Background to the complaint

1. The complainant, a company specialised in personal protective equipment, participated in a call for tenders[1] organised by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) for the provision of uniforms, footwear, other garments and associated services for Frontex Officers. The call was published in March 2025[2] and comprised five Lots.

2. In May 2025, the complainant submitted its tender for “Lot 1 – Garments with Frontex design, emblems and insignias”. Under the call, Frontex aimed to establish a single framework contract for the above Lot, with a maximum value of EUR 12 020 000.  

3. On 29 September 2025, Frontex rejected the complainant’s tender, informing the complainant that it had been ranked second.

4. Following this decision, the complainant asked Frontex to provide the relevant evaluation report, the scoring and ranking of the other tenders, as well as information on the financial offer of the successful tenderer, including Frontex’s assessment of whether the offer was not ‘abnormally low’ under the Financial Regulation.[3]

5. On 6 October 2025, Frontex gave the complainant the name of the successful tenderer, details on the tender’s characteristics and relative advantages, including its technical and financial score, and disclosed the total amount of the financial offer. Frontex further explained, in general terms, how it had concluded that the tender submitted by the successful tenderer was not abnormally low.

6. On the following day, the complainant informed Frontex that the French consumer protection and competition authority (‘Direction générale de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la répression des fraudes’ (DGCCRF)) had imposed an administrative sanction on the successful tenderer after the submission of its tender. The complainant also provided documentation concerning some alleged financial difficulties faced by the successful tenderer. It asked Frontex whether the above information may constitute grounds for excluding the successful tenderer from the procurement procedure, and whether it could qualify as ‘grave professional misconduct’.[4] The complainant further pointed out that the successful tenderer’s financial offer was substantially lower than the maximum contract value and questioned whether Frontex had duly assessed if the winning tender was not ‘abnormally low’. It asked Frontex to suspend the award decision.

7. On 13 October 2025, Frontex replied to the complainant’s concerns. It stated that the evaluation committee had concluded that the winning tenderer complied with the selection criteria and met the required economic and financial capacity criteria. It added that the tenderer was neither subject to EU restrictive measures nor listed in the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) and did not fall within any other exclusion situation[5]. Frontex further explained that, after following the two‑stage procedure set out in the Financial Regulation and the relevant case law, the evaluation committee found that the winning tenderer’s offer could not be regarded as abnormally low.

8. The complainant sent further correspondence to Frontex regarding the sanctions imposed by the DGCCRF on the winning tenderer. It reiterated its concerns about the award of a contract to a company that had experienced serious performance issues in the implementation of a previous contract with the French police, including severe delays. It also noted that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) had raised concerns about the low value of the winning tender.[6] Frontex did not further address the complainant’s concerns, relying on its previous reply.

9. Dissatisfied with how Frontex had dealt with its concerns, the complainant turned to the Ombudsman on 4 November 2025.

The inquiry

10. The Ombudsman opened an inquiry into the following aspects of the complaint:

(a) how Frontex had assessed the eligibility of the successful tenderer, in the light of the information available at the time of award, during the standstill period, and on the basis of the information provided by the complainant

(b) how Frontex had carried out its assessment of the allegedly abnormally low tender.

11. In the course of the inquiry, the Ombudsman received Frontex’s reply on the complaint and, subsequently, the comments of the complainant in response to Frontex’s reply. The Ombudsman’s inquiry team also inspected Frontex’s file on this case.

The eligibility of the successful tenderer

Arguments presented to the Ombudsman

In the complaint to the Ombudsman

12. The complainant reiterated its concerns about the award decision. In addition, it provided information on the financial difficulties faced by the winning tenderer, as demonstrated by its financial accounts for the fiscal year 2022. It further mentioned that the successful tenderer was subject to a collective insolvency procedure in France, as announced in the French Official Bulletin of Civil and Commercial Announcements (‘Bulletin officiel des annonces civiles et commerciales’ (BODACC)). It argued that these factors seriously undermined the tenderer’s reliability and should have been taken into account by Frontex in the evaluation of the tender.

In Frontex’s reply to the Ombudsman

13. Frontex explained that, during the evaluation phase, it had verified that the successful tenderer had access to the EU market and was not subject to any EU restrictive measures.[7] Moreover, it had also examined the documentation supplied by the tenderer, in accordance with the requirement of the procurement procedure, as well as the information available through the EDES database. After reviewing these elements, Frontex concluded that the tenderer was not in an exclusion situation.

14. Furthermore, Frontex stated that it had asked the successful tenderer for additional clarifications on the administrative sanctions imposed by the DGCCRF to determine whether they may constitute grounds for exclusion of the winning tenderer for ‘grave professional misconduct’ pursuant to Article 138(c) of the Financial Regulation. Frontex analysed the decision of the DGCCRF and concluded that this was not the case.

15. Regarding the notice published in the BODACC, Frontex explained that, following receipt of this information, it immediately suspended the signature of the contract and requested clarifications from the tenderer. The tenderer responded that the notice had been published in error. Frontex accepted this explanation.

16. Frontex further explained that concerns over the tenderer’s performance in a separate contract with the French police could not be taken into account because the evaluation of tenders was based solely on the exclusion, selection and award criteria set out in the procurement documents. In addition, Frontex stated that it did not consider it appropriate to comment on political questions from MEPs in the context of procurement procedures.

In the complainant’s comments on Frontex’s reply

17. The complainant argued that Frontex wrongfully dismissed the extensive information submitted to it regarding the serious operational, logistical and financial problems of the successful tenderer. It claimed that such information is based on publicly available and reliable sources. The complainant thus argued that Frontex had failed to adequately assess the ability of the winning tenderer to perform the framework contract based on the issues identified. 

The Ombudsman’s assessment

18. When it comes to the evaluation of tenders, contracting authorities are bound by the criteria set out in the procurement documents. In this regard, Annex I to the Tender Specifications of the call in question, provides that “[p]articipation is open to all natural and legal persons […], under the condition that: a) [t]hey are not subject to restrictive measures, they are not in any of the situations excluding them from participation and that they have no professional conflicting interests in relation to this contract; [and] b) they have legal capacity, economic and financial standing as well as technical and professional capacity to perform the contract”.[8]

19. Article 138 of the Financial Regulation sets out the grounds for excluding an entity from participating in a call for tenders. These ‘exclusion situations’ include, among others, bankruptcy and/or insolvency,[9] grave professional misconduct,[10] as well as serious contractual breaches.[11]  

20. The Ombudsman finds, based on the explanation received and the documents inspected, that Frontex duly carried out the eligibility check of the successful tenderer against the above exclusion situations. More specifically, when the complainant raised concerns regarding the insolvency notice published in the BODACC, Frontex immediately contacted the winning tenderer. The documents inspected show that the tenderer clearly explained that the collective insolvency notice was a mistake by the French Tribunal of Nanterre, providing adequate proof. It was thus correct for Frontex not to exclude the winning tenderer on this basis.  

21. Furthermore, the Ombudsman notes that, when the complainant raised its concerns over the sanctions imposed by the DGCCRF, Frontex promptly contacted the winning tenderer, requesting additional explanations and supporting documentation, including copies of the relevant decisions of the DGCCRF. The successful tenderer provided all the requested information and documents. The inspection of the file further confirms that Frontex then carried out a thorough assessment of all the material received. After reviewing Frontex’s assessment, which was provided on a confidential basis to the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman finds that Frontex’s conclusion that the tenderer’s conduct did not amount to ‘grave professional misconduct’ is reasonable and in line with Article 138(c) of the Financial Regulation.

22. In that regard, the Ombudsman notes that the EDES database[12] lists persons or entities that are excluded from EU‑funded contracts because of significant deficiencies in meeting contractual obligations, fraud, corruption or other misconduct. Frontex provided proof that, at the time when the tenders were evaluated, the successful tenderer was not listed in the EDES database. No further findings were made in relation to the winning tenderer that would have justified its inclusion in the EDES database. 

23. Finally, regarding the complainant’s allegations about the deficiencies of the successful tenderer in the implementation of another contract with the French police, Frontex correctly pointed out that it may assess tenders only against the exclusion, selection and award criteria set out in the procurement documents. Evaluating tenders against conditions that were not provided for in the procurement documents would undermine the principles of transparency and equal treatment, as tenderers must be able to know in advance the criteria against which their tenders will be assessed.[13] The Ombudsman notes that this does not mean that Frontex did not take into consideration the information provided by the complainant; on the contrary, the Ombudsman finds that Frontex took all the material provided into account and examined it in line with the applicable rules.

24. In light of the above, the Ombudsman finds that Frontex did not act with maladministration by considering that the successful tenderer was not in an exclusion situation.

The low value of the successful tender

Arguments presented to the Ombudsman

By Frontex

25. Frontex explained that its assessment of a potentially abnormally low tender for Lot 1 was carried out both for the offer submitted by the successful tenderer and for the offer submitted by the complainant.[14] In this context, Frontex noted that both offers were of a significantly lower value than the contracting authority’s estimated value for Lot 1.

26. To carry out this assessment, Frontex followed a two‑stage procedure, in line with the Financial Regulation. In the first stage, it reviewed the submitted tenders to determine whether they appeared to be abnormally low. Given the significant difference between the prices proposed by the successful tenderer and the complainant for Lot 1 and the contracting authority’s estimated value, Frontex proceeded to the second stage. In the second stage, Frontex requested, in writing, a detailed breakdown of the constituent elements of the price and costs for each offer.[15] Frontex concluded that both tenderers supplied sufficient evidence to substantiate their offers. Consequently, neither offer was deemed abnormally low, and both proceeded to the next phase of the evaluation process.

By the complainant

27. In reply to Frontex’s comments, the complainant argued that Frontex had relied exclusively on the successful tenderer’s explanations when assessing whether the submitted tender was abnormally low. The complainant claimed that this did not allow for a proper assessment of the tenderer’s ability to perform the contract in line with its contractual obligations and therefore risked affecting the operational readiness of border operations.

The Ombudsman’s assessment

28. The Financial Regulation provides that a tender is irregular when the contracting authority declares it to be abnormally low.[16] The concept of abnormally low tenders refers to situations where the price of the tender of an economic operator raises doubts as to whether the tender is economically sustainable and compliant with applicable legal obligations and whether it can be performed in accordance with the tender requirements.[17]

29. The Financial Regulation does not clearly define what an abnormally low tender is. It merely states that, when a tender appears to be abnormally low, the contracting authority shall request in writing details from the tenderer and give it the opportunity to present its observations.[18] The Financial Regulation nevertheless provides some guidance as to the elements to be taken into consideration by the contracting authority when making this assessment.[19] The Financial Regulation also mentions that the contracting authority shall reject a tender when it “does not comply with applicable obligations in the fields of environmental, social and labour law”.[20] If the evidence supplied does not satisfactorily account for the low price or costs proposed, the appointing authority should then reject a tender as abnormally low.[21]

30. In the absence of a clear definition, it is for the contracting authority to determine the method used to identify abnormally low tenders, provided that this method is objective and not discriminatory. The EU institutions have developed their own internal guidance to assist contracting authorities in this assessment.

31. Therefore, Frontex enjoys some discretion in determining if a tender is abnormally low. The Ombudsman’s role in such cases is not to re-do Frontex’s assessment, but rather to verify whether the assessment made is reasonable, in line with the applicable rules and that there is no manifest error of assessment.  

32. As a preliminary remark, the Ombudsman notes that, while the complainant argued that the winning tenderer’s price was abnormally low, thereby questioning its ability to perform the contract for the proposed price, the complainant’s own tender was also of a similarly low price.

33. In this case, the Ombudsman notes that Frontex did follow the two‑stage assessment procedure, in line with the Financial Regulation. Having first identified the tender as potentially abnormally low due to its lower value, Frontex initiated the second stage of the procedure and sent a comprehensive list of questions to the successful tenderer to verify whether the price offered could be justified. The tenderer then provided a detailed reply, which Frontex assessed in line with the applicable guidelines, and concluded that the price was justified.

34. The Ombudsman inspected both the questions sent by Frontex to the winning tenderer and its reply. While these documents are confidential and their content cannot be referred to in this decision, the Ombudsman is reassured that Frontex did carry out a thorough assessment of the matter and that its conclusion that the tender is not abnormally low is reasonable and in line with the applicable rules. In particular, the Ombudsman notes that the winning tenderer addressed in detail all questions asked by Frontex and provided the requested clarifications. Frontex did not request any further supporting documents, as it considered that the explanations provided sufficiently addressed its concerns regarding the tendered price. The Ombudsman considers that this approach is in line with the relevant guidelines.

35. On the basis of the above, the Ombudsman concludes that there was no maladministration by Frontex regarding its assessment that the successful tender was not abnormally low.

Conclusion

Based on the inquiry, the Ombudsman closes this case with the following conclusion[22]:

There was no maladministration by Frontex.

The complainant and Frontex will be informed of this decision.

Teresa Anjinho
European Ombudsman

Strasbourg, 12/08/2026

 

[1] In accordance with Article 167(1)(a) of Regulation 2024/2509 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (hereinafter “Financial Regulation”): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj/eng.

[2] Call for tenders FRONTEX/2024/OP/0058 – Lot 1, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/tender-details/7eca31e8-ef6d-4b62-b982-7aa3ac9f57d6-CN.

[3] Point 23.1 of Annex I to Regulation 2024/2509 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (the Financial Regulation)”: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj/eng.

[4] Financial Regulation, Article 138(c).

[5] Financial Regulation, Articles 136-141.

[6] See, in this regard, Parliamentary Question to the Commission titled “Safety of Frontex officers and the EU’s strategic autonomy in the context of call for tenders Frontex/2024/OP/0058” (E-003548/2025/rev.1): https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-003548_EN.html.

[7] Within the meaning of Article 29 of the Treaty of the European Union and Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

[8] Tender Specifications – Annex I, I.3. Eligibility,: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/tender-details/docs/7eca31e8-ef6d-4b62-b982-7aa3ac9f57d6-CN/Annex%20I%20-%20Tender%20specifications_V2.pdf#page=3.

[9] Financial Regulation, Article 138(1)(a).

[10] Financial Regulation, Article 138(1)(c).

[11] Financial Regulation, Article 138(1)(e).

[12] EDES database: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/how-it-works/annual-lifecycle/implementation/anti-fraud-measures/edes/edes-database_en.

[13] Judgment of the Court of 24 January 2008, Emm. G. Lianakis AE and Others v Dimos Alexandroupolis and Others, Case C-532/06, paragraphs 36-38: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62006CJ0532:EN:HTML

[14] Financial Regulation, Annex I, point 12.2(d).

[15] Financial Regulation, Annex I, point 23.

[16] Financial Regulation, Annex I, point 12.2.(d).

[17] Definition taken from the Practical guide to contract procedures in EU external actions (PRAG) - 2.6.10. ‘Abnormally low tenders and foreign subsidies’. This guidance is not directly applicable to Frontex.

[18] Financial Regulation, Annex I, point 23.1

[19] Financial Regulation, Annex I, point 23.1. (a) the economics of the manufacturing process, of the provision of services or of the construction method; (b) the technical solutions chosen or the exceptionally favourable conditions available to the tenderer; (c) the originality of the tender; (d) compliance of the tenderer with applicable obligations in the fields of environmental, social and labour law; (e) compliance of subcontractors with applicable obligations in the fields of environmental, social and labour law; (f) the possibility of the tenderer obtaining State aid in compliance with applicable rules.”

[20] Financial Regulation, Annex I, point 23.2.

[21] Financial Regulation, Annex I, point 23.2.

[22] This complaint has been dealt with under delegated case handling, in accordance with the Decision of the European Ombudsman adopting Implementing Provisions