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Decision on the European Securities and Markets Authority's refusal to give public access to exchanges with the European Commission on the preparation of 'equivalence decisions' in relation to the United Kingdom (Case 1278/2022/JK)

The case concerned the European Securities and Markets Authority's (ESMA) refusal to give public access to documents concerning exchanges with the European Commission on the preparation of 'equivalence decisions' in relation to the United Kingdom. Through these decisions, the Commission determines that the regulatory or supervisory regime of a certain non-EU country is equivalent to the corresponding EU framework. ESMA argued that disclosure of the requested documents would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards international relations.

The Ombudsman inquiry team met with representatives of ESMA and inspected the documents to which access was denied. Based on the meeting and the inspection, the Ombudsman found that ESMA’s decision to refuse access was reasonable, given the specific nature and content of the documents. The Ombudsman, however, identified a number of shortcomings in how ESMA had handled the case and made three suggestions for improvement.

Background to the complaint

1. In order to grant internal market access to UK firms in certain areas of financial services, the European Commission is in the process of adopting equivalence decisions. Through these decisions, the Commission determines that the regulatory or supervisory regime of a certain non-EU country is equivalent to the corresponding EU framework.

2. The complainant, a journalist, asked the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) for public access to documents[1] concerning (a) draft equivalence decisions prepared by ESMA before the end of the UK transition period on 31 December 2020 and (b) any correspondence with the European Commission on the topic of UK equivalence decisions over the course of 2020, 2021 and 2022.

3. ESMA informed the complainant that it was not in possession of draft equivalence decisions. As regards the complainant’s request for access to correspondence, it invited the complainant to clarify the scope of this element of her request[2], as the scope captured a significant amount of different types of documents, exchanged over an extended period of time.

4. In April 2022, the complainant clarified that she was seeking access to ‘any correspondence between the ESMA board and/or executive team with the European Commission on the topic of UK equivalence decisions over the course of 2020, 2021, and 2022.’ The complainant later provided further clarification in that the reference to ‘executive team’ was meant to cover ‘the senior executives at ESMA, meaning the chair, executive director, heads of unit and CCP committee as detailed in its organigram[3]’.

5. In May 2022, ESMA informed the complainant that it had identified the requested documents (without specifying how many), notably emails originating from either the Commission or ESMA. It explained that the identified documents are mainly correspondence on the following topics: (i) issues relating to the trading obligation for derivatives (DTO) and for shares (STO), (ii) agendas of calls on equivalence assessments and (iii) the UK central counterparties (CCP) draft equivalence decisions. ESMA refused access to the documents arguing that disclosure would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards international relations.[4]

6. The complainant then asked ESMA to review its decision to refuse full access (by making what is known as a 'confirmatory application').

7. In June 2022, ESMA adopted a confirmatory decision providing partial access to three short emails received from the Commission with the redaction of personal data[5] only. ESMA maintained its refusal to grant access to the remaining documents based on the need to protect the public interest as regards international relations.

8. In July 2022, dissatisfied with ESMA’s decision, the complainant turned to the Ombudsman.

The inquiry

9. The Ombudsman opened an inquiry into ESMA’s refusal to give public access to the documents requested. The Ombudsman’s inquiry did not cover the part of the complainant’s request concerning draft equivalence decisions, because the complainant had not contested ESMA’s position concerning these documents.

10. In the course of the inquiry, the Ombudsman inspected the unredacted copies of the documents at issue.

11. The Ombudsman also received ESMA’s written reply on the complaint. Furthermore, the Ombudsman inquiry team met with representatives of ESMA to obtain clarifications on the refusal to provide access to the requested documents[6]. The complainant provided comments on the meeting report.

Arguments presented to the Ombudsman

by ESMA

Concerning the identification of the documents within the scope of the request and the provision of a list of the documents falling within the scope of the request

12. During the meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team, ESMA stated that it did a mapping exercise while processing the complainant’s public access request to identify the documents falling within the scope of her request. In doing so, it took account of the terms of the complainant’s request, the wording of the confirmatory application and the complainant’s main interest in having access to documents concerning the deliberations between the Commission and ESMA.

13. ESMA argued that disclosing a list of the identified documents would have undermined the exception relied upon, in that it would have indicated the degree of intensity of the exchanges and would have given rise to speculation. In addition, ESMA considered that a list, devoid of confidential information, would not have enabled the complainant to identify whether the documents were of interest to her.

14. ESMA further considered that it was under no legal obligation to provide a list of documents. Instead, it described the documents by reference to categories of documents.

Concerning its reasons to refuse access to the identified documents

15. In refusing access to the documents at issue, ESMA relied on the need to protect international relations. It stated that the requested documents contain sensitive correspondence between ESMA and the Commission concerning the delicate matter of the adoption of equivalence decisions in relation to the UK. Their disclosure would undermine the credibility of the EU and weaken its position in international negotiations, as it would reveal information on the EU’s negotiating position and lead to speculation regarding the views of ESMA and of the Commission. This could undermine the climate of mutual trust between the UK and the EU.

16. During the meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team, ESMA also argued that, while it had only a technical role in the process of adopting equivalence decisions, even the sequencing of its exchanges with the Commission could be considered sensitive as it reveals the order in which the assessments were done. In addition, ESMA argued that disclosure of the documents would have prevented open and frank discussions in relation to future equivalence decisions.

17. ESMA argued that, according to EU case law, it has wide discretion in assessing the application of the exception for the protection of international relations,[7] and that the extent of judicial review was limited[8]. Furthermore, ESMA stated that it is not required to establish the existence of a definite risk of undermining the protection of EU’s international relations, but merely the existence of a reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical risk.[9]

18. ESMA also pointed to the temporary nature of the equivalence decisions. The fact that they could be subject to extension makes their duration difficult to estimate.

19. ESMA explained that the emails, which have been partially disclosed, differ from those not disclosed, because the documents linked or attached to those disclosed emails, although relevant and within the scope of the request, are public. Therefore, their disclosure posed no risk to international relations. On the contrary, the documents linked or attached to the non-disclosed emails were either considered confidential or were not in the possession of ESMA. Some of the documents were available through services not accessible to the applicant such as databases only accessible upon payment of a subscription, whilst others had only been made available on an ICT platform hosted by the Commission, which is no longer in use.

20. ESMA also stated that it had consulted the Commission on the access request[10]. The Commission opposed the documents’ disclosure. It did not consult the UK authorities, as it was clear that the documents originating from the UK authorities could not be disclosed.

by the complainant

21. The complainant argued that the documents should not be covered by the exception for protecting the public interest as regards international relations. She considered that the public expects greater transparency on these types of decision, which have long-lasting implications for financial markets, and therefore on EU companies and citizens.

22. In her confirmatory application, the complainant further stated that there was a public interest in having access to the deliberations at the highest level between ESMA and the Commission on this topic and that the documents cannot be considered confidential or sensitive as the decision-making process had ended some time ago.

The Ombudsman's assessment

23. The EU institutions enjoy a wide margin of discretion when determining whether disclosing a document would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards international relations[11]. As such, the Ombudsman’s inquiry aimed to determine if there was a manifest error in ESMA’s assessment on which it based its decision to refuse access to the documents at issue.

24. The inspection showed that ESMA identified 27 documents as falling within the scope of the complainant’s request, that is, 12 emails exchanged between the Commission and ESMA[12] (three of which were partially disclosed), as well as most of the documents linked or attached to these emails (with the exception of two).

25. As regards the identified documents linked or attached to the emails, the Ombudsman found that some of them constitute the UK replies to the EU’s equivalence questionnaires on different policy areas and the general cover note. It is reasonable to consider that disclosure of these documents would undermine the protection of the EU’s international relations. This is particularly the case in light of the fact that no equivalence decisions have been adopted yet in most of the areas covered by the documents and those that have been are temporary in nature.

26. However, the inspection also showed that two of the documents[13]attached to those emails, which ESMA identified as falling within scope, are in fact already publicly available. Therefore, these documents should have been provided to the complainant. Furthermore, based on the inspection, the Ombudsman considers that one of the two attached documents identified by ESMA as not falling within scope, namely a non-paper[14], could reasonably be considered to fall within the scope of the complainant’s request. As this non-paper is also publicly available, the Ombudsman suggests that ESMA, in addition to the two above-mentioned documents, also provides the complainant with this document.

27. As regards the emails themselves, the inspection showed that some of them contain sensitive information, such as preliminary assessments of the UK replies to the EU’s questionnaires. The Ombudsman agrees with ESMA that their disclosure could undermine the protection of the EU’s international relations with the UK.

28. However, most of the identified emails are of an administrative nature (such as sharing attached or linked material ahead of a scheduled call) and do not, for the most part, reveal any substantive information.

29. During the meeting with the Ombudsman inquiry team, ESMA representatives argued that the disclosure of these emails would nevertheless reveal the degree of intensity of the exchanges between the Commission and ESMA, and that even the sequencing of its exchanges with the Commission could be considered sensitive as it reveals the order in which the assessments were done. ESMA also argued that the disclosure of these emails would not be meaningful for the complainant, as the documents linked or attached to them were either considered confidential or were not in the possession of ESMA. This is because they had been saved on an ICT platform hosted by the Commission, which is no longer in use, or were available on databases only accessible upon payment of a subscription.

30.  The Ombudsman notes that the complainant explicitly requested access to “any correspondence” ESMA had with the Commission on the topic of UK equivalence decisions and that these emails constitute this correspondence. (Partial) disclosure of the emails would at least enable the complainant to understand the nature of the exchanges, and the kind of documents which have been exchanged (even if the documents themselves are considered confidential and could not be disclosed, or are not held by ESMA). Furthermore, there are documents linked or attached to the emails which, as noted above, are publicly available.

31. It is also not clear to the Ombudsman how revealing the degree of intensity and the sequencing of the exchanges between ESMA and the Commission would harm the EU’s international relations with the UK. While the EU institutions enjoy a wide margin of discretion when deciding on what the protection of international relations calls for in terms of disclosure of documents, they are still required to demonstrate a ‘specific and actual risk’.

32. Having said that, the information shared in the course of this inquiry allows for a better understanding of the nature of the exchanges, and the kind of documents which have been exchanged. In view of this, the Ombudsman does not consider it justified to inquire further into ESMA’s refused access to the administrative emails it identified. The Ombudsman nevertheless encourages ESMA to provide the complainant with the widest possible access to these emails, and will make a suggestion to that effect.

33. Finally, the Ombudsman notes that ESMA, when refusing access, did not provide the complainant with a list of documents falling within the scope of her request, as it considered that it was under no legal obligation to provide a list and that such a list would have contained confidential information, whose disclosure would have undermined the public interest that needed to be protected.

34. The Ombudsman considers that it is a matter of good administration to provide applicants with a list of the documents identified as falling within the scope of a public access request, unless the very disclosure of the list undermines the interest(s) to be protected.[15] In those instances where a list cannot be provided, it is important that the documents are described in such a way as to enable the applicant to understand the number and nature of the documents at stake.

35. In this case, ESMA informed the complainant that the documents it identified were emails, originating from either the Commission or ESMA, relating to correspondence on three different topics. However, ESMA did not inform the complainant that some of the identified emails had attachments or linked documents, some of which ESMA considered to fall within the scope of the request. As a consequence, ESMA did not describe the nature of these linked or attached documents. While this has now been done in the course of the Ombudsman’s inquiry, the Ombudsman will make a suggestion as regards ESMA’s dealing with future public access to documents requests.

Conclusion

Based on the inquiry, the Ombudsman closes this case with the following conclusion:

The European Securities and Markets Authority’s refusal to give public access to the requested documents was overall reasonable.

The complainant and ESMA will be informed of this decision.

Suggestions for improvement

ESMA should provide the complainant with the three publicly available documents, which could be considered to fall within the scope of the complainant’s request.

ESMA should provide the complainant with the widest possible access to those identified emails, which are of an administrative nature. In doing so, ESMA could consider redacting any information it considers to be sensitive.

In dealing with future public access to documents requests, ESMA should ensure, in those instances where a list of identified documents cannot be provided, that the documents are described in such a way as to enable the applicant to understand the number and nature of the documents at stake.

 

[1] Under Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents, applicable to ESMA in accordance with its access to documents policy: https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2011_mb_69_uu_decision_on_access_to_documents_rules.pdf.

[2] In line with Article 6(2) of Regulation 1049/2001: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32001R1049.

[3] As it was available at the time of the request on ESMA’s website.

[4] Article 4(1)(a) third indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

[5] Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049/2001.

[6] The report of the meeting is available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/doc/inspection-report/en/171327

[7] See, among others, Case T-166/19, Bronckers v European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2020:557

[8] See, among others, Case C-266/05 P, Sison v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2007:75, para. 34

[9] See, among others, Case T-166/19, Bronckers v European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2020:557, para. 60.

[10] In line with Article 4(4) of Regulation 1049/2001.

[11] In line with Article 4(1)(a) third indent of Regulation 1049/2001.

[12] And sometimes between the Commission, ESMA, the European Central Bank, the Single Resolution Board and the European Banking Authority.

[13] ‘DG FISMA draft - MOU on EU UK regulatory cooperation in financial services’ and ‘Draft equivalence decision UK CCPs’.

[14] Non-paper from ISDA.

[15] In line with Case T-701/18, Campbell v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2020:224, para 44.