Background to the complaint

1. On 19 July 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) adopted an advisory opinion[1] entitled “Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem” (‘the ICJ opinion’)[2].

2. In November 2024, the complainant, a journalist, asked the European Commission for public access to the following documents:

“documents, e-mails, letters, memos (including all attachments), datasets, reports, evaluations, briefings and analysis of any kind which contain the following information:

- Legal opinion prepared by the European Commission or external organisations regarding the implications of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024 on the EU-Israel trade agreement.

- Any meetings/calls/SMS/text messages hold with the state of Israel or third parties regarding the EU-Israel trade agreement since July 2024.”

3. In December 2024, the legal service of the Commission, which dealt with the first part of the request, identified one document entitled “Note to the file on the Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem” (‘the note’). It refused access to the note in its entirety, invoking the protection of legal advice under the EU legislation on public access to documents (Regulation 1049/2001)[3].

4. In January 2025, the complainant asked the Commission to review its decision refusing access to the note, by submitting a ‘confirmatory application’.

5. In March 2025, the Commission adopted its confirmatory decision, maintaining the refusal to grant access to the note, invoking the protection of personal data[4] and legal advice[5].

6. On 8 April 2025, dissatisfied with the confirmatory decision, the complainant turned to the Ombudsman.  

The inquiry

7. The Ombudsman opened an inquiry into how the Commission had dealt with the complainant’s request for public access to document in question. Since the complainant did not object to the redaction of personal data in the note, the Ombudsman’s inquiry did not cover the Commission’s application of this exception to the right of public access.

8. During the inquiry, the Ombudsman inquiry team inspected the note, and met with representatives of the Commission.

9. The Ombudsman then shared the report on the meeting[6] with the complainant who provided comments.

Arguments presented

By the Commission

10. The Commission refused public access to the note on the ground that its disclosure would undermine the protection of legal advice[7]. It referred to case-law that established a three-stage assessment to apply this exception to the right of public access: (i) the institution must satisfy itself that the document relates to “legal advice”, (ii) the institution must examine whether the disclosure of the legal advice would be harmful to its interest in seeking and receiving frank, objective and comprehensive legal advice, and (iii) the institution must assess whether there is an overriding public interest in disclosure[8].

11. The Commission explained that it considers the note to be covered by the concept of “legal advice” as its content relates to a legal issue. During the meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team, the Commission representatives specified that the document constitutes legal advice in its entirety, including those parts of the note that summarise the ICJ opinion. This is because the summary is of a subjective nature, emphasising certain parts or points of the ICJ opinion while omitting others.

12. Regarding the question whether disclosure would undermine the protection of legal advice, the Commission applied a general presumption of non-disclosure. It argued that, since the legal advice in question was not given as part of a legislative procedure, it “is in general not to be disclosed unless the applicant can demonstrate an overriding public interest”[9].

13. In support of this, the Commission underlined the specific role of its legal service as both in-house counsel and legal representative of the Commission before the EU courts. The Commission noted that, according to the case-law, the legal representative benefits from “legal privilege”, meaning that it must be able to give advice to its client without running the risk that the advice is divulgated and then used against the client. More specifically, the Commission noted that the court had confirmed that correspondence between a lawyer and his or her client is confidential to ensure the protection of the right to a fair trial.[10] The Commission stated that this is also recognised in the case-law concerning the interpretation of the exception to protect legal advice.[11] The Commission also noted that the administrative activity of the Commission is not subject to the same high standards of transparency as its legislative activity[12].

14. The Commission added that the purpose of the legal advice exception is for the institution to obtain frank, comprehensive and independent legal advice and to prevent a situation where its legal service could be confronted, before the courts, with its own assessment given earlier as in-house counsel of the Commission[13].

15. The Commission considered that the general principles developed by the EU courts concerning the protection of court proceedings and investigations should also apply to the legal advice exception, including the possibility to rely on a general presumption of non-disclosure.

16. In this context, the Commission referred to Article 4 of its detailed rules for the application of Regulation 1049/2001 (‘the detailed rules’), which “establishes that there is a presumption that access to the opinions of the Legal Service undermines the interests protected [...]”^[14].

17. During the meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team, the Commission representatives recalled that the Commission’s detailed rules are binding and enjoy a presumption of legality. The Commission representatives said that the Commission adopted the detailed rules based on Article 15(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union[15] and Regulation 1049/2001, which both recognise the power of the Commission to adopt specific provisions regarding access to its documents. The Commission representatives stated that the Commission is now applying these rules as the law as it stands.

18. During the meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team, the Commission representatives clarified that a general presumption of non-disclosure applies to legal advice regardless of its sensitivity.

19. In its confirmatory decision, the Commission noted that the specific nature of the legal advice included in the note and the limited number of recipients increased the risk of undermining the capacity of the Commission of receiving frank, objective and comprehensive advice[16]. It stated that the note includes an assessment of preliminary nature, intended for internal discussions, and concerned sensitive issues related to the EU’s relations with Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and access of the Israeli entities to EU funding. The sensitivity was further exacerbated by the ongoing armed conflict in the Middle East. The Commission further argued that disclosure of the note would limit the possibility for the Commission to define and adapt its line of defence during potential judicial proceedings against possible future measures. It considered the risk of future litigation plausible.[17]

20. During the meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team, the representatives of the Commission confirmed that, despite having invoked a general presumption of non-disclosure, an individual assessment of the document had been carried out, as a subsidiary argument. Based on that individual assessment, the Commission concluded that the disclosure of the note would undermine the protection of legal advice.

21. Specifically, the Commission representatives noted that the document was of a purely internal nature, as it was not circulated outside the legal service. The document was drafted by the team in charge of following the advisory opinion proceedings before the ICJ and only shared with a limited number of individuals referred to at the end of the document, who are all staff members of the legal service. The note is accessible in its IT system only to those addressees. The Commission representatives clarified that the document was neither addressed to nor was it endorsed by the Director-General of the legal service. The document was not shared with any other Directorates-General or Commissioners, cabinets or the College.

22. The Commission representatives further noted that the topic covered in the document is discussed by the EU Member States in the Council Working Party on Public International Law, where the issue of the interpretation of the ICJ opinion arose. Neither the Council, nor the Commission as collegiate organ, have formed a view on this topic, and until they have, the content of the document remains sensitive. According to the Commission representatives, the situation is comparable to that of preliminary legal advice given by the Commission legal service on the EU-Turkey statement, for which the General Court accepted that it is protected by the legal advice exception.[18]

23. The Commission representatives further mentioned that, at the time of the confirmatory decision, there were already discussions in academic circles that the ICJ opinion could trigger actions for failure to act against the EU institutions. The Commission did not rely on the need to protect judicial proceedings to refuse access to the document at confirmatory stage, because the legal advice exception was considered sufficient. However, since the litigation risk was plausible when the confirmatory decision was adopted, this element further underlined the sensitivity of the legal advice.

24. The Commission representatives added that an action for failure to act has been announced in the press since the confirmatory decision,[19] showing that this risk of litigation was indeed plausible and constituted a relevant factor to be taken into account. After the meeting, the Commission informed the Ombudsman inquiry team that the action for failure to act had been notified to the Commission.[20]

25. The Commission representatives provided further confidential explanations as to the sensitivity of the different parts of the document[21].

26. In the confirmatory decision, the Commission argued that the complainant did not establish the existence of an overriding public interest in disclosure. It stated that the complainant did not provide any concrete arguments showing why, having regard to the specific facts of the case, a public interest would be so pressing as to override the need to protect the legal advice of the Commission. During the meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team, the Commission representatives argued that the complainant had failed to show how concretely the public interest could be served by disclosure of a purely internal note.

By the complainant

27. In her confirmatory application, the complainant argued that there was an overriding public interest in disclosure of the note. Specifically, the complainant noted that the ICJ opinion addressed critical issues with implications for international law and EU foreign policy. She argued that the EU-Israel trade agreement and its implications on relations with the Occupied Palestinian Territories are a matter of significant public concern. The complainant found that, in this context, citizens have the right to scrutinise the legal reasoning underpinning the EU’s policies and actions.

28. In the complainant’s view, disclosing the document at issue would enable meaningful public participation in policy discussions to ensure that EU actions align with its fundamental values such as respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.

29. In the complaint to the Ombudsman, the complainant argued that the Commission had failed to adequately consider the existence of an overriding public interest in disclosure.

30.  The complainant also considered that the exception relied on by the Commission, that is, the protection of legal advice, was not applicable, given that the document does not concern a matter of litigation or ongoing internal deliberations but rather the application of EU law in external relations.

31. In her comments on the meeting report, the complainant contested the Commission’s assertion that she had failed to show how concretely the public interest could be served by the disclosure of a purely internal note.

The Ombudsman's assessment

32. The Court of Justice established three conditions for an institution to be able to rely on the protection of legal advice to refuse public access to a document: (i) the institution must satisfy itself that the document relates to “legal advice”, (ii) the institution must examine whether the disclosure of the document would be harmful to its interest in seeking legal advice and receiving frank, objective and comprehensive advice, and (iii) the institution must assess whether there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.[22]

33. The inspection of the note by the Ombudsman inquiry team showed that a significant part of the document summarises the ICJ opinion, which is a public document. This summary, however, emphasises certain information in the ICJ opinion, and can therefore reasonably be considered as subjective in nature. As such, the Ombudsman finds that it was not unreasonable for the Commission to consider the entire note, including the summary of the ICJ opinion, to constitute “legal advice”. Thus, the first condition for an institution to apply the exception in relation to the protection of legal advice can be considered fulfilled.

34. Regarding the second condition, the Commission’s assessment in its confirmatory decision focuses on the application of a general presumption of non-disclosure of legal advice, meaning that the Commission presumed that the disclosure of the note would be harmful to its interest in seeking legal advice and receiving frank, objective and comprehensive advice, given that the legal advice in question was not given as part of a legislative procedure.

35. The Ombudsman considers that the application of such a broad general presumption of non-disclosure is not supported by the case law of the EU courts.  

36. The General Court has held that the use of general presumptions “is no insignificant matter”, as they “restrict the fundamental principle of transparency”; therefore, “the use of such presumptions must be founded on reasonable and convincing grounds”[23]. As the Ombudsman has stated previously, general presumptions entail the risk that institutions invoke them automatically without considering the particular circumstances of the case at hand[24].

37. As the General Court restated recently, in principle, institutions must explain how access to a document could specifically and actually undermine the interest protected by an exception set out under Regulation 1049/2001. It is only in certain cases that the EU courts have recognised the possibility for institutions to consider that the disclosure of certain categories of documents undermines, in principle, the interest invoked, without being required to examine specifically and individually each of the documents requested[25].

38. The General Court added that in each of the cases where such a general presumption of non-disclosure was recognised by the EU courts, the refusal to grant access related to a set of documents which were clearly defined by the fact that they all belonged to a file relating to ongoing administrative or judicial proceedings[26]. Moreover, the General Court highlighted that, where the documents at issue fall within a particular area of EU law, general presumptions of non-disclosure are based on the fact that the exceptions under Regulation 1049/2001 cannot be interpreted without taking account the specific rules governing access to those documents[27]. Finally, the General Court noted that the application of general presumptions is essentially dictated by the overriding need to ensure that the procedures at issue operate correctly, and to guarantee that their objectives are not jeopardised[28].

39. In this case, by invoking a general presumption of non-disclosure that would apply to any legal advice, in any area of EU law, as long as it does not relate to a legislative file, the Commission departed from the rationale underpinning any of the general presumptions recognised by the EU Court.

40. The Commission also departed from the established case-law on the protection of legal advice. The EU courts have indeed consistently required institutions to demonstrate how specifically and actually the disclosure of legal advice would harm their interest in receiving and seeking legal advice before they can refuse public access to it - even if the legal advice at issue does not concern a legislative procedure.[29] The risk of that interest being undermined must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical.

41. While Regulation 1049/2001 imposes, in principle, an obligation to disclose the opinions of an institution’s legal service relating to a legislative process[30], it cannot be inferred from this case-law that legal opinions that are not related to a legislative process can be withheld by default, and in their entirety. The Court of Justice stated, in that regard, that the non-legislative activity of the institutions does not fall outside the scope of Regulation 1049/2001[31].

42. The relevance of the case-law referred to by the Commission on the confidentiality of correspondence between private persons and their lawyers[32] is unclear. The protection of privileged correspondence between lawyer and client, laid down in Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights[33] and Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights[34], is well established in the case law of the EU courts. However, neither this case law nor the case law on the interpretation of the protection of legal advice or court proceedings under Regulation 1049/2001 grants such automatic protection to correspondence between the legal service of an EU institution and the institution itself.[35]   

43. The Commission, as an EU institution, is subject to obligations to which private bodies are not subject to, including the principle of transparency laid down in Article 15 TFEU and implemented by Regulation 1049/2001. The Commission cannot escape from the obligations stemming from that principle by referring to the confidentiality of correspondence between private persons and their lawyers[36].

44. In view of this, the Ombudsman does not share the Commission’s view that there is a development in the case-law of the EU courts, which would support the application of a broad general presumption of non-disclosure of legal advice unrelated to a legislative procedure.

45. In this regard, the Ombudsman notes that the Commission’s new detailed rules for the application of Regulation 1049/2001,[37] referred to by the Commission in the confirmatory decision and during the meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team, are currently contested before the General Court.[38] The detailed rules state that there is a presumption that access to “opinions of the Legal Service”, notably, undermines interests protected by Articles 4(1) to (3) of Regulation 1049/2001[39]. Unless and until the Court issues its judgment on the legality of these rules, the Ombudsman will not take a position on the detailed rules as such. As the detailed rules must in any case remain in line with Regulation 1049/2001,[40] the Ombudsman will continue to assess the compliance of individual confirmatory decisions adopted by the Commission, which are brought to her attention, with Regulation 1049/2001, as interpreted by the EU courts, and the principles of good administration.

46. During the meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team, the Commission confirmed that, while its reliance on a general presumption of non-disclosure of legal advice had been the ‘centre of gravity’ of its assessment in the confirmatory decision, it had also carried out an individual assessment of the document in question to determine whether its disclosure would undermine the protection of legal advice.

47. In light of the content of the note and the additional (confidential) arguments put forward by the Commission representatives in the meeting with her inquiry team, the Ombudsman considers it reasonable for the Commission to conclude that disclosure of the note would harm the Commission’s interest in receiving and seeking legal advice. The Commission’s confirmatory decision merely stated that the note contains a preliminary legal assessment intended for internal discussions. During the meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team, the Commission representatives clarified that the note was not shared outside the legal service, nor addressed to or endorsed by its Director-General. Rather, the note remained internal to a group of individuals within the legal service referred to as addressees.

48. The Commission representatives further noted that neither the Council nor the Commission as a collegiate organ had formed a view on the interpretation of the ICJ opinion at the time of the adoption of the confirmatory decision (and still at the time of the meeting).

49. Based on the above considerations and combined with the fact that the note concerns sensitive issues relating to the EU’s relations with Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in a context of armed conflict, the Ombudsman considers that it was reasonable for the Commission to conclude that the disclosure of the note would pose a foreseeable risk to the ability of the Commission to obtain frank, objective and comprehensive legal advice in the future.

50. Since the Commission took the view that disclosure of the note would undermine the protection of its legal advice, it was incumbent on the Commission to ascertain whether there is an overriding public interest that would nevertheless require the note’s disclosure.[41]

51. The Ombudsman considers that there is a clear public interest in allowing participation of EU citizens in the Commission’s response to the ICJ opinion, considering, in particular, the human rights dimension of this opinion. However, contrary to what the complainant seems to assume, the note in question, which remained internal to the legal service, cannot be considered as setting out or underpinning the position of the Commission and a fortiori of the EU on the implications of the ICJ opinion on the EU’s policies or actions. It is therefore not clear how the note’s disclosure would serve the public interest identified by the complainant. Therefore, the Ombudsman considers that it was reasonable for the Commission to state that there was no overriding public interest in disclosure.

52. In light of the above, the Ombudsman concludes that the three conditions for the Commission to be able to rely on the protection of legal advice to refuse public access are met and hence the Commission was justified in refusing public access to the note.

53. That said, the Ombudsman regrets that a meeting with her inquiry team had been necessary to confirm that the Commission had carried out an individual assessment of the note, and to obtain explanations as to how disclosure of the note would concretely undermine the institution’s interest in seeking and receiving frank, objective and comprehensive legal advice. The Ombudsman also regrets that the Commission did not engage with the arguments of the complainant put forward in her confirmatory application, on the existence of an overriding public interest in disclosure of the note, and instead provided generic arguments that may apply to any context and failed to acknowledge the relevance of public participation in such a matter of public interest.

Conclusion

Based on the inquiry, the Ombudsman closes this case with the following conclusion:

While it is regrettable that the Commission did not elaborate in its confirmatory decision on the individual assessment that it carried out to determine whether the document’s disclosure would undermine the protection of legal advice, the Ombudsman considers that, based on the additional explanations provided during the inquiry, the Commission’s decision to refuse access to the requested document was reasonable. Therefore, no further inquiries are justified.

The complainant and the Commission will be informed of this decision.

Teresa Anjinho
European Ombudsman

Strasbourg, 19/11/2025

 

[1] See https://www.icj-cij.org/advisory-jurisdiction.

[2] Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240719-adv-01-00-en.pdf.

[3] Under Article 4(2) second indent of Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/1049/oj/eng.

[4] Under Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049/2001.

[5] Under Article 4(2) second indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

[6] Available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/doc/inspection-report/215474.

[7] Article 4(2) second indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

[8] Judgment of the Court of Justice of 1 July 2008, Sweden and Turco v Council, C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, paragraph 37, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=103C6E10D43F7EF0A307C61BB0818C6E?text=&docid=67058&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=12368680. 

[9] Confirmatory decision, p. 9

[10] Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 December 2022, Orde van Vlaamse Balies v Commission, C-694/20, paragraphs 25 to 28, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=268430&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=12388139. 

[11] Judgment of the Court of Justice of 21 July 2011, Sweden v Commission and MyTravel, C-506/08, paragraphs 117-118, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=107935&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=12378074.

[12] Judgment in Sweden v Commission and MyTravel, C-506/08, referred above, paragraph 87. 

[13] Referring also to the decision of the European Ombudsman in 1920/2022/NH, available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/167605.

[14] On 5 December 2024, the European Commission adopted Decision 2024/3080 including an annex setting out detailed rules for the application of Regulation 1049/2001, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202403080#anx_1.

[15] Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E015:en:HTML.

[16] Judgment of the General Court of 7 February 2018, Access Info Europe v Commission, T-851/16, paragraphs 90-94, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=B2DE611F910EA8956C158FDB5DE6AEED?text=&docid=199184&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=13171662. 

[17] Confirmatory decision, footnote 24. 

[18] Judgment in case T-851/16, Access Info Europe v Commission, referred to above, paragraphs 88-95.

[19] https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar48acfd1a?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=18307476475&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIt76ByOe-jgMVRaCDBx2gWzzgEAAYASAAEgKOsfD_BwE. 

[20] See Case T-482/25. On 5 September 2025, the General Court rejected the application for failure to act as manifestly inadmissible: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=304267&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=16095417.

[21] Recorded in the confidential annex to the meeting report.

[22] Judgment of the Court of Justice of 1 July 2008, Sweden and Turco v Council, C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, paragraphs 37-45, referred to above. 

[23] Judgment of the General Court of 25 September 2014, Spirlea v Commission, T-306/12, paragraph 52, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157983&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=245014.

[24] Proposal of the European Ombudsman for a solution in case 1379/2020/MAS on the European Commission’s refusal to grant access to preparatory documents related to anti-dumping measures on imports of iron or steel fasteners from China, available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/solution/en/138837.

[25] Judgment of the General Court of 10 September 2025, Nouwen v Council, T‑255/24, paragraphs 87-94, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=304181&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=10323038. 

[26] Judgment of the General Court in Nouwen v Council, T‑255/24, referred to above, paragraph 97. 

[27] Judgment of the General Court in Nouwen v Council, T‑255/24, referred to above, paragraph 98. 

[28] Judgment of the General Court in Nouwen v Council, T‑255/24, referred to above, paragraph 99. 

[29] Judgment of the Court of Justice of 21 July 2011, Sweden v Commission and MyTravel, C‑506/08 P, referred to above, paragraphs 109-117; judgment of the Court of Justice of 3 July 2014, Council v Sophie in ’t Veld, C-350/12 P, paragraphs 104-105, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=154535&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1254634; judgment of the General Court of 7 February 2018, Access Info Europe v Commission, T‑851/16, paragraphs 89, 92-94, referred to above ; see also judgment of the General Court of 7 September 2022, T-651/21, Saure v Commission, paragraphs 58-69, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=265031&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=14844610.

[30] See, for example, judgment of the Court of 8 June 2023, Council v Pech, C-408/21 P, paragraph 42: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62021CJ0408&qid=1711458671967, and judgment of the General Court of 13 March 2024, ClientEarth and Leino-Sandberg v Council, T-682/21 and T-683/21, paragraph 34: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=283785&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=193878, and European Ombudsman’s recommendation in case 2421/2023/MIG, paragraph 51, available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/recommendation/en/185538. 

[31] Judgment of the Court of Justice of 3 July 2014, Council v Sophie in ’t Veld, C‑350/12 P, paragraphs 96-111, referred to above.

[32] Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 December 2022, Orde van Vlaamse Balies v Commission, C-694/20, referred to above.

[33] Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng. 

[34] Available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/convention_eng.

[35] See case-law related to the protection of court proceedings, summarised in the Ombudsman’s recommendation paragraphs 30-31, in case 849/2024/PVV, available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/recommendation/en/199551.

[36] See by analogy, regarding the application of the exception to protect judicial proceedings, judgment of the General Court of 9 July 2025, Eva Kaili v European Parliament, T‑1031/23, paragraph 52, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=8FBF058962FAABAD57DF228F490F6351?text=&docid=302350&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3939194.

[37] See the Commission’s detailed rules for the application of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202403080#anx_1:~:text=p.%C2%A060).-,ANNEX,Council%20regarding%20public%20access%20to%20European%20Parliament%2C%20Council%20and%20Commission%20documents,-Whereas%3A.

[38] Case T-146/25, De Capitani and Others v Commission, information on the case available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?lgrec=fr&td=;ALL&language=en&num=T-146/25&jur=T; Case T-641/25, ClientEarth v Commission, the summary of the pleadings is not yet public.

[39] Article 4(2)(c) of the Commission’s detailed rules.

[40] In line with Article 15(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which requires each institution, body, office or agency to “elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure specific provisions regarding access to its documents, in accordance with the regulations referred to in the second subparagraph”. The General Court held that Rules of Procedure adopted by the Commission (in Joined Cases T-371/20 and T-554/20, Pollinis v Commission, paragraph 93) or conclusions adopted by the Council (in case T-255/24, Nouwen v Council, paragraph 103) must remain in line with Regulation 1049/2001. In the latter case, the Court held that “[t]he scope of the obligations incumbent upon an EU institution under Regulation No 1049/2001, as interpreted by the Courts of the European Union, cannot depend on the content of acts, such as the Council’s conclusions, adopted by the institution concerned itself”.

[41] Judgment in Sweden & Turco v Council, C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, paragraph 44, referred to above.