024.

3. He requested:

• Minutes of meetings between Europol and national authorities of the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands regarding counter-smuggling activities towards networks organising clandestine journeys in small boats towards the United Kingdom;
• Europol Intelligence Notifications and Investigation Initiation Documents regarding organised criminal smuggling networks in the Channel; and
• Exchanges between Europol and Frontex (documents including but not limited to emails, minutes of meetings, attachments etc.) related to counter-smuggling operations and/or migration management activities.

4. In December 2024, Europol replied that it had identified 197 documents, 185 of which were messages exchanged via the ‘Secure Information Exchange Network Application’ (SIENA)[2]. The other documents included reports on meetings and exchanges with national authorities and Frontex. Europol refused access to all these documents, relying on the exceptions to public access in Article 4(1)(a), first and third indents of the Europol Management Board Decision on Public Access[3] (protection of public security, such as the safety of natural and legal persons, the proper fulfilment of Europol’s tasks, investigations and operational activities of Member States, third parties or Union bodies and of international relations, in particular the relations between Europol and its partners as regulated in Chapter V of the Europol Regulation), as well as Article 4(1)b of that decision (protection of the privacy and integrity of the individuals).

5. In January 2025, the complainant challenged Europol’s decision to refuse access (by making a ‘confirmatory application’). The complainant argued that Europol had applied the exceptions to public access incorrectly, and that Europol should at least provide partial access to templates of SIENA messages, removing all sensitive information. In February 2025, Europol confirmed its refusal to provide public access to the documents it had identified.

6. Dissatisfied with Europol’s reply, the complainant turned to the Ombudsman and contested the decision.

The inquiry

7. The Ombudsman opened an inquiry into Europol’s refusal to grant public access to the requested documents under the EU legislation on public access to documents (Regulation 1049/2001[4]).

8. During the inquiry, the Ombudsman received a written reply from Europol on the complaint. The Ombudsman inquiry team inspected the documents requested by the complainant, with the exception of the messages exchanged via SIENA.

9. The Ombudsman inquiry team then held a meeting with Europol representatives, during which it also inspected samples of the requested messages exchanged via SIENA.

10. Subsequently, the Ombudsman received the complainant’s comments on the report on the meeting.

Arguments presented to the Ombudsman

11. Europol argued in its confirmatory decision that public access had to be refused considering the requested documents’ sensitivity and operational nature and based on the exceptions laid down in Article 4 of its Management Board Decision on Public Access.

12. Specifically, Europol said that all documents, including the requested meeting minutes and reports, are connected to past and present investigations or contain information about the modus operandi of Europol and its operational partners. The disclosure of such information would reveal sensitive details on the scope and capabilities of Europol and its partners to fight against illegal migration and would put at risk the effectiveness and efficiency of Europol’s core business tasks. Europol and its partners rely on the confidential treatment of the documents shared among them. Their disclosure might therefore jeopardise the trust between Europol and its partners, which include Frontex and Member State authorities.

13. Europol noted that no partial access could be granted, given that even the templates would contain sensitive information on operations and procedures. Europol explained that the templates are used for all types of investigations, not only concerning migrant smuggling, and reveal the types of information that are exchanged between different police forces. Providing public access to these templates would therefore expose the strategies used for investigations more generally.

14. In view of the above, Europol concluded that disclosure of the requested documents would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, such as the safety of natural and legal persons, the proper fulfilment of Europol’s tasks, investigations and operational activities of Member States, third parties or Union bodies, pursuant to Article 4(1)(a), first indent of the Management Board Decision on Public Access.

15. In addition, Europol argued that disclosure of the documents would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards Europol’s international relations, as defined in Article 4(1)(a), third indent of the Management Board Decision on Public Access. Europol said that this exception to public access covers Europol’s relations with Frontex, because it is one of Europol’s “partners”, as defined in Chapter V of the Europol Regulation[5].

16. During the meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team, Europol representatives said that, while Europol acknowledges that relations between EU institutions and Member States are not protected by the international relations exception[6], the exception may apply to its relations with other EU bodies, where mutual trust is a fundamental requirement due to the highly sensitive nature of the information exchanged.

17. Finally, Europol representatives confirmed during the meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team that there had not been any consultations with third parties on the access request, such as with the originators of the requested documents. Given that the documents concern high-level meetings, it was clear that no public access could be provided.

18. The complainant argued that Europol’s justifications for the refusal of access were not sufficient. Europol had not conducted an individual assessment of all documents before refusing access but had invoked general arguments.

19. The complainant said that Europol should have at least provided partial access to the non-sensitive parts of the documents, including to its templates.

20. Finally, the complainant said that the exception pertaining to international relations does not apply to exchanges with Frontex. He noted that the Europol Regulation differentiates between EU bodies, on the one hand, and other international partners, on the other, so that the exception pertaining to the protection of the public interest as regards international relations cannot apply to EU bodies.

The Ombudsman's assessment

21. EU institutions and agencies enjoy a wide margin of discretion when determining whether disclosing a document would undermine any of the public interests protected under Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation 1049/2001, such as the protection of the public interest as regards public security and international relations.[7] As such, the Ombudsman’s inquiry aimed to assess if there was a manifest error in Europol’s assessment in that regard.

22. The inspection of the documents confirmed that the identified minutes of meetings between Europol and national authorities and the exchanges between Europol and Frontex contain sensitive information, including details of high-level strategic positions on counter-smuggling activities. The information contained in these documents is not publicly available elsewhere.

23. The inspection also confirmed that the messages exchanged via the SIENA system contain detailed operational information about investigations concerning migrant smuggling. Much of the information in these documents was supplied by Member States and the UK.

24. Based on the inspection and considering the additional explanations provided by Europol representatives during the meeting, the Ombudsman finds that there was no manifest error in Europol’s assessment that disclosure of the requested documents could undermine the public interest as regards public security and international relations (insofar as the requested documents concern meetings with and information supplied by the UK). The Ombudsman notes that these public interests cannot be superseded by any other public interest.

25. That said, the Ombudsman is currently examining Europol’s reliance on the international relations exception in Article 4(1)(a), third indent of Regulation 1049/2001 to protect its exchanges with another EU agency, Frontex, in the context of a different inquiry. She will further address the issue in that context.[8]

26. Finally, the Ombudsman considers that Europol could have provided more specific explanations as to why access to the documents in question had to be refused and, in particular, as to why no meaningful partial access to some of the meeting reports could be provided. The Ombudsman reminds Europol in this context of her suggestion for improvement in case 851/2024/SF,[9] namely that “Europol should provide, in all its decisions refusing public access, sufficient reasoning to allow applicants for public access to documents to understand why access could not or could only partially be granted, taking into account the specific content of each document”.

Conclusion

Based on the inquiry, the Ombudsman closes this case with the following conclusion:

There was no maladministration by Europol in refusing public access to the documents at issue.

The complainant and Europol will be informed of this decision.

Teresa Anjinho
European Ombudsman

Strasbourg, 18/03/2026

 

[1] https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-serious-and-organised-crime-centre-esocc/european-migrant-smuggling-centre-emsc.

[2] SIENA is a secure platform set up by Europol for the exchange of information between Europol and national law enforcement agencies, https://www.europol.europa.eu/how-we-work/services-support/siena.

[3] Europol Management Board Decision laying down the rules for applying Regulation 1049/2001 with regard to Europol documents, available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/decision_of_the_mb_rules_applying_reg_1049_2001.pdf

[4] Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/1049/oj. 

[5] Regulation 2016/794 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02016R0794-20260111.  

[6] Judgment of 14 February 2012 in case T-59/09, Germany v Commission, paragraphs 62 to 65, available at: https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/affair?lang=EN&sort=AFF_NUM-DESC&searchTerm=%22T-59%2F09%22&publishedId=T-59%2F09.  

[7] Judgment of 1 February 2007, Sison v Council, C‑266/05 P, paragraph 64, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-266/05; Judgment of 27 November 2019, Izuzquiza and Semsrott v Frontex, T-31/18, paragraph 65, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-31/18.

[8] Case 376/2025/PVV: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/case/en/68246.

[9] https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/214746.