

Odločba v zadevi 2573/2007/VIK - Razpisni postopek na področju informacijske tehnologije

Odločba

**Primer 2573/2007/VIK - Preiskava uvedena dne 04/12/2007 - Priporočilo o 25/01/2012 -
Odločba z dne 13/12/2012**

To pritožbo je vložila družba, dejavna na področju informacijske tehnologije. Komisija je objavila javni razpis za postavitev „*spletne strani o vključevanju*“, na katerem je sodeloval tudi pritožnik. Ocenjevalna komisija je njegovo ponudbo zavrnila, ker naj ne bi izpolnjevala kvalitativnih meril za dodelitev naročila. Pritožnik je v dopisu, poslanem 8. decembra 2006, tej odločitvi nasprotoval in trdil, da je nepravilna in pristranska ter da jo bremenijo očitne napake pri presoji. Trdil je še, da je izbrani ponudnik v ponudbi predložil dve možnosti. Po njegovem mnenju je bila ena od teh možnosti „varianta“, čeprav so bile v zadevnih razpisnih pogojih variantne ponudbe jasno prepovedane.

Pritožnik je v pritožbi varuhu človekovih pravic (i) trdil, da je ocenjevalna komisija ravnala napačno s tem, ko je sprejela variantno ponudbo, in (ii) nasprotoval oceni svoje ponudbe.

Varuh človekovih pravic je v zvezi s točko (i) ugotovil, da je ena od možnosti, ki ju je predložil izbrani ponudnik, dejansko „varianta“. Nato je preučil, ali bi lahko Komisija ob morebitni ugotovitvi, da je eden od obeh predlogov (variant) nedopusten, preučila preostali predlog. Varuh človekovih pravic je v odločbi poudaril, da ni seznanjen z nobenim pravilom, na podlagi katerega bi se od upravnega organa izrecno zahtevalo, naj v takih primerih razveljavi celotni razpis, ker je bila predložena variantna ponudba. Pripomnil je še, da v razpisni dokumentaciji ni bilo navedeno, da je treba zavrniti celotno ponudbo, če se skupaj z veljavno ponudbo predloži tudi varianta. Varuh človekovih pravic je glede na navedeno ugotovil, da se zdi, da v zvezi s tem zakonodaja o javnih naročilih ni bila kršena.

Kar zadeva oceno pritožnikove ponudbe (točka (ii) zgoraj), je varuh človekovih pravic menil, da je Komisija izpolnila obveznost obrazložitve in formalne zahteve v zvezi s pravico neizbranega ponudnika, da dobi informacije. Kljub temu je poudaril, da je pritožnik v dopisu z dne 8. decembra 2006 nasprotoval obrazložitvi ocenjevalne komisije in da se je Komisija odrekla obravnavi navedenih trditev, čeprav je varuh človekovih pravic med preiskavo zaradi dobrega upravljanja to od nje večkrat zahteval. Ker se Komisija na te prošnje ni ustrezno odzvala, je varuh človekovih pravic pripravil osnutek priporočila in v njem Komisijo pozval, naj obravnava pritožnikove trditve, da bo lahko dokončal presojo.



Komisija je v odgovor na osnutek priporočila dovolj podrobno pojasnila zadevna vprašanja, ki jih je postavil pritožnik. Varuh človekovih pravic je tako primer zaključil, pri čemer je ugotovil, da je Komisija sprejela njegov osnutek priporočila in sprejela zadovoljive ukrepe za njegovo upoštevanje.

Ob upoštevanju navedenega ni varuh človekovih pravic v obravnavanem primeru ugotovil nikakršnih nepravilnosti.

The background to the complaint

1. The present complaint concerns a contested tender procedure. The complainant, a company active in the IT field, disagreed with the appraisal of its bid, and alleged that the evaluation committee wrongly accepted a bid with variants, whereas variants were not allowed under the call for tenders.

2. On 19 August 2006, the European Commission's then Directorate-General (DG) "Justice, Freedom and Security" ('DG Justice') launched a call for tenders for the creation of a " *Website on Integration* " [1] . On 27 September 2006, the complainant submitted its bid.

3. On 23 November 2006, the Commission awarded the contract to another company. On the same day, it sent letters to all the bidders informing them about the outcome of the evaluation. The evaluation committee concluded that the complainant's bid failed to meet the qualitative award criteria. It received 53.5 points, whereas the threshold was 60 points. The best offer obtained 83.5 points.

4. On 29 November 2006, the complainant appealed against the award decision and asked for a copy of the evaluation report, as well as information concerning the name of the successful tenderer, its partners and subcontractors, the scores awarded to its own offer and to the winning bid, and the financial offer made by the successful tenderer.

5. By letters of 5 and 13 December 2006, the Commission provided the requested information. As regards the evaluation report, however, it disclosed only those parts which concerned the evaluation of the complainant's offer.

6. On 8 December 2006, the complainant sent to the Commission a detailed analysis of each comment made by the evaluation committee concerning its offer, in particular as regards the qualitative criteria. It argued in essence that the evaluation of its tender was inaccurate. The complainant, therefore, requested the institution not to proceed with the award of the contract and to re-evaluate its offer instead.

7. On 14 December 2006, the Commission signed the service contract in question with the chosen tenderer. It took the view that the evaluation of the award criteria had been carried out for all tenderers in a non-discriminatory way and that it had fully complied with the tender



specifications. It also found that it had already given sufficient reasons for its rejection of the complainant's bid.

8. Several months later, on 4 June 2007, the complainant sent a further letter to the Commission, in which it pointed out that, despite numerous letters exchanged concerning the said tender procedure, the Commission had yet to give sufficient reasons for rejecting its bid. The complainant added that the Commission had not properly replied to the arguments set out in its letter of 8 December 2006. The complainant finally asked to be given a copy of the full evaluation report.

9. In its reply of 18 June 2007, the Commission provided a copy of the full report from which certain data, such as the names of the members of the evaluation committee and information that could affect the commercial interests of other tenderers, had been removed. The Commission reiterated its view that it had transmitted to the complainant all the necessary information concerning the tender procedure in question and that, if the complainant were not satisfied, it could turn to the Court of Justice or to the European Ombudsman.

10. After having examined the copy of the evaluation report received from the Commission, the complainant noted that the successful tenderer had in fact submitted two financial offers for Phase I of the project. The complainant considered that the second offer constituted a variant and that variants were clearly forbidden. It pointed out that the tender specifications provided the following: *"Tenderers may not submit bids for only part of the services required. Variants are not allowed"* [2] .

11. On 11 July 2007, the Commission explained that the selected bid included an offer that was in conformity with the tender specifications. The bid could therefore not be rejected.

12. On 9 October 2007, the complainant filed the present complaint with the Ombudsman.

The subject matter of the inquiry

13. The Ombudsman opened an inquiry into the following allegation and the following claims:

Allegation:

The complainant alleged that the Commission's evaluation committee had violated, in the framework of the call for tenders JLS/B4/2006/002, the public procurement legislation and Article 4 of the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour [3] ('ECGAB'). More specifically, the complainant argued that the committee had accepted a bid with variants, whereas variants were not allowed under the tender specifications.

Claims:

(1) The complainant claimed that it should be recognised that, in this case, the Commission had



infringed the ECGAB.

(2) The Commission should further acknowledge the irregularities that had taken place in the framework of the tender in question and offer the complainant suitable compensation for the losses it had suffered or may suffer in the future.

14. In its complaint to the Ombudsman, the complainant also alleged that the Commission was in breach of Article 17 of the ECGAB [4] , since it failed to give timely access to all the relevant information concerning the tender in question. In the complainant's view, this had prevented it from duly exercising its rights.

15. The Ombudsman noted that, following the complainant's initial request to receive a copy of the evaluation report, the Commission provided it with certain extracts from the report. However, there was nothing in the complaint to suggest that the complainant had made it clear to the Commission that it did not consider the access thus granted to be satisfactory, before it reiterated its request for access in June 2007. The Ombudsman further noted that the Commission had rapidly dealt with that request and had granted access to the evaluation report in its entirety, with the exception of certain data considered to be confidential. In these circumstances, the Ombudsman concluded that there were insufficient grounds for him to investigate the alleged failure of the Commission to give the complainant timely access to the relevant information.

16. The Ombudsman further noted that the complainant had argued, as it had also done in other cases it had submitted to the Ombudsman, that it was deliberately targeted by the Commission, and that it was black-listed, abused or harassed by it. The complainant asked the Ombudsman to launch an own-initiative inquiry into these issues. The Ombudsman had already informed the complainant [5] that he considered that, thus far, he had not been provided with convincing evidence that would warrant an inquiry into those issues. The Ombudsman would, therefore, continue to analyse and address the relevant grievances on a case-by-case basis.

The inquiry

17. By letter of 4 December 2007, the Ombudsman opened an inquiry into the allegation and the claims set out in point 13 above, and requested the Commission to submit an opinion. The Commission sent its opinion on 29 April 2008. The opinion was forwarded to the complainant for its observations, which it provided on 27 June 2008.

18. On 2 December 2008, the Ombudsman asked the Commission to specify the respective meaning of the terms "*variant*" and "*option*" and to indicate how they could be distinguished from each other. He also asked the institution to clarify why it considered that one of the proposals of the winning tenderer did not comply with the tender specifications. The Ombudsman finally requested the Commission to address the submissions that the complainant had made in its letter of 8 December 2006 regarding the evaluation of its tender.



19. The Commission provided its reply on 30 March 2009. This reply was forwarded to the complainant, who submitted observations on it on 26 June 2009.

20. On 31 March 2010, the Ombudsman requested the Commission to explain why it felt entitled to award the contract to a tenderer, even though the latter had submitted two offers, which were referred to as options. The Ombudsman also reiterated his request to the institution - made in the framework of his initial set of further inquiries - to address the arguments put forward by the complainant in its letter of 8 December 2006.

21. The institution's reply was received on 13 July 2010 and the complainant's observations on 25 August 2010.

22. On 12 January 2011, the Ombudsman's representatives inspected the Commission's file. On 17 February 2011, the Ombudsman sent a copy of the inspection report to the parties. The complainant submitted its comments on 30 March 2011.

23. On 25 January 2012, the Ombudsman made a draft recommendation to the Commission. The Commission sent its detailed opinion on 18 June 2012. It was forwarded to the complainant, who sent its observations on 31 October 2012.

The Ombudsman's analysis and conclusions

Preliminary remarks

24. The present complaint encompasses two main issues: (i) the Commission's allegedly wrong acceptance of a bid containing a variant, whereas no variants were allowed; and (ii) the Commission's allegedly wrong appraisal of the complainant's bid. These two issues are discussed below.

A. As regards the complainant's allegation and its related first claim

Arguments presented to the Ombudsman

Concerning the acceptance of a bid containing a variant (point (i) above)

25. The complainant provided a copy of the evaluation committee's report which indicated that the successful tenderer had proposed " *an option* " relating to the implementation of Phase I of the project. According to the report, the evaluation committee concluded that only the proposed



" *option* " could guarantee compliance with the IT requirements set out in the tender specifications. The complainant noted that the Commission's DG Budget was consulted on whether the option could be retained as the only acceptable offer from this tenderer.

26. The report of the evaluation committee reflected the discussion which took place among its members on whether the proposed " *option* " constituted a variant. The relevant section of the report reads as follows:

"... if variants are not allowed and the Tenderer submits only a variant offer, this must be rejected as being not in conformity with the Tender Specifications. On the other hand, if the Tenderer submits two offers, one of which is in conformity and the other not, then only the one of the offers which [is] not in conformity need[s] to be rejected. The Tender should not be automatically rejected just because the Tenderer has presented a basic offer (complying with the tender specifications) along with a separate alternative bid ("variant solution") to this basic offer. Ignoring one of the offers ("variant solution") and proceeding with [the] evaluation of the other offer ("basic offer") is possible, provided that the basic offer is entirely independent from the variant solution and perfectly identifiable. On the contrary, if it is not clear and unambiguous which of the two solutions shall be evaluated by the evaluation committee as the basic offer, by proceeding with [the] evaluation of one of the offers the authorizing officer would make a decision which does not fall into his/her competence".

27. According to the complainant, by putting forward two financial alternatives, the successful tenderer had in fact submitted a variant. Considering that variants were clearly forbidden under the tender specifications, the evaluation committee's approach was wrong and not in conformity with the applicable public procurement legislation.

28. In its opinion, the Commission stated that its " *decision regarding the options provided by one of the tenderers [was] clearly justified in the evaluation committee report. The bid concerned did include an offer in conformity with the tender specifications and could not therefore be rejected on this basis* ".

29. In support of its position, the institution explained that the winning bid contained two " *options* ", which concerned only a very specific part of the tender, namely, the proposed software. Option 1 was the open source solution and Option 2 was based on Oracle/Coldfusion. The evaluation committee considered whether Option 1 should be qualified as a " *variant* " within the meaning of the tender specifications, in which case it could not have been accepted. It concluded that Option 1 could not be taken into consideration, because it did not fully comply with the IT requirements set out in the tender specifications. Option 2, however, did comply with the tender specifications and had to be considered further. According to the Commission, the rules applicable to the award of public contracts were fully complied with. Rejecting this tender would have constituted a breach of the principles governing the award of public contracts.

30. In its observations, the complainant strongly disagreed with the above view. It stated that, in public procurement procedures where variants are not allowed, tenderers that ignore this rule are automatically rejected. This approach is applied all over the world and no exceptions are



allowed. The tenderers tend to offer a variant or an option precisely with a view to being able to submit two distinct financial proposals. If certain members of the evaluation committee have a preference for the tenderer submitting alternative options, they could use one of the two options to ensure that the contract goes to this tenderer. The variant or the availability of two options constitutes the equivalence of a second offer. This is known in the jargon of public procurement as a " *safety net* ".

31. The complainant observed that all tenderers would like to be allowed to submit two or three offers with different financial figures, because by doing so, they would increase their chances of winning, especially if the company could rely on the support of the evaluation committee. In the present case, the winning tenderer submitted two financial offers with a difference in price of 20%.

32. The complainant remarked that the successful tenderer was one of the traditional suppliers of services for DG Justice. It also found it strange that all other tenderers had been found inadequate to carry out the work in question.

33. The complainant was also puzzled as to why one of the two options was found not to comply with the tender specifications. It noted in this regard that the only information given by the Commission was that this offer was based on open source software. However, this fact did not necessarily imply that such an offer would be at variance with the relevant technical specifications. The complainant surmised that, in reality, both options provided by the successful tenderer were valid and that the evaluation committee deliberately disqualified the cheaper one, so as to ensure that its preferred tenderer would get the maximum amount offered.

34. The complainant finally argued that, even if one of the two " *variants* " was not valid, the Commission should have rejected the entire tender on the ground that some of its parts did not comply with the tender specifications.

The Ombudsman's initial set of further inquiries

35. After having analysed the Commission's opinion and the complainant's observations, the Ombudsman concluded that further inquiries concerning this aspect of the complaint were necessary. Thus, he requested the Commission to address the following further questions:

- " *Could the Commission please specify the respective meaning of the terms 'variant' and 'option' and how one could be distinguished from the other? Could the Commission please also specify why in the present case the two alternative proposals (Open Source solution and Oracle/Coldfusion solution) were considered to be options and not variants? In this context, the Commission may wish to take into consideration the 'Explanatory Note on Variants', issued by DG Budget (Central Financial Service, Procurements, contracts and grants) on 27 February 2007, which is available on the Internet.*

- *Could the Commission please also provide information as to why it felt able to disregard one of the options and explain why it considered this option to be non-compliant with the tender specifications? "*



36. In its reply, the Commission pointed out that a variant is a "*technical solution proposed by the tenderer which is different from the specific description of the good to be delivered or the service to be rendered included in the contract documentation as described by its technical specifications*".

37. As explained in the minutes of the evaluation committee, if variants are not allowed and if a tenderer nevertheless submits a variant, the variant must be rejected as not being in conformity with the conditions of the tender. If the tenderer, however, submits two offers - one of which is in conformity with the technical specifications whilst the other is not - then only the one which is not in conformity with the technical specifications should be rejected. The Commission reiterated its view that a tender should not automatically be rejected just because it had presented a basic offer (complying with the tender specifications) along with a separate alternative bid to the basic offer. Ignoring one of the offers and proceeding with the evaluation of the other one was possible, provided that the basic offer was "*entirely independent from the alternative bid and perfectly identifiable*".

38. In the present case, the winning tender contained two bids, incorrectly labelled "*options*" by the tenderer. The institution acknowledged that "*the bid called Option 1 could be considered as a variant*". It could not be taken into consideration, since it did not fully comply with the requirements laid down in Annex 7 ('Information System Hosting Services of the Data Centre'), referred to in point 4.5.2 [6] of the tender specifications. The bid entitled "*Option 2*" was not a variant, since it fully complied with the tender specifications and consequently could be taken into consideration for the award.

39. In view of the foregoing, the Commission reiterated its view that rejecting this tender would have constituted a breach of the rules on the award of public contracts.

40. As for the Explanatory Note on Variants, the Commission explained that this note could not be taken into account in the present case, because the evaluation took place in 2006, whereas the Note in question was issued in 2007. Nevertheless, the conclusions of the evaluation committee were fully in line with the said Note. The interpretation was moreover consistent with the clarifications provided by the Court of Justice in Case C-421/01 [7] in relation to the use of variants in public procurement.

41. In its further observations, the complainant considered that the interpretation of the term "variant" put forward by the Commission was "*absolutely arbitrary*", since it was not based on any legislative provision or judgment. The complainant observed that, regardless of how the terms "*variant*" or "*option*" were to be interpreted, both variants and options were prohibited in accordance with Articles II.1.9 [8] and Article II.2.2 [9] of the contract notice. The complainant further remarked that, in its decision in Case C-421/01 *Traunfellner GmbH*, the Court of Justice did not actually provide any definition of the term "variant."

42. Considering that it was indisputable that the selected tenderer had provided two options in its offer and that options were forbidden under Article II.2.2 of the contract notice, the



complainant concluded that the Commission's position was clearly wrong.

43. The complainant added that, when a tenderer presents two options, which have an impact on the price, this allows the evaluation committee to consider two different prices, referring to two different technical solutions. This situation could allow evaluators to manipulate the process and, by using various arguments, to select the option that results in the relevant tenderer being ranked first. Consequently, the presentation of the two options implied, in the complainant's view, that there was automatically a variant.

44. The complainant noted that, according to the Commission, a variant existed only when the proposed tender constituted a deviation from what was requested by the tender specifications. The complainant pointed out that, even if one could assume that such an interpretation were correct, the Commission did not publish it in the tender specifications or any other document so as to ensure that it was available to all the tenderers in good time. Moreover, the Commission argued in the present case that one of the two options was not in compliance with the tender specifications. Therefore, this option certainly constituted a variant.

The Ombudsman's second set of further inquiries

45. On the basis of the above new arguments advanced by the complainant, the Ombudsman considered it necessary to request the Commission to reply to the following additional question:

" In its further observations, the complainant referred to the contract notice, which provides that neither variants nor options were allowed (Point II.1.9 and Point II.2.2). At first sight, this would seem to mean that tenderers were supposed to submit one single offer. Could the Commission, therefore, please explain, why it felt entitled to award the contract to a tenderer even though the latter had submitted two offers and even though these offers were referred to as 'options'? "

46. In its reply, the Commission explained that excluding options or variants did not mean that a tenderer could not submit more than one offer. The tender specifications and the contract notice did not rule out the possibility of multiple offers. Both the Financial Regulation [10] and Directive 2004/18/EC [11] provide a closed list of exclusions from the tender, and the situation which arose in the present case, where the tenderer submitted more than one offer, was not among them. The Commission considered that economic operators were allowed to submit a number of offers or participate in a number of groupings submitting joint offers and the contracting authorities had neither grounds nor means to restrict this practice.

47. The Commission provided the following further explanations:

" The Contract notice excluded variants or options on the service to be provided. Therefore, only offers for the specific service (in this case the creation of a Web Site on Integration) were considered eligible.

In fact, a variant, as the term is used in public procurement, refers to a difference, from a technical or economic point of view, between the solution proposed in the offer and the one



envisaged in the technical specifications, not between or within offers submitted by one tenderer (e.g. if [the] subject of the tender was defined only by results). Without requirements towards the implementation method, different solutions proposed are not variants because they have nothing to differ from. Thus, variant refers to the substance of the offer and not to its form or number".

48. The Commission pointed out that this understanding was also confirmed by the Court of Justice's decision in Case C-421/01. The Commission referred to the operative part of the ruling, which stated that:

" Article 19 of Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts is to be interpreted as meaning that the obligation to set out the minimum specifications required by a contracting authority in order to take variants into consideration is not satisfied where the contract documents merely refer to a provision of national legislation requiring an alternative tender to ensure the performance of work which is qualitatively equivalent to that for which tenders are invited ".

49. The Commission maintained its view that, when a tenderer submits two offers, one of which is in conformity with the technical specifications whilst the other one is not, then only the offer that is in conformity with the technical specifications can and must be admitted. In any case, both offers should be assessed. A tenderer cannot automatically be rejected just because it presented an offer complying with the tender specifications along with another offer. Furthermore, rejecting a valid offer because there was a second offer from the same tenderer - be it valid or invalid - would breach the equality of treatment between tenderers, as every valid offer must be evaluated.

50. The Commission finally noted that accepting such an offer was fully in line with the case-law on public procurement and the principle that the contracting authorities must ensure the widest possible participation and competition in procurement procedures.

51. As for the term " *option* ", the Commission explained that " *options are qualitative (or quantitative) extras ancillary to the service that is the subject of the procurement (something additional to the main subject of the contract which nevertheless is priced and the contracting authority may, in the course of implementation of the contract, decide to buy it)* ". The institution noted that the winning tenderer wrongly used the term option, since it did not apply to the present case.

52. In this procurement procedure, the winning tenderer had made two distinct offers, one of which was valid and corresponded to the relevant specifications while the other one was invalid, as it did not comply with the said specifications. In the Commission's view, rejecting a valid tender and thus the tenderer that had submitted it, would be a violation of the rules on the award of public contracts. The institution submitted, therefore, that it had acted fully in compliance with these rules.

53. In its further observations, the complainant rejected the arguments of the Commission and



firmly maintained its position.

54. The complainant considered that the Commission's statement that "*excluding options and variants* [did] *not mean that a tenderer cannot submit more than one offer*" contradicted basic common sense and most importantly the cornerstone of public procurement as it is known in the EU and internationally. It reiterated its position that options and variants were offered through the submission by tenderers of alternative, that is, more than one, offers and alternative offers inevitably constituted either options or variants.

55. As a general rule, options and variants annulled free and fair competition, since they allowed certain tenderers to provide multiple offers and to obtain different quality/price scores, thus increasing their chances to win. This was especially the case when - as in the present case - only one tenderer could submit more than one offer.

56. In the complainant's view, the contracting authorities have an interest in allowing options only in cases of: (a) complex calls for tenders, where certain decisions need to be taken during the implementation of the contract; (b) when the available budget of the contracting authority is unknown at the time of the call for tenders; (c) when the delivery of the services depends on environmental factors beyond the contracting authority's control. However, the present call for tenders did not fall within any of the above-mentioned categories.

57. To the best of the complainant's knowledge, the Commission "*never*" allowed options, variants or alternative offers, not only in cases, such as the present one, concerning the development of a website but in all its calls for tenders. When the Commission deviates from this rule, it is clearly specified in the tender specifications. This was obviously not done in the contested procedure.

58. The complainant illustrated the implications of the Commission's statement that tenderers could submit more than one tender by using the following hypothetical example. In the context of an examination, a student was asked by his/her teacher to give the value of pi (π). Assuming that multiple offers were allowed, the student could write down as many as, for example, 300 figures, hoping that one of them would be close to 3.14 and thus expect to pass the examination. The complainant questioned how one could evaluate such a student through such an approach, particularly in view of the fact that all the other students were allowed to give one answer only.

59. The complainant further contested the Commission's reasoning that, if a tenderer had submitted two or more offers and one of them happened to comply with the tender specifications, the institution had to ignore the non-compliant one and to evaluate the one that was valid. Using the same example, the complainant suggested that, if the student gives 300 answers to the above question he or she may still pass the examination, provided that one of its answers is 3.14 or a value close to it, while others who gave only one answer could fail.

60. The complainant understood the Commission's interpretation of the terms "*option*" and "*variant*" to be that tenderers would not be allowed to offer, in the context of a specific call for



tenders, services other than those which are specified in the tender specifications, such as providing catering to the Commission's cafeteria instead of developing a website. The Commission failed to explain, however, how this could possibly be covered by a reference to options and variants, when it is clear that, in case the tenderer attempts to offer something that does not comply with the tender specifications, its tender is automatically rejected due to such non-compliance.

61. The complainant underlined the fact that the Commission did not explain to tenderers that they were allowed to submit multiple offers. As for the Commission's argument that multiple offers were not included in the list of "*exclusion situations*" and must thus be considered as allowed, the complainant pointed out that it had never argued that multiple offers were illegal. Such offers could indeed be accepted, unless there is a specific reference in the tender specifications stating that options and variants are not allowed. The Commission's comment that it wished to ensure the widest possible participation was totally insincere, since, in this case, the Commission rejected all the other tenderers and considered only one tenderer in the award phase.

62. The complainant stated that the institution decided of its own accord to alter the content of the tender and to take an arbitrary decision that the options which were offered by the tenderer in question were not options, but rather "*different offers*", which, in the Commission's view, were acceptable, even though this was a privilege offered only to the winning tenderer.

63. The complainant reiterated its understanding that the winning tenderer had submitted only one offer and that this offer contained two different technical solutions, which constituted two options of a single tender. Given that options were clearly prohibited by the tender specifications, this should have led the Commission to disqualify this tenderer immediately.

64. Even if one were to assume that the winning tenderer had made two different offers, this was not allowed by the tender specifications. According to the complainant, the Commission failed to realise that it created a very dangerous precedent, following which all tenderers would from now on be in a position to submit different "*offers*" and as many as they like, in order to increase their chances of winning. This would have a domino effect on the EU's public procurement, with tremendous implications.

The inspection of the Commission's file

65. Having analysed the position of the parties, the Ombudsman considered it necessary to inspect the Commission's file. After the inspection, and following a question raised at that inspection, the Commission provided the Ombudsman with copies of two internal e-mails of 26 October 2006, in which the eligibility of the winning tenderer's suggestion to use open source software was discussed. These e-mails confirmed that, if the system was to be hosted in the Commission's Data Centre, it had to respect the Data Centre hosting guidelines, regardless of whether the product was based on an open source software or not. However, certain open source solutions - including the one covered by the first proposal of the winning tenderer - were



not considered by the Data Centre hosting guidelines at the time. The results of the inspection and the contents of the above e-mails were set out in a report drawn up by the Ombudsman's services.

66. In its observations on the report on the inspection, the complainant submitted that the Commission's Data Centre installs and supports all the software that is necessary for its DGs. If a particular DG selects a specific IT solution, comprising open source software compliant with the tender specifications, then the Data Centre has to install it. According to the complainant, it would be very insincere for the Commission to claim that the Data Centre could refuse to do so. Such an approach would imply that certain products were discriminated against and would itself constitute a serious infringement of EU law. The complainant concluded that the Commission could not use an e-mail from the Data Centre (which indicated that, at a certain moment in time, it did not have in place a specific product) as an argument that one of the two options offered was not valid.

67. The complainant pointed out that an offer should be considered invalid only when it infringes a provision of the law or a provision of the tender specifications. This was not the case with the said option proposed by the winning tenderer. The complainant furthermore reiterated its understanding that, even if one of the options were invalid, this could not possibly allow the evaluation committee to consider that there was "*only one valid offer*" and use this to downplay a blatant infringement of the tender specifications and the Financial Regulation.

Concerning the appraisal of the complainant's bid (point (ii) above)

68. In its 8 December 2006 letter to the Commission, the complainant contested most of the comments made by the evaluation committee concerning the qualitative assessment of its bid and argued that these comments were presented in a telegraphic form and that they were "*vague and not substantiated and consequently arbitrary, wrong and unfair*".

69. The complainant considered that the low score given to its tender resulted from certain manifest errors of assessment on the part of the evaluation committee. It referred, for example, to the statement made in the report that there was in its tender proposal "*... a confusing mix of different notions: stakeholders, users, target groups, client, customer...*". The complainant strongly disagreed with this conclusion and pointed out that, in different sections of the report, it had identified the key actors and target groups, the national focal points, the coordinator and sub-contractor and even provided a 255-page list of organizations dealing with migration and integration all over Europe. The complainant could thus not understand how any confusion could arise as to who was a stakeholder, user or a target group. The complainant explained in this context that the expressions "*client*" and "*customer*" were ordinarily used when referring to the contracting authority.

70. The complainant further disagreed with the evaluation committee's statement that the "*source code itself [was] not described as an output artefact of the whole process*". It found the



comment to be manifestly wrong, as it had explained in detail all its standards and procedures for writing the code.

71. According to the complainant, the evaluation committee's comment that " *the part on project management in the chapter named project organization [was] not relevant there* " also constituted a manifest error of assessment, since it was difficult to understand how the committee could argue that project management was not relevant to the project organisation.

72. In its opinion, the Commission pointed out that, following the assessment of the complainant's bid on the basis of the award criteria, the evaluation committee arrived at the conclusion that it did not pass the threshold of 60 points for quality award criteria as required under the tender specifications. It did not obtain the minimum points as regards the quality and clarity of the approach, methodology and working methods proposed for the assignment, including information collection, analysis and processing techniques. In particular, for the part of the bid relating to the information systems, the evaluation committee concluded that it lacked clarity, conciseness, structure and consistency.

73. In view of the specific arguments which the complainant raised in this context, both in the complaint and in its observations, the Ombudsman considered it appropriate and necessary to request the Commission to address the following question:

"In its complaint, the complainant argued that the Commission's evaluation of its tender was unfair, arbitrary and tainted with manifest errors of assessment. Could the Commission please address the arguments put forward by the complainant in this regard in the complaint and in its letter to the Commission of 8 December 2006?"

74. In its reply, the Commission reiterated that only the winning tenderer reached the minimum " *qualitative* " score required by the specifications and that sufficient reasons had already been provided to the complainant as to why its offer had not been accepted. The relevant information was provided in accordance with the rules applicable for each step of the tendering procedure. The call for tenders followed the Financial Regulation and its Implementing Rules. The Commission remarked that the Ombudsman had already rejected the complainant's allegation that the Commission had denied access to the relevant information.

75. In its further observations, the complainant maintained its view that the Commission failed to address the substantive arguments raised in its letter of 8 December 2006 and that it, therefore, failed to offer adequate explanations for its decision. It pointed out that the simple affirmation that the tendering procedure was in line with the relevant rules could not constitute a valid justification or adequate explanation. The complainant referred to Article 100(2) of the Financial Regulation and other provisions, reiterating that it had to be informed about the grounds for taking the decision and the relative advantages of the successful tender. It considered that no detailed explanation and justifications were provided by the Commission and this was in violation of the applicable public procurement legislation.

76. In view of the above, the Ombudsman concluded that it was necessary to address a



second request for further information to the Commission. In his letter, the Ombudsman recalled that the complainant had argued that the evaluation of its tender was unfair, arbitrary and tainted with manifest errors of assessment. The Ombudsman, therefore, reiterated his request that the Commission address the arguments put forward by the complainant in this regard, both in the complaint and in its letter to the Commission of 8 December 2006.

77. In its reply, the Commission pointed out that it had on several occasions explained why the complainant's offer had been rejected. On 23 November 2006, it informed the complainant that its bid was not selected, because it did not obtain the minimum points for the qualitative award criteria (the threshold of 60 points as required in the tender specifications). The Commission had also promptly provided the complainant with an extract of the evaluation report containing the reasons why its offer had not been accepted. On 17 June 2007, the Commission had sent the complainant the complete evaluation report.

78. The Commission recalled that for two out of three criteria, the complainant's offer reached the minimum points required. It was only in relation to one of the criteria that its offer did not obtain the minimum points. This was the criterion concerning the quality and clarity of the approach, the methodology and working methods proposed for the assignment, including information collection, analysis and processing techniques. In particular, the evaluation committee concluded that part of the complainant's offer relating to the information systems lacked clarity, conciseness, structure and consistency.

79. The Commission noted that the contested assessment did recognise the strong points of the complainant's proposal. In comparison, other tenderers evaluated in the context of the same procurement procedure did not even reach the minimum points required for any of the three criteria.

80. The Commission pointed out that, when analysing each tender, the evaluation committee carried out an in-depth assessment which was reflected in the report. As an illustration, the Commission referred to the assessment concerning criterion (a), which stated that "*the way the Tenderer [was] going to tackle the language, translation and international issues [was] not well described (and [was] one of project's risks and critical success factors)*". For criterion (b), it was noted, for example, that the complainant did not show evidence of clear, efficient and workable integration of the two methodologies (RUP [12] and the complainant's home made web development methodology). Though the complainant had described the RUP methodology, the integration of the two methods was not addressed and described in sufficient clarity so as to warrant a higher evaluation grade.

81. In the Commission's view, the report of the evaluation committee explained in detail why the complainant's offer was rejected. When comparing the points given and the comments made concerning the different tenderers, one could easily understand the difference. Given that the same award criteria were applied to all the valid offers following unanimous agreement of four experts in the field, the evaluation could clearly not be regarded as unfair or arbitrary.

82. The Commission finally remarked that, in accordance with firmly established case-law [13] ,



the contracting authority was not obliged to reply to each and every question submitted by an unsuccessful tenderer on the basic concepts of the evaluation.

83. In its observations, the complainant maintained its view that the information provided by the Commission was not sufficient for it to understand the low score given to its offer. In any event, the information provided did not justify its exclusion and did not show in which respects the winning tenderer was offering something more or better than itself. The complainant maintained its view that the evaluators did not analyse its proposal properly and had committed serious and manifest errors of assessment during the evaluation.

84. The complainant pointed out, for example, that, in accordance with the tender specifications, the winning tenderer had to offer a mixture of expertise and skills, including the coverage of as many European languages as possible. The complainant considered that the Commission's evaluators failed to take this clear requirement into consideration.

85. As regards criterion (a), the complainant argued that the Commission's evaluators failed to consider the information which the complainant provided in its tender concerning international issues ("*Links to other EU activities and avoiding possible overlaps*"). The complainant further pointed out that the functional and technical requirements of its offer were presented in the section of the tender entitled "*Approach, Methodology and Working Methods Proposed*". This part of its offer contained a detailed description of how the complainant proposed to tackle the language, translation and international issues.

86. As regards criterion (b), the complainant submitted that its proposal did not contain two different methodologies which needed to be integrated but, rather, one global methodology covering the entire project and a vertical one dealing with the software development tasks. The complainant pointed out that, in Chapter 2.1 of its proposal, it described how the RUP principles were applied for the development work of the website and, in Chapter 2.2, it described the overall methodology used for the development of web-based software projects.

87. Finally, the case-law of the General Court to which the Commission referred concerned situations in which the contracting authority had fulfilled its obligation to explain what motivated its decision and had provided full transparency to the rejected tenderers, illustrating, by means of comparison, the ways in which the winning tenderer's bid was superior to the bids submitted by the other tenderers. In these cases, the contracting authority was not supposed to continue a permanent dialogue. In the complainant's view, the present case was, however, different.

The Ombudsman's assessment leading to a draft recommendation

As regards the allegedly wrong acceptance of a bid with a variant



88. In order to assess whether the Commission was right in accepting and analysing an offer that proposed two alternative solutions, whereas no variants and no options were allowed under the tender specifications, the Ombudsman considered it important to establish first of all what the winning tenderer had actually submitted in the present case. In this context, the Ombudsman also addressed the issue of the compatibility of the alternative proposal with the tender specifications.

89. The Ombudsman noted that a number of different terms were used and applied, not always consistently, by the relevant actors involved. The report of the evaluation committee used words such as " *option* ", " *basic proposal* ", " *variant solution/offer* " or " *alternative bid* ". In its tender proposal, the winning tenderer had suggested " *Option 1* " and " *Option 2* ". In its opinions, the Commission discussed the terms " *options* " and " *variants* ", and distinguished them from the terms " *bids* " or " *offers* ". It went on to conclude that the successful tenderer had in fact submitted two different offers. The complainant, on the other hand, argued, in essence, that irrespective of whether the chosen bid contained an option or a variant, both were clearly prohibited under the tender documentation.

90. Against this variety of terminological references, the Ombudsman understood that what the winning tenderer had submitted were two alternative technical solutions (an open source solution and a proprietary software solution) for the development of the web portal in question.

91. The Ombudsman noted that the Commission defined options as " *qualitative (or quantitative) extras ancillary to the service that is the subject of the procurement* " [14] . In the Ombudsman's view, the complainant had not put forward any convincing arguments to show that this definition should be considered incorrect. Given that the two technical solutions proposed were alternative and were not aimed at complementing one another by adding qualitative or quantitative extras, the Ombudsman took the view that neither of these proposals could be regarded as an option. This also appeared to be the Commission's view, which stated that the successful tenderer had wrongly called the two alternative solutions " *options* ".

92. The Commission further explained that a variant is a " *technical solution proposed by the tenderer which is different from the specific description of the ... service to be rendered* ". The Commission Vade-Mecum on Public Procurement provides as follows: " *Variant means a solution technically or economically equivalent to a model solution known to the contracting authority. Variants may relate to the whole contract or to certain parts or aspects of it. Variants must be submitted separately and identified as variants.* " In the course of the Ombudsman's inquiry, the Commission acknowledged that one of the proposed alternatives (the open source solution) " *could be considered as a variant* " [15] , since it did not fully comply with the requirements laid down in Annex 7 of the tender specifications.

93. The complainant argued that the proposed alternative did actually comply with the tender requirements. In that regard, the Commission referred to point 4.5.2 of the technical specifications, which required that the " *IT system's architecture must be in compliance with what is supported by the Information System Hosting Services of the Data Centre* ". Therefore, in order for the proposal to be eligible, it had to comply with the Data Centre hosting guidelines,



regardless of whether the product was based on an open source software or not.

94. Following the inspection of the Commission's file, it was established that the open source solution proposed by the winning tenderer was not at the time considered by the Data Centre hosting guidelines. The Ombudsman, therefore, concluded that the Commission's view that it did not comply with point 4.5.2 of the technical specifications appeared to be reasonable.

95. In its submissions, the complainant argued that the Data Centre must install and support all types of software, if needed. The Ombudsman noted that nothing in the documents inspected and the material provided in the context of the present complaint substantiated such a view. In fact, if this were indeed the case, point 4.5.2 of the technical specifications would hardly make sense and would not need to be included in the tender documentation.

96. The Ombudsman found no elements that would call into question the evaluation committee's conclusion that the open source solution proposed by the successful tenderer did not comply with the Data Centre hosting guidelines and, therefore, with the tender specifications.

97. Taking all of the above elements into consideration, the Ombudsman concluded that the open source solution was a " *technical solutiondifferent from the specific description of the ... service to be rendered* ". Consequently, the said open source solution was a variant and should have been identified as such by the evaluation committee.

98. The Ombudsman recalled in this context that point 18 of the tender specifications provided the following: "*Tenderers may not submit bids for only part of the services required. Variants are not allowed*". Given that the open source solution had to be considered as a variant, or was a variant, the Commission clearly had to disregard it. The Ombudsman noted that this is what the Commission did in the present case.

99. The question, however, that still remained to be addressed was whether, in these circumstances, the Commission was entitled to retain the remaining offer, that is, the proprietary software solution submitted by the winning tenderer, and whether it was right to conclude that only part of the tender, that is, the open source solution was inadmissible, and not the entire bid.

100. The Ombudsman was not aware of any rule which specifically obliges the administration, in situations such as the present one, to disregard the entire tender due to the fact that a variant was proposed, whereas variants were not allowed under the tender documentation.

101. In the Ombudsman's view, the Commission's approach was thus possible. The tender documentation did not indicate that, if a variant were to be submitted together with a valid offer, the entire tender must necessarily be rejected. Point 14.2 of the tender specifications laid down two conditions for the exclusion of the tenderer during the procurement procedure. None of them, however, covered the present situation [16] . The Ombudsman noted that, in order to challenge the Commission's approach, the complainant put forward the example of a student who had to give the value of pi (π). It appeared obvious that that example concerned an



entirely different subject matter. It was therefore difficult to see how it could be relevant in the present context.

102. The Ombudsman also did not consider the reference to Case C-421/01 *Traunfellner GmbH* to be relevant for the present dispute, since this judgment discusses a case in which variants were allowed under the tender, but where no minimum technical requirements to be satisfied by the variant in order to be accepted were laid down. The complainant's case refers to a situation in which variants were not allowed, so there was no way whatsoever for a variant to be accepted.

103. In view of the foregoing, the Ombudsman was unable to conclude that, by accepting a tender, after having disregarded the variant it contained, the evaluation committee violated the public procurement legislation and the principle of lawfulness, laid down in Article 4 of the ECGAB. The Ombudsman, therefore, found no maladministration as regards this aspect of the case.

As regards the appraisal of the complainant's bid

104. The Ombudsman has continuously taken the view that it is for the administration organising a call for tenders to assess whether the applicants fulfil the conditions laid down in this call. The Ombudsman must not substitute his own assessment for that of the institution and should only check whether the relevant procedures have been respected and if the assessment made is not vitiated by a manifest error. The Ombudsman noted that, in the present case, in addition to the alleged manifest errors of assessment, the complainant argued that the assessment of its proposal was also "*unfair*" and "*arbitrary*". The Ombudsman, therefore, considered the aspects set out below.

105. The Ombudsman recalled at the outset that it is established case-law that the Union institutions and bodies enjoy a wide margin of discretion with regard to the factors to be taken into account for the purposes of deciding to award a contract following an invitation to tender.

106. Notwithstanding the wide discretion given to the relevant administration, an unsuccessful tenderer has a right to receive information as to why its bid was rejected. This right is an expression of the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions in any administrative procedure which could adversely affect an individual [17] .

107. Article 100 (2) of the Financial Regulation provides that "the contracting authority shall notify all candidates or tenderers whose applications or tenders are rejected of the grounds on which the decision was taken, and all tenderers whose tenders are admissible and who make a request in writing of the characteristics and relative advantages of the successful tender and the name of the tenderer to whom the contract is awarded."

108. In the present case, following the complainant's request, the Commission immediately disclosed to the complainant those parts of the evaluation report which concerned its bid. In the



Ombudsman's view, the relevant parts of the report contained specific and pertinent comments on the assessment made. On the basis of this information, the complainant was in a position to identify which parts of its proposal the evaluators assessed positively and which were considered less satisfactory. Further to that, the institution informed the complainant of the characteristics and the relative advantages of the successful tender and of the name of the tenderer to whom the contract was awarded.

109. Against this background, the Ombudsman considered that the Commission complied with its duty to state reasons and with the formal requirements concerning the right of the unsuccessful tenderer to receive information, laid down in Article 100(2) of the Financial Regulation and Article 149 of its Implementing Rules.

110. The Ombudsman noted, however, that the complainant contested the reasoning provided by the Commission. In its letter of 8 December 2006, the complainant advanced a number of comments in support of its view and argued in essence that the Commission's substantive assessment of its bid was "*unfair*", "*arbitrary*", and tainted by "*manifest errors of assessment*".

111. When opening the present inquiry, the Ombudsman asked the Commission for an opinion on the complaint. When doing so, he expected the Commission to address the comments made in the complainant's letter of 8 December 2006. In fact, these comments contain specific arguments to support the complainant's view that the Commission's assessment of its bid was incorrect. However, the Commission refrained from addressing these comments in its opinion. During the course of the present inquiry, the Ombudsman therefore explicitly requested the Commission to address the comments made in the complainant's letter of 8 December 2006. He did so twice, in his further inquiries on 2 December 2008 and 31 March 2010. Despite these requests, the Commission did not address the complainant's above-mentioned arguments, but essentially maintained that it was not obliged by law to provide explanations to the complainant that went beyond the ones it had already given to it. In this context, the Commission referred to the case-law of the General Court and in particular to Case T-211/07 *AWWW v. Eurofound*, in which the Court ruled that the contracting authority is not obliged, on the basis of its duty to state reasons for a decision rejecting a bid, to enter into a debate with the complainant on the merits of its offer as compared with the successful bid.

112. The Ombudsman considered it important to underline that he did not ask the Commission to address the comments the complainant had made in its letter of 8 December 2006 on the basis of the legal obligations flowing from the rules on public procurement. Instead, the Ombudsman's requests of 8 December 2006 and 31 March 2010 were made on the basis of the notion of good administration. The Ombudsman has consistently taken the view that a citizen-friendly administration is one that is ready to explain its position. The Ombudsman's above requests were also made with a view to enabling him to proceed with an assessment of the complaint which the complainant had submitted to him, to the extent that this complaint concerned the assessment of the complainant's bid by the Commission. The Commission's decision not to respond to the Ombudsman's requests failed to take these considerations into account. The Commission's approach was therefore not only highly regrettable, but it also



effectively prevented the Ombudsman from completing the said assessment. Such an approach constitutes a failure on the part of the Commission to comply with its duty of loyal cooperation with the Ombudsman. Accordingly, the Ombudsman concluded that this was an instance of maladministration and made the following draft recommendation:

"The Commission should respond to the Ombudsman's repeated requests to address the complainant's arguments, as set out in its letter of 8 December 2006, that the disputed assessment was tainted by unfairness, arbitrariness and manifest errors of assessment. The Commission's response should be such so as to enable the Ombudsman to complete his assessment of the relevant allegation and claim raised by the complainant."

B. As regards the claim for compensation

113. The Commission did not provide any specific comments concerning the complainant's claim for compensation. However, it denied having committed irregularities in the framework of the procurement procedure in question. In his further inquiries, therefore, the Ombudsman requested the Commission also to comment on the claim for compensation.

114. In reply, the Commission reiterated that it had fully complied with the rules relating to the award of public contracts and access to all the relevant information. Therefore, the institution considered that there was no ground for compensation, since no violation of the applicable law had taken place.

115. In its observations, the complainant maintained its claim and considered that the Commission should pay damages to it, since, had the Commission properly handled the matter, it would have been the winning tenderer in this procurement procedure.

116. The complainant added that it was facing a systematic plan to exclude it from all the Commission's contracts and that it was forced to rely on the Ombudsman and the General Court in order to defend its rights. However, the process was long, painful, time- and effort-consuming and very expensive for the complainant. For the time being, the Commission had only been condemned to pay the legal fees of the complainant. Under these circumstances, the only solution for the complainant was to be paid compensation for the damage it had suffered in the past and that it would suffer in the future. The complainant expected that the Commission should thus admit that it was wrong and immediately start discussing measures to compensate it accordingly.

The Ombudsman's assessment

117. The Ombudsman found no instance of maladministration on the part of the Commission for having accepted the valid proposal of the winning tenderer [18]. The Ombudsman, therefore, concluded that to the extent that the complainant's claim for compensation was based on that aspect of the complaint, it must fail.



118. As noted above, due to the Commission's failure to address the complainant's arguments pertaining to the assessment of its bid, the Ombudsman, at the time he made his draft recommendation, was unable to ascertain whether the Commission had committed any maladministration as regards the assessment. As a consequence, the Ombudsman noted that he was also unable to decide whether the complainant was entitled to claim any compensation in that context.

C. The arguments presented to the Ombudsman after his draft recommendation

The Commission's comments following the Ombudsman's draft recommendation

119. In its detailed opinion on the Ombudsman's draft recommendation, the Commission pointed out, as a general remark, that the comments made by the complainant in its letter of 8 December 2006, were based on incomplete quotations. The Commission's more specific explanations can be summarised as follows.

As regards criterion (a) [19]

120. The Commission noted that the evaluation committee considered that: *"...regarding tasks and results to be achieved, the IT component [was] not well interlinked with the integration expertise. Concerning the IT part, the offer [was] in general confused, not accurate, not specific enough and lack [ed] important aspects such as risks analysis"*. The Commission observed that, in its comments, the complainant had omitted the first part of the above sentence. This part was however important in relation to the *"tasks and results to be achieved"*. In its evaluation, the evaluation committee had also underlined positive points of the complainant's proposal, such as the statement that *"the Tenderer [had a] clear picture of the context"*.

121. The Commission explained that the complainant should have demonstrated better and more precisely its understanding of how the two main components of the call for tenders - the IT and the integration expertise - were linked to each other. This was a key feature of the call for tenders, as it was not merely an IT tender or a tender for the analysis of policies on integration of migrants, but a mix of both. The Commission added that the complainant should have better explained how the IT system (website) and its functionalities could meet the objectives and challenges of the contract/project. If it had done so, its offer would have been more accurate and more specific.

122. In its letter of 8 December 2006, the complainant did not mention that the evaluation committee had also given another example of the same weakness in the complainant's proposal, namely, that *"the way the Tenderer [was] going to tackle the language, translation and international issues, [was] not well described (and [was] one of the project's risks and critical success factors)"*. As mentioned in the evaluation report, chapter 7 of the complainant's offer entitled *"Critical success factors and risks"* did not actually include a risk analysis, since it



focused only on the success factors.

As regards criterion (b) [20]

123. As to the evaluation committee's comment that, *"the method [was] of a more research nature and [did] not guarantee full success in terms of the link with practical experiences necessary for the development of [the] Web Site and in particular to the data collection tool for good practices"*, the Commission pointed out that the complainant had again not quoted the full text of the report. The latter read as follows: *"Whereas working methods [...were] developed in a good manner, there [was] too much focus on static information, i.e. the method [was] more of a research nature [...]"*.

124. The Commission explained that the evaluation committee had not claimed that the complainant did not provide elements of a methodology to collect good practices. It had rather made the remark that the focus was mostly put on *"static"* information, whereas the *"non-static"* aspect was limited to the good practices [21]. In order to build and maintain an up-to-date website, the complainant should have better elaborated on the *"non-static"* aspect in the description of its methodology in part 3 of its offer.

125. The Commission then referred to the following comments of the evaluation committee:

"Concerning the IT part, in general the tenderer lack [ed] clarity, conciseness, structure and consistency."

"Regarding IS management it propose [d] two methodologies: RUP [Rational Unified Process] and its home made web development methodology. The offer [did not] show evidence of a clear, efficient and workable integration of the two methodologies."

"It [did] not propose to cut the different phases into iterations, which is expected from a RUP practitioner. The list of artefacts of RUP (which [were] not necessary deliverables) that would be produced during each iteration [was] not described. Even the source code itself [was] not described as an output artefact of the whole process."

126. The Commission reiterated that the evaluation committee had considered that the complainant's offer lacked clarity, conciseness, structure and consistency. The lack of conciseness was explained by the length of the complainant's offer (more than 200 pages), whereas other offers were considerably shorter.

127. As to clarity, structure and consistency, the evaluation committee noted that the description of the RUP (Rational Unified Process) in section 2.1 was superficial and not well structured. It contained four sections: it started with an Overview; continued with the Software Development Core Processes; and then moved onto Requirements Management and Documentation. These sections had a different scope and level of importance. Moreover, it was not clear how section 2.3 of the complainant's offer, dealing with the Graphical User Interface Design, detailed the RUP. The Commission assumed that, instead, the complainant had made



reference to section 2.2 of the offer, which provided a description of the home-made methodology. In that case, the comment of the evaluation committee concerning the lack of evidence of a clear, efficient and workable integration of the two methodologies was still valid. The Commission referred to page 24 of the complainant's offer, where the complainant stated that this home-made methodology *"... was integrated into the RUP methodology described in the first section of this chapter"*. However, in the text which followed, there was no mapping between the RUP and the complainant's methodology phases, activities, artefacts and roles which could explain how the integration between RUP and the complainant's home-made technology had materialised.

128. Thus, the Commission took the view that the overall approach of the complainant's offer lacked clarity and was purely driven by the need to follow the recommendation of the Commission on using RUP. This resulted in a plain theoretical description of the principles of RUP, which was constantly kept separate from the home-made methodology. The complainant's comment that *"we used this method in agreement with the Commission for many years now, in order to develop precisely the same type of projects"* was irrelevant to the specific tendering procedure; it was clearly a subjective statement that could not be considered as an argument to support its offer. However, it should be pointed out that the evaluation committee's assessment did not contest the efficiency of the home-made methodology, but highlighted the ambiguity and the lack of clarity of the overall proposed solution.

129. Next, the Commission stated that breaking down the RUP phases into iterations goes to the substance of the RUP methodology. Every iteration should include the development activities leading to a product release and its related artefacts. By presenting the list of deliverables in different draft versions as described in section 3.1 of the offer, the complainant did not provide real evidence of having followed the requested iterative approach. Furthermore, section 2.2 of the complainant's offer mentioned that, in the home-made methodology, not all of the eight proposed phases were of an iterative nature, since on page 25, it was clearly stated that only *"[...] the first four phases are often revisited in an iterative mode [...]"*.

130. The evaluation committee's comment the *"[...] code itself [was] not described as an output artefact of the whole process"*, was based on *"the observation that the system "builds", as testable subset of runtime system functions being project artefacts per se, [were] not included in the catalogue of project deliverables of section 3.1"*. The comment thus did not at all relate to the complainant's perception regarding the procedures and techniques of code writing. In that respect, the complainant's argument that there had been a manifest error of assessment was unfounded.

131. As to the evaluation committee's comment that the *"RUP [was] indeed clear on the terminology to be used: the stakeholder requirements management [was] a key activity of the elaboration phase which [was] not clearly isolated and identified here. A preliminary list of stakeholders was expected"*, the Commission observed that the clarity and the complete understanding of the tender were the key aspects of the assessment, which were applied fairly to all the tenderers. When terminology had not been applied systematically by a tenderer, the evaluation committee had to mention this in its evaluation.



132. The evaluation committee highlighted that the complainant mixed up in its offer different notions and used ambiguous terminology. Thus, in section 2.1 of the offer, the term " *process* " was substituted for the RUP term " *discipline* ". In addition, there was a reference to a non-RUP " *User Requirements Specification* " document in section 2.1.2.2, and another reference (to the same or a different document) called " *Software Requirements Specification* " at a later stage in section 2.1.3 of the complainant's offer. This was not in line with the artefacts produced following RUP, and showed the complainant's failure to demonstrate the requested quality in the description of the proposed approach.

133. The Commission added that the " *requirements management* " and the " *requirements discipline* " were described in subsection 2.1.2.2 of the complainant's proposal and, again, in section 2.1.3, thus making it unclear why two different sections were needed to tackle the same issue. Moreover, contrary to the complainant's claim, the " *requirements discipline in RUP* ", which was to be implemented through a specific set of steps, namely, (a) " *analyze the problem* "; (b) " *understand stakeholder needs* "; (c) " *define the system* "; (d) " *manage the scope of the system* "; (e) " *refine the system definition* "; and (f) " *manage changing requirements* ", was not described in section 2.1.3 of its offer.

134. As to the evaluation committee's comment that " *the tenderer [did] not propose an enterprise architecture framework technology, such as CEAF* ['Commission Enterprise IT Architecture Framework'], *which was developed by the Commission, and clearly part of the requirements* ", the Commission pointed out that it was not up to the evaluation committee to search for information which was not clearly included in the complainant's offer, and to draw conclusions on a possible compliance of the complainant's offer with the Commission's standards.

135. The fact that a platform called MERMIG was provided for as a basis for development should not be considered as an element bringing a clear added value to the project. The decision on the final IT platform upon which the system in question - and every IT system - had to be built could only be taken after going thoroughly through the IT development methodology phases and after receiving the approval of the involved stakeholders. It could not be a decision taken on the basis of a tenderer's reassurance that one of its products was excellent.

136. The Commission concluded that the evaluation committee had clearly and fully addressed criterion (b) in a consistent way. It reiterated that the evaluation committee had treated all tenderers in a fair and objective way. In fact, comments related to the failure to propose a RUP [22] and CEAF [23] method had been addressed to another tenderer as well. For the Commission, the evaluation committee had fully justified the mark given to the complainant's offer for criterion (b).

As regards criterion (c) [24]

137. As to this criterion, the complainant noted that " *the evaluation committee provided to this criterion only 18.5 points, just half a point above the threshold.* " The Commission failed to



understand the meaning of the remark *"[...] just half a point above the threshold [...]"*. The complainant was successful in this criterion, but it did not achieve a higher score for the reasons described in the evaluation report.

138. The Commission pointed out that the next comment of the evaluation committee, *("however the offer seems to rely too heavily on inputs from the Commission")* was made after a description of the positive aspects of the complainant's offer had been provided. It referred to the dependencies mentioned in the complainant's offer, for example, in Chapter 7 (page 50 of the offer), where the tenderer addressed the "news" section *("this kind of news would then, e.g. have to be provided by the National Focal points on Integration")* or, on page 55, in the section on obligatory information provision.

139. The evaluation committee also stated that *"the part on project management in the chapter project organisation [was] not relevant there."* The Commission noted in this regard that the evaluation committee had already clarified that the project management *"[...] (should potentially have been integrated in the methodology section), " " i.e. the specific section should have better been placed in the methodology section describing the project management discipline "*. This was yet another illustration of the insufficient understanding of the RUP methodology by the tenderer.

140. As to the evaluation committee's comment that, for the IT part, there was *"no detailed breakdown of resource allocation and work package"*, the Commission clarified that a work programme of high quality should include a work breakdown of profiles per task. Therefore, the complainant should have provided a Work Breakdown Structure as proof of its capacity to schedule and plan the project activities with the available resources.

141. In conclusion, the Commission stated that, following the Ombudsman's draft recommendation, it had addressed the complainant's arguments. The Commission maintained that the procedure applied for this call for tenders was not tainted by unfairness, arbitrariness and manifest errors of assessment. It stressed that it had explained in detail and beyond the legal requirements the comments put forward by the evaluation committee for this tender. The institution added that it had also demonstrated that the comments made by the evaluation committee were fully justified.

The complainant's comments on the further information provided by the Commission

142. In its observations on the Commission's detailed opinion, the complainant observed at the outset that the Commission provided the above explanations only in the summer of 2012, that is to say, six years after the contested call for tenders had been closed. Even if one were to accept that these comments could possibly allow the Commission to fulfil its obligations, *quod non*, they were issued too late to allow the complainant to exercise its appeal rights before the General Court and too late to seek financial compensation (should it have been entitled to it). In the complainant's view, this situation, which was not accidental, but systematic, was evidence of maladministration.



143. As regards the substance of the Commission's reply, the complainant considered that the institution failed again to address its request, which was to be given explanations, in line with the provisions of the Financial Regulation and the Implementing Rules, in a clear and accurate manner. More particularly, the complainant expected to be informed why and how its tender allegedly failed to meet the requirements of the tender specifications of the call for tenders, and what the winning tenderer offered that was more or better.

144. The complainant maintained its view that the Commission continued to use vague and unfounded expressions, such as "*is not well described*" or "*should have demonstrated better and more precisely its understanding*" or "*better explained the ways*", which failed to explain why the winning tenderer had made a better offer.

145. The same applied to other comments made by the Commission, such as, that the complainant's offer "*should have better elaborated*"; "*lacked clarity, conciseness, structure and consistency*"; and "*was superficial and not well structured*". According to the complainant, the Commission used such vague arguments in order to "*justify the grade given*". However, such comments fell short of the obligation of a contracting authority to give reasons for its decision. Moreover, acting in accordance with the principles of good administration, a contracting authority should not base its decisions on such arguments, and then award contracts and spend EU funds amounting to millions of EUR.

146. Furthermore, the complainant considered that, in the course of the evaluation of the tenders, the Commission added *a posteriori* a new evaluation criterion which was not known to the tenderers previously. More specifically, the complainant referred to criterion (b), and noted that the evaluators argued that the methodology proposed by the complainant was not clearly mapped with RUP. However, the complainant had proposed the same methodology that it had used in all the projects it had delivered to the Commission which were based on RUP. Moreover, such methodology was fully in line with the Commission's own requirements and practices. The complainant added that, according to the tender specifications, tenderers were invited to present their methodologies. They should be evaluated for what they had offered. They were not asked to "provide any mapping with any other methodology". Therefore, the offers submitted could not have been judged on the basis of a mapping process.

147. The complainant indicated that the same could be said for the Commission's comments regarding criterion (c). The Commission argued that the project management element should have been placed in another section in the tender, and downgraded the complainant, not for what it offered, but for where in the tender it placed its offer. This was something which was not reflected in the tender specifications, or any other abstract rationale to which a logical tenderer should possibly be expected to adhere. The same would apply to the detailed breakdown of resource allocation, also not requested in the tender specifications. The complainant noted that that level of detail was even out of place in fixed price projects, such as the one at stake.

148. In the complainant's view, the evaluators commented on each criterion, but failed to focus on the description of the criterion itself, thereby altering its meaning with new and unknown elements.



149. The complainant disagreed with the Commission's comment that it did not offer CEAF. It argued that this comment was totally unfounded, since its tender did offer CEAF. The complainant noted that, at the same time, the Commission praised the tenderer which offered its own "*homemade enterprise architecture framework methodology*", which was clearly not CEAF.

150. In view of the above, the complainant considered that the Commission failed to respect its obligations and used practices aimed at downgrading certain tenders and promoting others, by using criteria which had nothing to do with the tender specifications. Such practices discredited the whole evaluation process. This behaviour did not seem to be in line with the code of ethics and good administration that reputable EU institutions, such as the Commission, should follow.

151. The complainant thus asked the Ombudsman to invite the Commission to refrain from such practices, to produce clear tender specifications, and to refrain from introducing new criteria *a posteriori*. It argued that the Commission should always provide specific reasons, comparing each offer with the offer chosen, and showing what the winning tenderer offered that was "*more*" or "*better*". Most importantly, the Commission should be invited to present a clear link between the awarded grade and the criteria relied upon.

D. The Ombudsman's assessment after his draft recommendation

152. In his draft recommendation, the Ombudsman explained that he did not request the Commission to address the comments made by the complainant in its letter of 8 December 2006 on the basis of the legal obligations flowing from the rules on public procurement. Instead, the Ombudsman's request was made on the basis of the notion of good administration and the understanding that a citizen-friendly administration is one that is ready to explain its position without unnecessary delay [25]. Against this background, the Ombudsman asked the Commission, once again, to address adequately the arguments put forward by the complainant in its letter of 8 December 2006.

153. After having carefully analysed the further information provided by the parties, the Ombudsman considers that, in its most recent submissions, the Commission addressed the arguments put forward by the complainant in its letter of 8 December 2006, and clarified in sufficient detail the comments made by the evaluation committee regarding the complainant's tender. The Ombudsman does not agree with the complainant that the further explanations put forward by the Commission were vague or unsubstantiated. The Commission explained the specific context to which the comments of the evaluation committee referred, and provided concrete examples in order to allow the complainant to understand the relevant conclusions [26]. The fact that the complainant was still unsatisfied with the reasons put forward by the Commission does not mean that the explanations given by the latter were inadequate or manifestly wrong.



154. The complainant submitted that the Commission had added a new evaluation criterion *a posteriori*, which was not specifically laid down in the tender specifications. The Ombudsman recalls in that respect that the Commission enjoys a wide margin of discretion with regard to the factors to be taken into account for the purposes of deciding to award a contract following an invitation to tender [27]. In exercising its margin of discretion, the evaluation committee was thus entitled to determine the detailed criteria or the evaluation grid on the basis of which to assess all the proposals. In support of its view, the complainant disagreed with the conclusion that the methodology it had proposed was not clearly mapped with RUP, since it had proposed the same methodology in all previous projects that it had delivered to the Commission. However, as the Commission explained, the fact that the complainant had proposed in the past the same methodology was irrelevant for the evaluation of the present tender, since, in the Commission's view, the overall approach of the complainant's offer lacked clarity, as it was a mere theoretical description of the RUP principles. The Ombudsman finds this explanation reasonable.

155. The complainant further argued that it should not have been given fewer points just because certain information was placed in other parts of its offer. In its comments, the Commission explained that the evaluation committee had considered that the part on project management would have been better placed in the methodology section describing the project management discipline. The Commission pointed out in that respect that this was another example, in which the complainant failed to demonstrate sufficient understanding of the RUP methodology [28]. In that regard, the Ombudsman notes that it would seem that the points awarded by the Commission in this context were not determined by the fact that the complainant had put certain information in a section which the Commission did not consider to be the more appropriate one, but by the complainant's insufficient understanding of the RUP methodology in general. The Ombudsman considers that the complainant has not been able to call this position into question.

156. In any event, it suffices to say that the complainant did not submit any evidence showing that the criteria used for the evaluation of its proposal were unfair, unreasonable or discriminatory, and, in any way, different from those used to evaluate the other proposals.

157. The complainant finally wished to know what the winning tenderer offered that was more or better in comparison with its own offer. The Ombudsman recalls that, on 5 December 2006, the Commission informed the complainant of the name of the successful tenderer, the scores awarded to the complainant and the winning offer as regards each of the three criteria, and the total cost of the services offered by the successful tenderer. In this letter, the Commission summarised that the offer of the successful tenderer was considered "*clear, focused and well-structured*". It added that both parts on the IT and integration were considered "*comprehensive and interlinked*", and that the complainant's offer "*revealed significant weakness concerning the quality and clarity of the approach and the methodology in relation to the IT part*".

158. Furthermore, it is worth adding that, following the complainant's request to receive a copy of the evaluation report, the Commission immediately provided it with this report [29], which



contained the conclusions of the assessment made concerning both the complainant's and the successful tenderer's bids. Considering that the Commission provided the complainant with all the above elements, the Ombudsman concludes that the Commission did indeed give the complainant sufficient information concerning the offer submitted by the successful tenderer [30] and the relevant ranking made.

159. In view of the foregoing, the Ombudsman considers that the Commission has accepted his draft recommendation and has taken satisfactory steps to implement it.

160. Since the Ombudsman does not consider that the appraisal of the complainant's bid was unfair, arbitrary or vitiated by a manifest error of assessment, the complainant's claim for compensation in this regard must consequently fail [31] .

161. In view of the conclusions set out above (see paragraphs 103, 159 and 160), the Ombudsman finds no instance of maladministration on the part of the Commission.

E. Conclusions

On the basis of his inquiry into this complaint, the Ombudsman closes it with the following conclusion:

The Commission has accepted the Ombudsman's draft recommendation and has taken satisfactory steps to implement it. The Ombudsman finds no maladministration in the present case.

The complainant and the Commission will be informed of this decision.

P. Nikiforos Diamandouros

Done in Strasbourg on 13 December 2012

[1] Reference number: JLB/B4/2006/02.

[2] Point 18 of the tender specifications.

[3] Article 4 (Lawfulness) of the ECGAB reads: "*The official shall act according to law and apply the rules and procedures laid down in Community legislation. The official shall in particular take care that decisions which affect the rights or interests of individuals have a basis in law and that their content complies with the law*".

[4] Article 17 of the ECGAB (Reasonable time-limit for taking decisions) reads as follows: "*The official shall ensure that a decision on every request or complaint to the Institution is taken*



within a reasonable time limit, without delay, and in any case no later than two months from the date of receipt. (...) "

[5] The Ombudsman's letters to the complainant of 30 June 2011 and 27 October 2011.

[6] Point 4.5.2 of the tender specifications is entitled "Compliance with the IT policy of the European Commission".

[7] Case C-421/01 *Traunfellner GmbH* [2003] ECR I-11941.

[8] Article II.1.9 of the contract notice reads as follows: "Variants will be accepted: No".

[9] Article II.2.2 of the contract notice reads as follows: " *Options: No* ".

[10] Council Regulation No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, OJ 2002 L 248, p. 1.

[11] Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114.

[12] Rational Unified Process (RUP).

[13] The Commission referred to Case T-50/05 *Evropaiki Dynamiki v. Commission* , [2010] ECR II-1071 and Case T-211/07 *AWWW v. Eurofound* , [2008] ECR II-106.

[14] See paragraph 51 above.

[15] See paragraph 38 above.

[16] The provision of the tender specifications (point 14.2) concerning exclusions during the procurement procedure reads as follows:

" Contracts will not be awarded to tenderers who, during the procurement procedure: (a) are subject to a conflict of interest; (b) are guilty of misrepresentation in supplying the information required by the contracting authority as a condition of participation in the contract procedure or fail to supply this information ".

[17] Article 41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 18 of the ECGAB.

[18] See paragraph 103 above.

[19] Criterion (a): *" Understanding of the context, objectives, challenges and of the problems and needs as well as tasks to be preformed and results to be achieved - 20 points (minimum 12 points) "*.



[20] Criterion (b): "*Quality and clarity of the approach, methodology and working methods proposed for this assignment, including information collection, analysis and processing techniques. Creativity will also be taken into account - 50 points (minimum 30 points) "*".

[21] The Commission referred to page 6 of the complainant's offer.

[22] See paragraph 127 above.

[23] See paragraph 134 above.

[24] Criterion (c): "*Quality and coherence of the work programme and timetable, including consistency with tasks, milestones and deliverables, and the organisation, management and working methods of the project team and the allocation of responsibilities to individual members - 30 points (minimum 18 points) "*".

[25] See paragraph 112 above.

[26] See paragraphs 120 - 140 above.

[27] See paragraph 105 above.

[28] See paragraph 139 above.

[29] See paragraphs 8 and 9 above.

[30] See also paragraphs 108 - 109 above.

[31] See also paragraphs 153 - 154.