European Ombudsman
1. This case concerns the European Commission's handling of a complaint which relates to the exercise of the legal profession in Greece. The complaint was brought by a Greek national, who is a lawyer and a member of the Thessaloniki Bar Association.
2. The facts upon which the complaint is based are the following. On 15 July 2005, the complainant lodged two parallel complaints with the Greek Competition Authority ('GCA') and the European Commission. On 29 July 2005, he sent the Commission a summary of his complaint in English. In his complaints, the complainant expressed certain grievances about the Greek legislation in force at the time and about the practices of the 63 Greek Bar Associations.
3. Specifically, the complainant complained about a provision of Greek law that prohibited lawyers from appearing before any civil or administrative court outside the geographical confines of the Bar Association with which they were registered[1]. In order to circumvent that prohibition, Bar Associations across the country developed a practice by means of which any lawyer registered with a Bar Association other than the one which fell within the geographical confines of the court before which he or she wished to appear could do so if "legitimised" by a lawyer registered with that Bar Association. Although the local lawyer's involvement in the case was nominal, his representation fee had to be paid to the local Bar Association. In the complainant's view, this practice caused difficulties in the exercise of the profession, increased the cost for clients and, more importantly, infringed Greek competition law[2] and Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
4. In addition, the complainant complained about another provision of Greek law which precludes lawyers from representing clients in the drawing up and signature of contracts except at the seat of the Bar Association to which the lawyer belongs[3]. That prohibition knows no exceptions in practice.
5. In March 2006, having received no acknowledgement of receipt or information regarding the progress of his complaint from the GCA, the complainant brought proceedings against it before the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal[4]. The Greek Court annulled the GCA's tacit refusal to deal with the complaint but refused to either deal with the substance of the complaint or make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union. Following the Greek Court's decision, the GCA examined the complaint and, on 2 October 2008, announced its decision that it found no breach of Greek Competition law.
6. As regards his complaint to the Commission, the complainant received an acknowledgement of receipt and was informed of the complaint's registration number in July 2005[5]. However, he received no further correspondence from the Commission as regards that complaint.
7. On 27 February 2009, the complainant sent the Commission a letter in which he outlined the content of his complaint, attributed the lack of progress before the GCA to politically motivated considerations and claimed to be a victim of the reform of EU Competition law and the decentralisation of its enforcement[6].
8. By e-mail of 20 March 2009, the Commission informed the complainant that it took note of the complaint before the GCA and that it was looking into the matter with a view to responding to him in more detail.
9. On 21 September 2009, the Commission wrote to the complainant and thanked him for the information provided in his letter of 27 February 2009 and in a further letter of 15 September 2009. In its letter, the Commission identified two aspects of the complaint: (a) an infringement complaint against Greece concerning the infringement of Articles 10 and 81 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment by the Treaty of Lisbon, Articles 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and 101 TFEU); and (b) a complaint concerning a breach of EU Competition law by Greece's 63 Bar Associations. As regards aspect (a) above, the Commission informed the complainant that that part of the complaint had been forwarded to the Commission's Secretariat-General (SG) for registration and it provided the infringement complaint's reference number. With regard to aspect (b) above, the Commission informed the complainant that it had to comply with the legal requirements regarding the conduct of proceedings by the Commission in accordance with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU[7] but noted that, in accordance with Article 13 of Regulation 1/2003 and Article 9 of Regulation 773/2004, "the Commission does not in general treat cases that were dealt with by another competition authority and where it was concluded that no competition rules were violated."
10. On 19 October 2009, the complainant sought clarifications on (a) the relationship between the 2005 registration by DG Competition (DG COMP) and the 2009 registration by the SG, and (b) the respective roles of DG COMP and the SG at present and in future regarding the handling of his complaint ("who does what").
11. On 7 December 2009, the complainant expressed his dissatisfaction to the Commission for not having received a reply and set a deadline for it to reply "by next Thursday".
12. On 16 December 2009, the complainant lodged the present complaint with the European Ombudsman.
13. The Ombudsman opened an inquiry into the complainant's allegations concerning maladministration as follows.
(1) The Commission failed to provide clarification to the issues brought to its attention.
In support of this allegation the complainant argued that the Commission caused legal confusion as to whether it was dealing with his complaint as an infringement complaint, a competition complaint or both.
(2) The Commission delayed excessively in the handling of his complaint.
The complainant argued that since July 2005, he received no decision regarding his complaint and no information on whether it was being examined as a competition or an infringement complaint. He maintained that, in any event, the two complaint procedures and the corresponding complainant's rights are different. Consequently, the Commission's handling of the complaint put the complainant's rights at risk and infringed legal certainty.
The Commission should offer the clarifications requested and proceed with the examination of the complaint with no undue delay.
14. On 19 January 2010, the Ombudsman sent a request for an opinion to the Commission.
15. On 9 July 2010, the Commission sent its opinion which was forwarded to the complainant for observations. The complainant submitted his observations on 30 August 2010.
16. In its opinion, the Commission referred to Article 2(4) of the European Ombudsman's Statute[8] and argued that the complainant presented his submissions in July 2005 and made no administrative approach until February 2009. Since February 2009, the Commission actively handled the complaint.
17. While it did not make an express claim to this end, the Commission's reference to Article 2(4) of the European Ombudsman's Statute could be understood to raise the question of admissibility of the complaint to the Ombudsman on the ground that, in the Commission's view, it was made more than two years after the date on which the facts on which it is based came to the complainant's attention. In this regard, the Ombudsman considers it important to recall that whereas the complainant submitted his competition complaint and his infringement complaint to the Commission in July 2005, it was only in 2009 (and only after the complainant contacted the Commission again in February 2009), that the Commission provided information about its handling of these complaints. It is thus obvious that the period within which to bring a complaint before the Ombudsman could not have begun to run before 2009. The admissibility criteria set out in the Ombudsman's Statute are therefore met.
18. The complainant argued in support of his allegation that the Commission caused legal confusion as to whether it was dealing with the complaint as an infringement complaint, a competition complaint or both.
19. In its opinion, the Commission made the preliminary substantive remark that it handled both the competition complaint and the infringement complaint in a manner that fell within its margin of discretion.
20. It is on the basis of the above premise that the Commission responded to the allegation at hand. In this regard, the Commission explained the reasons for not registering the complainant's complaint as an infringement one. It argued that the complainant's letters of 15 and 29 July 2005 were heavily focused on the practices of the Greek Bar Associations in light of Greek and EU Competition law. It could only vaguely be deduced that the complainant also complained of an infringement by a Member State and that aspect was, in any event, unsubstantiated and not developed. Moreover, the possible Member State's infringement was referred to in a very subordinate part of the complainant's submissions under the heading "[s]ome other legal thoughts and arguments". The complainant first and foremost asked the GCA and the Commission's DG COMP to put forward legislative proposals that the Greek authorities should take into account in the legislative reform, which was ongoing at the time, so as to bring Greek legislation in line with EU law. It was only if the Ministry were to fail to take action that the Commission was to "initiate proceedings against Greece for infringement of Community law". Therefore, the Commission argued that the complainant made no direct request to it to launch infringement proceedings against Greece.
21. In view of this, the Commission did not register this aspect of the complainant's submissions as an infringement complaint. The Commission argued that this was considered to be in line with the Commission Communication on relations with the complainant in respect of infringements of Community law (hereafter, the '2002 Communication')[9]. The Commission went on to underline the discretion it enjoys in deciding whether "to act upon" an infringement complaint submitted to it.
22. Against this backdrop, the Commission stated that it did not register the complainant's submissions of 15 and 29 July 2005 as an infringement complaint. The Commission acknowledged that it omitted to inform the complainant of the non-registration and apologised for this omission. Due to the above omission, the complainant was not informed in 2005 that, if he wished to pursue the infringement complaint aspect of his letters, he should explain and substantiate his complaint with regard to competition law and consider substantiating it with regard to internal market law to enable the competent service of the Commission to assess it.
23. However, when, in his letter of 15 September 2009, the complainant reinforced and substantiated the Member State's infringement aspect "by submitting further information which he — in his own words — previously had omitted", and claimed an infringement of Articles 10 and 81 EC (now Article 4(3) TEU in conjunction with Article 101 TFEU), the Commission decided to register that correspondence as an infringement complaint and to inform the complainant of this.
24. As regards its handling of the competition complaint against the Greek Bar Associations, the Commission contended that the issue was whether the case was to be dealt with by DG COMP or by the GCA. It explained how the Commission and the National Competition Authorities ('NCAs') exercise their parallel competences according to Regulation 1/2003 and stated that "the complainant's submission did not appear to be a priority for the Commission to investigate insofar as the competent national authority in Greece was seized with the matter". In fact, the Commission also stated in another part of its opinion that there was at least a tacit understanding between the complainant and itself that the GCA would handle his complaint. Within the framework of the European Competition Network ('ECN'), DG COMP monitors the progress of cases investigated by NCAs on the basis of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and, in accordance with Article 11 of Regulation 1/2003, it may initiate proceedings itself and thereby end the competence of an NCA to deal with a given case. In the case at hand, the complainant came back to the Commission in February 2009. By letter dated 21 September 2009, DG COMP informed him that it did not intend to pursue the matter insofar as the competent Greek authorities had extensively investigated it.
25. Finally, the Commission acknowledged that it failed to reply to the complainant's letters of 19 October and 7 December 2009 and apologised for this omission. It argued that its failure to reply should be attributed to the fact that DG COMP was of the view that, in its letter of 21 September 2009, it had provided sufficient clarifications as to the relationship between the different aspects of the complainant's submissions and as to their further handling by the Commission.
26. In his observations, the complainant argued that the Commission's opinion was characterised by logical errors, contradictions, temporal leaps, misleading arguments and lack of sincerity. The complainant stated that in fact, if the Commission had been sincere, it would have reduced the length of its reply by half.
27. The complainant noted that the Commission acknowledged that DG COMP did not reply to his letters of 19 October and 7 December 2009 and that it apologised for this. Moreover, the Commission also acknowledged that it failed to inform him about its decision not to register his infringement complaint and to request additional information as regards that complaint. The Commission offered the complainant an apology for these omissions. However, it did not acknowledge the seriousness of its omission in 2005 to identify the competent authority to deal with his competition complaint. The complainant further argued that the Commission's above-mentioned apologies were in any event not genuine and stated that an apology does not suffice if the problem persists.
28. The complainant stressed that the complaint he had lodged in 2005 had a double target and was directed both at Greece and at the 63 Greek Bar Associations. He noted that, as regards infringement complaints against Member States, the Commission enjoys unfettered discretion under Article 258 TFEU. It does not, however, enjoy the same discretion when it comes to complaints from individuals in the field of competition law under Article 101 TFEU. The complainant argued that in the latter case, the Commission is obliged to take a decision without being bound by a deadline.
29. The complainant dismissed the Commission's argument that it was unclear whether the complaint was against the Bar Associations or Greece. In fact, the complainant protested about the Commission's view that the complaint focused mainly on the Bar Associations rather than the Member State. Furthermore, the complainant also rejected the Commission's contentions that he had "returned" to his complaint and "completed" it only in 2009. In this regard, he dismissed those contentions as unsuitable attempts "to bring the timer to zero and start counting again from 2009".
30. The complainant clarified that his complaint was both against the Bar Associations and Greece; that it was a single and indivisible complaint with no aspect of the complaint having preponderance over the other; that he did not "return" to his complaint in 2009 but that the complaint had been pending since 2005 and the Commission did nothing about it; that the supplementary information provided in his first letter of 2009 did not relate to competition law issues and could not therefore be characterised as "completing" the complaint.
31. As regards the Commission's argument that the part of the complaint against the Member State was too vague and unsubstantiated to be registered as an infringement complaint, the complainant argued that this was self-contradictory. Following the opening of the present inquiry by the Ombudsman, the Commission proved capable to proceed to a legal analysis of the complaint while it claimed to have been incapable of doing so before[10]. The complainant explained that his complaint against Greece was brief because he was aware of the Commission's discretion under Article 258 TFEU and of the fact that he would not be in a position to press it to launch an infringement procedure. A more detailed analysis would change neither the Commission's legal position nor his own procedural rights. It was clear, however, that his grievance concerned Article 44 of the Greek Lawyers' Code to which the Commission referred twice in its opinion.
32. In any event, the complainant argued that, if the Commission did consider that the infringement complaint was vague, it should have informed him accordingly in 2005. However, it did not do so, nor did it request additional information. In the complainant's view, the obvious conclusion was that the Commission did not deal with the infringement complaint at all.
33. Moreover, the Commission failed to explain the reasons for not having dealt with the competition complaint against the Bar Associations. The ground put forward in its opinion for its inaction was that there were proceedings pending before the GCA. The complainant argued that this demonstrated that the Commission did not cooperate with the GCA because, had it contacted the GCA, it would have been told that the latter was not dealing with the matter. In fact, because of the GCA's failure to register his complaint, the complainant brought a case against the GCA before the Greek administrative courts.
34. The complainant also criticised the manner in which the Commission used his letters of 27 February and 20 March 2009 in its reasoning. Instead of acknowledging that the objective of those letters was to help it, the Commission took advantage of the content of those letters to state that they contained information which the complainant had previously omitted.
35. Furthermore, the complainant contended that the Commission's argument that his infringement complaint was subject to the condition that the Greek Ministry of Justice failed to take action on the matter was legally pointless. He pointed out that the Commission is an independent EU institution which enjoys wide discretion in the handling of infringement complaints. Therefore, an individual complainant may not attach any conditions to his or her complaint.
36. As regards the Commission's argument that the complainant did not contact it and only "returned" to his complaint in February 2009, the complainant argued that this was implausible and misleading, given that the Commission was legally obliged to take the initiative in the procedure in question. In July 2005, the complainant obtained a registration number from DG COMP which led him to infer that the Commission was handling his competition complaint. In any event, the complainant presumed that never, in the course of all these years, did DG COMP and the GCA contact one another.
37. The Ombudsman is called upon to assess whether the Commission provided clarifications on its handling of the complainant's complaint. The Ombudsman recalls that the complaint contains both a competition complaint against the Greek Bar Associations and an infringement complaint against Greece concerning competition and internal market law.
38. Beginning with the competition complaint, the Commission's principal argument is that the GCA was dealing with it and that it was therefore not necessary for the Commission to examine it.
39. The Ombudsman notes that, in accordance with the relevant applicable rules, the Commission may reject a complaint when an NCA is dealing or has dealt with it[11]. However, the complainant has put forward evidence to show that the GCA initially refrained from examining his competition complaint and only proceeded to examine it after he had successfully appealed against that refusal to a Greek court. The Commission did not dispute the complainant's statements. It is therefore difficult to see how the Commission could, in 2005, justify its decision not to deal with the complainant's competition complaint by reference to an examination carried out by the GCA. It is true that the Commission has argued that there was a "tacit understanding" between itself and the complainant to the effect that the GCA would deal with the latter's competition complaint or that the complainant had even withdrawn the competition complaint he had submitted to the Commission. However, the complainant has strongly objected to these suggestions, and the Commission has not put forward any evidence to show that such an understanding did indeed exist or that the complainant did withdraw his complaint.
40. In any event, the Ombudsman cannot but note that the Commission never informed the complainant about its decision not to deal with is competition complaint before the complainant contacted it again in 2009. This constitutes a manifest failure to comply with basic principles of good administration.
41. Next, as regards the handling of the infringement complaint, the Ombudsman notes that the Commission's arguments in support of its decision not to register and investigate this complaint can be summarised as follows: (a) the infringement aspect of the complainant's submissions was only secondary to the competition complaint; (b) the complaint was vague and unsubstantiated; (c) the complainant showed no active interest in the complaint from 2005 to 2009; and (d) the complaint was conditional on the Greek Ministry of Justice not addressing the issue in the legislative reform which was ongoing at the time.
42. The Commission's conduct should be examined with reference to the rules and procedures established in the Communication on relations with the complainant in respect of infringements of Community law which the Commission published in 2002 (the '2002 Communication')[12] and which aims to establish a clear and transparent framework for the handling of infringement complaints. It should be noted that the Commission made reference to the 2002 Communication in its opinion.
43. In this regard, the Ombudsman emphasises that the registration of an infringement complaint is a basic procedural step. Its aim, among other things, is to ensure that such complaints are handled in accordance with the rules in the 2002 Communication. In support of its decision not to register the infringement complaint in question, the Commission did not invoke any of the specific exceptions set out in point 3 of the 2002 Communication[13].
44. In any event, the Commission was clearly duty-bound to inform the complainant, in 2005, of its decision not to deal with his infringement complaint and of the reasons for this decision. The Ombudsman cannot but note that the Commission only informed the complainant about its decision not to deal with is competition complaint when the complainant contacted it again in 2009. This constitutes a further manifest failure to comply with basic principles of good administration.
45. It should be noted that the Commission apologised for its failure to inform the complainant of its decision not to register his infringement complaint. The complainant did not consider this apology to be satisfactory or genuine.
46. The Ombudsman takes the view that where maladministration has occurred but the institution concerned has subsequently apologised and taken appropriate remedial action, there is normally no need for further action on his part. He considers, however, that, as a minimum, an apology can only be considered satisfactory if the administration unequivocally admits that it has made a mistake[14]. The Ombudsman is not convinced that this occurred in the case at hand. In fact, it should be noted that the apology offered by the Commission concerns merely one aspect of the case, that is, its failure to inform the complainant about its decision not to register the complaint. No apology whatsoever was offered for the Commission's failure to inform the complainant about its decision not to examine his competition complaint. Instead, the Commission even tried to invoke an alleged "tacit understanding" with the complainant. The Ombudsman therefore takes the view that the Commission's apology was not sufficient in the circumstances. He will therefore make a critical remark below.
47. In order to avoid possible misunderstandings, the Ombudsman considers it useful to stress that his conclusions set out above concern the Commission's conduct prior to February 2009. As regards the subsequent period, the Ombudsman takes the view that the Commission has provided satisfactory explanations as to how it handled the competition complaint and the infringement complaint submitted by the complainant.
48. The complainant argued that since July 2005, he received no decision regarding his complaints and that the Commission's delay put his rights at risk and infringed legal certainty.
49. The Commission expressed the opinion that it did not excessively delay the handling of the two complaints submitted by the complainant.
50. As regards the complainant's competition complaint, the Commission argued that there had been "at least a tacit understanding between the complainant and DG COMP after July 2005 that the GCA would handle his antitrust submission and that the Commission would not act on it, given that the case was actively being looked into by the competent Greek authorities." The Commission stated that it was therefore entitled to assume that the complainant had withdrawn the competition complaint he had lodged with the Commission. In its view, therefore, it could not be argued that in 2005 or at any time between July 2005 and February 2009 DG COMP delayed the handling of the competition complaint.
51. The Commission further argued that, in his letter dated 15 September 2009, the complainant admitted, also with regard to his competition complaint, that some information was "omitted in the first letter". It contended that the complainant's statement clearly indicated that the information contained in his submissions presented in 2005 was incomplete. According to the Commission, it was for this reason that DG COMP had been unable to define its position earlier.
52. As regards the infringement complaint, the Commission reiterated the arguments that it had already put forward in its reply to the first allegation. The Commission concluded that the complainant's allegation of excessive delay was therefore unfounded.
53. In his observations, the complainant expressed his dissatisfaction with the Commission's position. In particular, he strongly protested against the Commission's argument that there had been a "tacit understanding" pursuant to which the Commission would not handle his competition complaint. The complainant added that he considered the Commission's argument that it "had the right to assume that the complainant [had] withdrawn" his competition complaint to the Commission provocative.
54. The Ombudsman recalls that the right of every person to have his affairs handled within a reasonable time constitutes a constituent element of the right to good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union[15].
55. The Ombudsman considers that his assessment on this issue can be brief. It has already been shown that the Commission committed a serious instance of maladministration by omitting to inform the complainant in good time that it did not intend to examine either his infringement complaint or his competition complaint. As a result of this omission, these complaints were only considered in earnest by the Commission after the complainant turned to it again in 2009. The Commission cannot therefore seriously dispute that its approach led to a serious delay in the handling of these two complaints.
56. None of the arguments submitted by the Commission in defence of its position are convincing. Even if one were to assume that the information contained both in the infringement complaint and in the competition complaint submitted by the complainant was not sufficient to allow the Commission to examine the issues he had raised, the Commission had the possibility simply to draw the complainant's attention to this fact and thus to invite him to provide the missing information. The Commission's argument that it felt entitled to assume that the complainant had withdrawn his competition complaint is simply astonishing, as the Commission has not put forward any element on which such a conclusion could have been based.
57. It is true that the complainant only inquired about the state of things in early 2009. However, the Commission cannot use this fact in order to exonerate itself from its responsibility properly and speedily to handle complaints.
58. In view of the above, the Ombudsman concludes that the approach adopted by the Commission in the present case led to a serious delay in its handling of the complaint lodged by the complainant. This constitutes a further instance of maladministration. A critical remark will be made in this context below.
59. In its opinion, the Commission argued that it offered all the required clarifications about the manner in which it handled the complainant's complaint from his first submissions presented on 15 July 2005 to date.
60. With regard to the complainant's claim that it should proceed with the examination of his complaint without delay, the Commission stated that it had already done so. In its letter of 21 September 2009, DG COMP provided sufficient clarifications concerning the competition complaint against the Greek Bar Associations. Concerning the infringement complaint, the Commission proceeded to register the complaint with the SG and to examine it actively.
61. In his observations, the complainant expressed his disagreement with the Commission's substantive assessment of its conduct. However, he did not call into doubt the above steps taken by the Commission.
62. In the context of the examination of the first allegation, the Ombudsman found that as regards the period since February 2009, the Commission provided clarifications about the manner in which it handled the complaint. Therefore, no further inquiries are necessary concerning the first part of the complainant's claim.
63. As regards the second part of the complainant's claim, it transpires from the information available to the Ombudsman that by letter dated 21 September 2009, the Commission informed the complainant of its position as regards the competition complaint. The approach adopted in this letter appears to be reasonable. Furthermore, the complainant informed the Ombudsman that the Commission carried out a substantive examination of his infringement complaint and sent him a pre-closure letter on 29 March 2010 on which he made observations. In the absence of prima facie maladministration as regards the substance of that examination, the Ombudsman considers that it is not necessary to carry out further inquiries into the second part of the complainant's claim.
On the basis of his inquiry into this complaint, the Ombudsman closes it with the following conclusions:
1) It is good administrative practice to inform citizens in good time about the assessment of any complaints they may submit. In 2005, the complainant submitted a complaint to the Commission. The first aspect of that complaint concerned an alleged infringement of EU law by Greece, whereas the second aspect concerned an allegedly anti-competitive practice. The Commission took the view that it did not need to address the substance of the complaint. However, the complainant was only informed of this more than four years later, when he inquired about his complaint. This failure to inform the complainant constitutes a serious instance of maladministration.
2) It is good administrative practice to handle complaints as rapidly as possible. The above-mentioned omission on the part of the Commission resulted in a serious delay in the assessment of the complainant's complaint. This constitutes a further instance of maladministration by the Commission.
No further inquiries are necessary as regards the complainant's claim.
The complainant and the Commission will be informed of this decision.
P. Nikiforos Diamandouros
Done in Strasbourg on 28 March 2012
[1] Article 44 of Legislative Decree 3026/1954 (The Lawyers' Code). This provision was amended by Article 5(1) of Law 3919/2011, which removed the said prohibition.
[2] Article 1 of Law 703/1977.
[3] Article 42 of Legislative Decree 3026/1954 (The Lawyers' Code).
[4] In fact, the complainant was not allowed to represent himself in that case because he is not registered with the Athens Bar Association.
[5] Complaint 19.07.05/ -A07404.
[6] See Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L1, p. 1.
[7] Article 5 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ 2004 L123, p. 18.
[8] "A complaint shall be made within two years of the date on which the facts on which it is based came to the attention of the person lodging the complaint and must be preceded by the appropriate administrative approaches to the institutions and bodies concerned", available at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/resources/statute.faces#hl7
[9] Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the European Ombudsman on relations with the complainant in respect of infringements of Community law, COM(2002) 141 final, OJ 2002 C 244, p. 3.
[10] The Commission carried out an examination of the infringement complaint and sent the complainant a pre-closure letter on 29 March 2010. The complainant submitted his observations on the Commission's pre-closure letter on 27 April 2010.
[11] Article 13(1) of Regulation 1/2003 provides:
"Where competition authorities of two or more Member States have received a complaint or are acting on their own initiative under Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty against the same agreement, decision of an association or practice, the fact that one authority is dealing with the case shall be sufficient grounds for the others to suspend the proceedings before them or to reject the complaint. The Commission may likewise reject a complaint on the ground that a competition authority of a Member State is dealing with the case."
Article 9 of Commission Regulation 773/2004 provides:
"Where the Commission rejects a complaint pursuant to Article 13 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, it shall inform the complainant without delay of the national competition authority which is dealing or has already dealt with the case."
[12] Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the European Ombudsman on relations with the complainant in respect of infringements of Community law, COM(2002) 141 final, OJ 2002 C 244, p. 3.
[13] In the context of the Ombudsman's own-initiative inquiry OI/3/2009/MHZ, the Ombudsman welcomed the Commission's statement that only the six exceptions referred to in the first paragraph of point 3 of the 2002 Communication are binding. See, Decision of the European Ombudsman closing his own-initiative inquiry OI/3/2009/MHZ concerning the European Commission, paragraph 44.
[14] See Decision of the European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 1059/2008/(WP)VL against the European Commission, paragraph 36.
[15] "Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union."
